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ABSTRACT 
 
Hollie Mann: Politics, Human Flourishing, and Bodily Knowing: 
A Critical Theory of Embodied Care 
(Under the direction of Susan Bickford and Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
 
This project investigates the relationship between human flourishing, politics and care. I 
consider how politics can stifle or foster citizens‟ potential to attain and practice the 
virtue of care and why this matters for politics. In this work, I make three principal 
contributions to our study of care: First, we must begin to see care as more than a means 
to other ends. Care not only helps us achieve political ends like autonomy, justice, and 
equality, but it is also an activity that should be done for its own sake. Second, the best 
citizen is a caring one, a claim that contrasts deeply with conventional understandings of 
citizenship, both ancient and modern. Others have articulated care‟s importance to 
democratic citizenship, but what we need now is a more capacious understanding of what 
it takes to create a caring subject and what political work is required to sustain citizens‟ 
practices of care. This requires reimagining ourselves, as well as thinking through the 
civic structures, institutions, and policies that are most compatible with an understanding 
of a caring self. Third, my conception of care as an embodied practice illuminates the 
relationship between bodies, inequality, and carework. I consider how a particular kind of 
embodied politics can activate and sustain an ethic that cultivates citizens‟ capacities and 
desires to care.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
CARING AND THE WORK OF POLITICS 
 
I. CONNECTING CARE TO POLITICS 
The United States now confronts what Ruth Rosen in a 2007 article in “The 
Nation” called the care crisis, characterized primarily by a societal failure to adequately 
restructure the workplace and family life following women‟s mass entrance into the paid 
workforce so that the caring needs of individuals and families continue to be met.1 The 
current congressional stalemate over how to address major failures in the health care 
system is only one manifestation of a much larger failure to make care a political priority. 
Today, most families are dual-earner households, wherein both adults work, usually full-
time, outside of the home, which means that there is no longer a full-time, unpaid 
caregiver in the home.
2
 With rising costs in childcare and elder care, families often 
struggle to find adequate and affordable care for children and, increasingly, for aging 
parents. Often, the work of finding, managing, and performing care continues to fall to 
women, even though they, too, have full time jobs.
3
 And when arrangements can be made 
                                                     
1 Ruth Rosen, "The Care Crisis," The Nation, March 12, 2007 2007, 135. 
 
2 Janet C. Gornick and Marcia Meyers, Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood 
and Employment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003), Arlie Russell Hochschild, The 
Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work, 2nd Owl Books ed. (New 
York: H. Holt, 2001). 
 
3 Sharon Hays, Flat Broke with Children: Women in the Age of Welfare Reform (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Arlie Russell Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second 
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for the care of dependents during work hours, families must still figure out how to meet 
the often overwhelming caregiving needs for family members during those times when 
one or both earners are not at work.  
Although men have increased their participation in housework and caregiving 
responsibilities over the past decade, it is still the case that women, on average, manage 
and perform the bulk of this work in the home.
4
 This means that the “burden” of care is 
not equally distributed across both genders in heterosexual dual-income households; even 
when care is outsourced so that both adults can work, men are much more likely to be 
“off the hook” for caregiving activity in the home, while women only during work hours 
and sometimes not even then. Single mothers are, not surprisingly, most vulnerable to the 
consequences of the care crises, since they very often have no extra help and are in low-
paying jobs that make meeting the costs of childcare extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. Middle- and working-class families, as well as single-parents, most often end 
up having to patch together a combination of caregiving arrangements, which include 
paid childcare or eldercare and assistance from friends and families, while the working 
poor can sometimes gain access to federal or state programs, though many of these 
support services are certainly at risk of being diminished or disappearing altogether in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Shift (New York: Penguin Books, 2003). For a good overview of the rising costs of child care in 
the United States, see Stephanie Armour, "High Costs of Child Care Can Lead to Lifestyle 
Changes, Adjustments," April 18, 2006. 
 
4 Suzanne M. Bianchi, John P. Robinson, and Melissa A. Milkie, Changing Rhythms of American 
Family Life (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 2007), Ellen Galinsky, Kerstin Aumann, and 
James T. Bond, "Times Are Changing: Gender and Generation at Work and at Home,"  (Families 
and Work Institute, 2008). 
 
 3 
recent economic downturn.
5
 Rosen writes that, “women who work in the low-wage 
service sector, without adequate sick leave, generally lose their jobs when children or 
parents require urgent attention. As of 2005, 21 million women lived below the poverty 
line—many of them mothers working in these vulnerable situations.”6 Further, it is far 
from clear that President Obama‟s recent proposal for middle-class tax benefits, which 
would increase public support for child care, elder care, and retirement (thinking about 
elder care in advance), will either come to fruition or, if they do, provide much relief to 
the working poor and those most afflicted by the absence of public care or even the 
publicly shared value of care in this country. 
One common assumption, which Rosen seems to share, is that the upper-class and 
very wealthy do not suffer the consequences of the care crisis and that this perhaps 
contributes to a lack of political will to address the problems that result from it.
7
 These 
families are not as vulnerable to the “burden of family care,” to use Nancy Folbre‟s 
phrase in a recent NY Times article on the need for a Dependent Price Index to measure 
the costs of caring for dependents, because they are typically able to absorb the costs and 
employ full-time nannies or at-home caregivers, very often from developing countries, to 
meet their caregiving needs.
8
 Yet, at the same time, job loss and the need to be more 
flexible and mobile for work opportunities has meant that more workers in all socio-
                                                     
5 Jason DeParle, "For Victims of Recession,  Patchwork State Aid," New York Times, May 9, 
2009, Paula Span, "Adult Day-Care Centers Worry About Funding," The Washington Post, 
December 1, 2009.  
 
6 Rosen, "The Care Crisis." 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Nancy Folbre, "How Much Do We Spend Caring for Family?," New York Times, February 1, 
2010. 
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economic brackets are taking jobs that may not be nearby, which often leads to new care-
related challenges in the home. Although women are less likely to experience job loss in 
the current economy, it is not clear that the exit of men from the labor market across all 
classes is resulting in a decrease of time spent on housework and care for women. In any 
case, it is certainly true that the wealthy are able to secure care more easily than the 
middle-class and the poor, and so, in one way, are less likely to feel the worst of the 
strain put on work/family arrangements as a result of the collective failure to make care a 
political priority. However, I want to suggest that even the wealthy are victims of the care 
crisis in this country, but not because they lack the financial means to pay for costly care 
services. Rather, to the extent that any individual is either denied opportunities to give 
care or is encouraged to choose not to do so as a norm, then they miss out on an 
incredibly valuable aspect of human existence.  
One of the core themes of this dissertation is that care is an activity that is 
constitutive of human flourishing; in other words, although it has instrumental value and 
certainly is a form of paid and unpaid labor, I argue that caregiving is also an activity that 
when practiced in the right way and under the right political and social condtions is a 
mode of self-actualization and excellence that is distinctly human. Although almost all 
care theorists believe that care has value of some sort, either because of its benefits to 
society and to those who receive care or because it is work that citizens have a duty to 
perform, this emphasis on the value of practicing care because doing so makes us more 
excellent creatures represents a very different way to think about care.  
Up until now, the ethics of care literature has basically developed along two 
dominant trajectories. The first focuses on the dependency side of care, specifically, the 
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philosophical, moral, and political problems that arise from shared conceptions of the self 
that do not admit of weakness and vulnerability.
9
 This work is characterized by critiques 
of traditional liberal conceptions of personhood and the political principles that very often 
derive from such accounts, as well as by efforts to make connections between healthy 
societies and care. The liberal self at the core of most political theory, the argument goes, 
is autonomous, disembodied, and atomistic; critics have responded to this by suggesting 
that this account of personhood barely reflect reality and has dangerous consequences for 
the most vulnerable in society—i.e. children, the elderly, the disabled, caregivers; they 
further argue that rational, autonomous, and independent persons, which we can say exist 
only in a very qualified and particular sense, are the product of a great deal of care and 
social reproductive labor that very often goes ignored by liberal political theorists and 
practioners, yet is extremely valuable for creating the political world in which we live.   
A second approach to the study of care intersects with social welfare state 
scholarship and centers primarily on work/family issues.
10
 Specifically, these scholars are 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Annette Baier, "The Need for More Than Care," in Justice and Care, ed. 
Virginia Held (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), Ruth E. Groenhout, Connected Lives: Human 
Nature and an Ethics of Care (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), Virginia 
Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, Women in Culture and 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on 
Women, Equality, and Dependency, Thinking Gender (New York: Routledge, 1999), Martha C. 
Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning," in Feminist Interpretations of 
Aristotle, ed. Cynthia Freedland (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1998), Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Future of Feminist Liberalism," in The Subject of Care: 
Feminist Perspectives on Dependecy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political 
Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1994).  
 
10 For examples of this approach, see Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (New 
York: The New Press, 2004), Nancy Folbre, The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values 
(New York: New Press, 2001), Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on The 
"Postsocialist" Condition (New York: Routlege, 1997), Gornick and Meyers, Families That 
Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Robin West, "The Right to Care," 
in The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, ed. Ellen K. Feder Eva Feder 
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interested in the relationship between care and gender inequality in the home and the 
workforce. Work that falls along this trajectory tends to focus on the obligations the state 
has to provide support to caregivers such that they are not unfairly burdened by care 
responsibilities. Often scholars in this camp are concerned to make arguments about the 
rights of citizens to give and to receive care, the state‟s role in ensuring gender equity in 
the home and the labor market with respect to care, and, in general, how to fairly 
distribute both the burden of carework and the resource of care among the population. 
There is obviously some overlap between these two areas of research in the ethics of care 
literature. The connections are fairly obvious: It is women who continue to be associated, 
ironically, with both dependency and care of dependents and because care is an activity 
that is not highly valued in the labor market and in the home, it is most often assigned to 
the least powerful in society; this has historically been women and, increasingly, we see 
women and men of color, specifically, immigrant workers, taking on a range of 
caregiving jobs for those who can afford the rising costs of privatized care.
11
  
This project is not so much of a critique of these approaches as it is an attempt to 
encourage a new way of thinking about why care is valuable and, perhaps more 
importantly, precisely how the crisis of care we now face constitutes a political question 
that demands a political response. Simply finding a more equitable and just way to 
compensate and value the work that “caregivers” do or to fairly distribute the “burden” of 
care across both genders, which I take to an important and fundamental aim of many care 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kittay (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), Julie Anne White, Democracy, Justice, and the 
Welfare State: Reconstructing Public Care (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2000).  
 
11 Of course, we pay lip service to the domestic work and nurturing labor that women often 
perform in the home, but it‟s surely the case that if we placed a high premium on this work it 
would likely be paid and or men would be eager not reluctant to do it. 
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theorists, does not address the deeper issue of care‟s potential to enrich our lives; indeed, 
if the outsourcing of care is a norm that can be carried out in ways that are agreeable to 
consumers and careworkers alike, or if both genders are opting out of performing care at 
equal rates, or if we decide to rely more and more on robotic technology to perform 
caregiving tasks, as is happening in countries like Japan and Germany, then these 
“solutions” may bypass the question of caregiving and human flourishing altogether and 
we will be the worse off for it. 
The centrality of care to ethical and political life has been largely ignored in 
Western political theory. Theorists of care have responded to the failure to adequately 
theorize care by calling our attention to the ethical and political implications of its 
necessity, which they argue follows from facts of human dependence and vulnerability. 
Though these theorists have highlighted the political and moral dangers that arise when 
we dismiss or deny care‟s significance, they have not gone far enough. My work offers 
three important theoretical revisions to our study of care. First, we must begin to see care 
as more than a means to other ends—ends like autonomy, justice, and equality. While 
caregiving enables the achievement of these ends, it must also be valued for its own sake. 
On my account, it is not only constitutive of just political communities and so should be 
pursued with that aim in my mind, but it is also a practice that is itself constitutive of 
individual human flourishing. Second, we must reimagine that the best citizen is a caring 
one, a claim that contrasts deeply with conventional understandings of citizenship, both 
ancient and modern. Others have certainly articulated care‟s importance to democratic 
citizenship, but what we need now is a more capacious understanding of what it takes to 
create a caring subject and what political work is required to sustain citizens‟ practices of 
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care. This work requires thinking through the civic structures, institutions, and policies 
that are most compatible with an understanding of a caring self. Third, we must recover 
an understanding of care as an embodied practice and elucidate the relationship between 
bodies, inequality, and carework. I consider how a particular kind of embodied politics 
can activate and sustain an ethic that cultivates citizens‟ capacities and desires to care. 
More broadly, this work investigates the relationship between politics (and practices of 
care. 
Joan Tronto was one of the first feminists to make an argument that care is a 
political good and, by way of engagement with Scottish enlightenment thinkers, an 
activity that is deeply integral to modern democratic citizenship.
12
 She offers an 
illuminating and expansive definition of care: “Care is a species activity that includes 
everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it 
as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all 
of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.”13 Tronto has 
significantly enriched theoretical discussions of care by conceiving of it a political good 
that everyone needs and is entitled to, rather than a mere personal choice or a form of 
charity. In particular, she has demonstrated the dangers of viewing care as a “feminine 
morality,” dispelling the myth that care is a moral disposition associated only with 
women and the household, and thus irrelevant to civic life.
14
 Tronto makes her case 
largely on the grounds that individuals require care for survival and that a healthy society 
                                                     
12 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
 
13 Ibid. 103 
 
14 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), Nel Noddings, Caring, a Feminine 
Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
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is one that cares for its citizens throughout the life-course. She further argues that one‟s 
ability to not simply care about others but to also actively take care of other human 
beings is a requisite skill for good citizenship. This view is absolutely correct, yet it fails 
to capture something of perhaps even greater political importance where care is 
concerned: Caregiving is more than something we need others to do for us in order to 
survive or something we must do for others out of a sense of obligation and reciprocity. 
Care is an activity that, when practiced in the right way and for the right reasons, and 
totally independent of the outcomes, makes us more excellent creatures than we would 
otherwise have been. For this reason, too, democratic polities have a responsibility to not 
only ensure that all citizens receive care, but also to secure opportunities for citizens to 
choose to give care to their fellows. Further, political communities must cultivate the 
necessary conditions that facilitate citizens actually practicing care without the risk of 
becoming economically or otherwise vulnerable.  
We lack a normative argument that helps us to see caregiving as itself constitutive 
of a good life and why, on precisely these grounds, it is relevant to democratic 
citizenship. We also need a better understanding of the body‟s role in the practice of care 
and what it might mean to look to the work of politics to generate more caring 
dispositions and habits on the part of citizens.
15
 I enter the debate here: Against the view 
that care is merely instrumental to the continuation of biological and social life, I advance 
the deeper claim that care is something we should take up for its own sake precisely 
because we are at our best when we care for those with whom we construct and sustain 
                                                     
15 It will become clearer throughout the dissertation what, specifically, I mean by “work of 
politics,” but generally I refer to the role of formal political institutions, structures, and policies, 
as well as more individualized techniques of the self, projects of creative self-fashioning that, 
following Foucault, reflect a conversion of power—a political process—that constitutes work on 
oneself.  
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our political and moral life. This is the underlying ethical claim shaping my dissertation 
and I believe it has great significance for how we structure our political world.  
 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING CARE 
Virtue 
 Care ethics is similar to virtue ethics in so far as it assumes some picture of the 
good life and upholds the idea that having certain feelings and attitudes about others, like 
generosity, concern, and thoughtfulness, as well as acting in particular kinds of ways, are 
either in the service of that good life or in the service of some other, less ideal, life. If one 
has the intentions to care, a caring attitude, and caregiving habits, we say that one 
possesses the virtue of care, and that the possession of this virtue means that you are, at 
least in some way, attempting to live a good life. This virtue dimension of care has 
relevance for politics in a few ways. First, the virtue ethics view of care takes care to be 
inherently valuable because it presupposes a notion of the good life that cannot be lived 
outside of a certain kind of polity that sets some values and activities above others. 
Second, it redirects the ethical focus to one‟s motivations and precludes a 
consequentialist view of care wherein our moral evaluation is based on the consequences 
of an action rather than the spirit with which that action was undertaken. In other words, 
it allows us to evaluate whether someone behaves morally, that is, whether someone is 
other-regarding and caring, rather than simply efficient and competent at meeting caring 
needs; “results” are only one way of determine the quality of care. A good polity, then, 
will work to cultivate the right kinds of desires and preferences in citizens, desires and 
preferences which align with care as a value set over and above other values, like self-
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interest or self-sufficiency. Third, conceptualizing care as a virtue allows us to retain 
some degree of agency and focus on individuals‟ ability to be, at least sometimes, 
something of their own making without totally abandoning the importance of relationality 
and community. Although, according to Aristotle, the virtues are not natural but arise in 
us once we have received the proper education and been “habituated” within larger 
structures, institutions, and processes, it is nevertheless the case that individuals possess 
the capacity to push back against those forces; that is, to be agents in the world and to 
make judgments as potential or actual caregivers. The ability to make judgments, often 
for the well being of another who cannot judge for himself, is another important feature 
of care. To care means to be attentive to others‟ needs and to make a judgment about how 
to respond. To perform an act of care without the proper feelings and motivations, or do 
to something that inadvertently has the effect of care for another, cannot be properly 
counted as owing to a caring disposition. If a young man, to impress his date, stops to 
help an elderly woman cross a busy intersection with her bag of groceries when he would 
normally not even notice such a situation, we would not say that this act is evidence that 
he is a truly caring person; instead, we would say only that he did a good thing in helping 
the woman cross the street. In other words, involuntarily performing a caring action or 
voluntarily taking up an act of care with less than caring motivations is, if we follow 
Aristotle, simply not care. Virtue ethics helps us to keep the distinction between actions 
that look like care and actions that really are care in view. For these reasons, it is 
sometimes useful to think about care as a virtue. 
 
 
 12 
Practice 
 Care also involves a doing. Joan Tronto has labeled the first phase of care caring 
about someone or some thing. Despite the positive connotations this has for many, she 
has suggested that this is actually a less ideal mode of “caring” because it doesn‟t involve 
the “direct meeting of needs for care” and often does not entail the ongoing effort and 
attention that caregiving does.
16
 Nevertheless, caring about is an important requisite for 
care because “it involves noting the existence of a need and making an assessment that 
this need should be met.”17 Yet we need much more than a feeling of care in a healthy 
polity. We need for those about whom we care to be cared for. In other words, we 
ultimately need care to be lived out in our daily lives, to be something that is done not 
something merely felt—the “grunt work,” if you will. This is also what I take Virginia 
Held to mean when she argues that care is both a virtue and a practice.
18
 She writes: 
As a practice, [care] shows us how to respond to needs and why we should. It 
builds trust and mutual concern and connectedness between persons. It is not a 
series of individual actions, but a practice that develops, along with its appropriate 
attitudes. It has attributes and standards that can be described, but more important 
that can be recommended and that should be continually improved as adequate 
care comes closers to being good care.
19
 
 
I accept this view of care as a practice and its necessary emphasis on the caring relation. 
Ultimately, Held argues that although caring may be thought of as a kind virtue, virtue 
ethics is incompatible with care ethics because it is too individualist and obscures the 
                                                     
16 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 104-5.  
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford University Press,  
2005). 
 
19 Ibid.  
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interdependence and relationality that theorists of care take to be fundamental to human 
flourishing.  
Any virtue ethic that does not elucidate the ways in which virtue ethics might 
derive form care ethics (so, not always the other way around) and the centrality of the 
caring relation to the formation of ethical subjects should be rejected.
20
 Yet I think 
conceiving of care as both a virtue and a practice is absolutely coherent. We might give 
two possible responses that call into question Held‟s claims about the necessity of 
elucidating caring relationships and ultimately rejecting insight from virtue ethics: First, 
she moves too quickly to reject all variations of virtue ethics and is guilty of dismissing at 
the start some forms of virtue ethics, in particular, the Aristotelian sort that Held singles 
out. This is odd, since Aristotle is such a rich resource for giving an account of the ways 
in which our relationships with others work to cultivate and sustain the good in us, and 
the way that our own “goodness”—or the virtues we possess—nourish and sustain the 
same in others. Friendship is relevant here, but also the fact that Aristotle believes, as do 
most virtue ethicists, that we cannot practice the virtues outside of intimate and thick 
relationships with others, and the most valuable friendships for Aristotle, of course, are 
ends in themselves. And we also must rely on others to teach us the virtues, both through 
moral and intellectual education when we are children and in our experiences with the 
political structures, laws, and systems, all of which are constructed by a wider 
community, in adulthood.  
The second response cautions against a tendency in care ethics to privilege caring 
relationships and communities at the expense of gaining a better understanding of the 
                                                     
20 See also, Maureen Sander-Staudt, "The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics," 
Hypatia 21, no. 4 (2006). 
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specific techniques and behaviors of those who do the work of caring. Even if we grant 
that virtue ethics is too narrowly focused on individuals‟ motives and attitudes and that an 
ethic of care ought to gives primacy to practice in the context of relationality, care ethics 
must still probe important questions related to what constitutes a caring disposition and 
what it means for one to practice care. In other words, care ethics should call our 
attention to how a subject embodies care and it should make vivid what it means for 
individuals to do the work of care, even as they very often do this work in community. I 
view such a project as central to the critical component of care ethics, that is, to an 
examination of the social and political contexts in which care plays out, and to the 
normative piece of care ethics, that is, to the moral argument that care is a politically and 
ethically valuable activity and should be widely regarded as such by political theorists 
and practioners. What is needed in the area of care ethics is a clearer picture of the 
specific habits, techniques, dispositions, and modalities that actually constitute 
caregiving. This necessarily entails a picture inclusive of caring relationships and 
communities, but it will also shed much light on the individualized caring practices of the 
people who do the “work” of care.  
Tronto has correctly noted that “to call care a practice implies that it involves both 
thought and action, that thought and action are interrelated and that they are directed 
toward some end.” 21 She goes on to suggest that each phase of care, which includes 
receiving care, can serve as an ideal for a well-integrated act of care. This, once again, 
brings the caring relation into view, as well as the importance of some kind of 
equilibrium between one‟s attitudes and one‟s actions when giving good care. I do not 
wish to ignore the cognitive and emotional dimensions of care or, as I‟ve said, the fact 
                                                     
21 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 108. 
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that practices of care necessarily play out in relationships and in wider communities. 
(Though it‟s also certainly the case that many caregivers and dependents experience care 
in deep isolation from others. Further, even though caring relationships generally involve 
at least two people—the caregiver and the receiver of care—very often the one who is 
being cared for is unresponsive and not fully receptive to the caregiver in a way that 
makes the assessment and assistance of a caregiver‟s actions, not to mention the 
affirmation of those actions, very difficult; this is clearly the case with infants, severely 
mentally disabled people, and sometimes those who suffer from a terminal illness. 
Relationships of care often lack reciprocity even to such a degree that a “relationship” 
can hardly be felt to exist by the caregiver.) In any case, care is certainly a kind of 
practice that often takes its shape within community and networks of caregivers. But 
what concerns me about the language of practice is that it can obscure the fact that certain 
people don‟t seem to be able or willing to take up the practice. In our attempts to get 
away from associating care with femininity, we have moved too quickly from care as a 
strictly feminine virtue, as Ned Noddings envisioned it, to a practice that just about 
anyone can take up. 
 In what was one of the earlier watershed works in care ethics, Maternal Thinking: 
Toward a Politics of Peace, Sara Ruddick strikes a balance between honoring the fact 
that carework has historically been the work of women and holding open the possibility 
that care is a practice that can serve as the ground for a new pacifist politics.
22
 She adopts 
a materialist approach, developing a conception of a unique that arises from the maternal 
social reproductive work. She suggests that mothers are engaged in the work of 
                                                     
22 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989). 
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preservative love, fostering growth, and nurturing social acceptance. Viewed one way, 
Ruddick is quite similar to Gilligan and Noddings in that she takes for granted a great 
deal about women and mothering and tends to make a number of universalistic claims 
about both, when it is certainly the case that maternal practices vary across time and 
space. She fails to acknowledge that she is constructing a particular view of what it 
means to be a mother. Yet, viewed another way, Ruddick‟s work is instrumental in 
helping us to think about the possibilities for the widespread practice of caring. She 
believes that women are far more likely to be maternal thinkers and already engage in 
most maternal practices, and so she grounds her theory in women‟s experiences. It is 
refreshing to engage with political theory that does not begin with men‟s experiences in 
the world or with a “neutral perspective” that is blind to important differences. Yet her 
goal is also to extend the notion of caring rooted in mothering to a politics we can all take 
up. Ruddick helps us to see the value in honoring the work of mothers because doing so 
keeps us attentive to current injustices and differences with respect to gender, in a way 
that “even-handed talk of parenting” does not: 
Since the maternal and womanly are politically and conceptually connected, a 
man who engages in mothering to some extent takes on the female condition and 
risks identification with the feminine. The fear of becoming “feminine”—more 
common in men but also evident in many women—is a motivating force behind 
the drive to master women and whatever is “womanly.” Although I am not 
recommending that young boys be told they will be mothers, grown men should 
confront the political meaning of “femininity” and their own fear of the feminine. 
A man does not, by becoming a mother, give up his male body or any part of it. 
To be sure, by becoming a mother he will, in many social groups, challenge the 
ideology of masculinity. To a man taunted for “being a woman,” talk of parenting 
may be temporarily comforting. But if he is undertaking maternal work, he is 
identifying with what has been, historically, womanly. What is so terrible—or so 
wonderful—about that? This is the question women and men might well sit with 
rather than evade.
23
 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 48. 
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Drawing on the work of Nancy Hartsock‟s feminist standpoint theory, Ruddick wants to 
extend maternalist thinking and practice to men, thus transforming what it means to be a 
father and a man.
24
 Yet Ruddick seriously underestimates how deeply entrenched ways of 
thinking and acting are and how tightly certain identities are bound up with care, while 
others depend, for their success, on being non-caring. Practice is an important part of 
care, for it care looks like, even if we get such descriptions right. We need a better 
account of why certain habits of care are so deeply entrenched for some identities and so 
foreign to others, of why the practice of caregiving seems more available to some than to 
others. Finally, despite its emphasis on action, practice hasn‟t gone very far towards 
explaining the relationship between the political and social contexts in which care plays 
out, embodiment, and care. To better get at this relationship, we will need to introduce a 
new dimension of care, one that involves both virtue and practice, but also goes beyond 
these frameworks to illuminate the relationship between care, inequality, and bodies. 
 
III. A CRITICAL THEORY OF EMBODIED CARE 
As already noted, this work makes three principal contributions to the study of 
care: 1) Caregiving is constitutive of human flourishing. 2) Care is not only integral to the 
practice of citizenship, but politics must also take as its aim the cultivation of 
opportunities for citizens to give care and the fashioning of citizens who are capable and 
desiring of this practice. 3) Care is an embodied practice and, as such, it has a long 
history of being associated with the people who are themselves associated with the body; 
                                                     
24 Nancy Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Historical Materialism," in Discovering Reality, ed. Merrill B. and Sandra Harding Hintikka 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983). 
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further, a deeper understanding of the embodied habits, techniques, and disposition that 
constitute the practice of care is crucial to the transformation of ourselves into more 
caring subjects.  
Each of these contributions emerges from a corresponding question. First, what is 
the relationship between human nature, the work of politics, and care? Many have tended 
to see nature and practice as opposed to one another. In contrast, I advance an 
Aristotelian view and, with Aristotle, argue that “the virtues arise in us neither by nature 
nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed 
through habit,” (NE 1103a25). Caring is both a part of human nature and an ethical 
practice that is necessarily informed and regulated by political structures, institutions and 
norms. In other words, politics can either stifle or foster those qualities we take to be 
good and part of the way it does so is by discouraging some practices and promoting 
others. This is important because it means that practices of care can be both an effect of a 
caring disposition and can help to produce such a disposition. Just as it is only through 
our close friendships with others that we learn the real value of friendship and how to be 
a good friend, it is only through our experience of caring for others that we are able to 
understand the value of caregiving and its potential to enrich our lives, transforming us in 
ways we cannot fully understand outside of care relationships and communities.          
Second, what account of personhood must accompany an ethic of care? In 
response to a tendency in philosophy to privilege disembodied conceptions of the self, I 
seek to show the significance, for care and for political philosophy more generally, of the 
fact that we are embodied creatures. A view of the self that privileges rationality over 
corporeality, or self-sufficiency over interdependence impedes an understanding of care 
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as central to the human condition and as an embodied practice. We perform care with our 
bodies, which is to say that care involves more than cognition and affect. Care involves a 
doing. Our bodies also have meaning and knowledge rooted in them and our experiences 
of caring and being cared for constitute valuable tools for cultivating good caring habits 
and dispositions. Though being well cared for in our past is not sufficient for being good 
caregivers ourselves, such experiences can help to habituate us to care. To be a caring 
person is to conform to certain kinds of physical modalities, to inhabit one‟s body in 
particular ways, to possess a certain kind of attunement to others‟ bodies, and to display 
caring habits. Finally, care is made possible precisely because we are vulnerable and 
fragile creatures with imperfect bodies.  
This approach to human vulnerability and dependency marks an entirely different 
understanding of the relationship of care to bodies. Care theorists and political theorists 
who have thought about care have tended to view it as a necessary activity since, quite 
obviously, human beings are dependent animals and generally lack the characteristics at 
some point in their lives that we associate with independence. Setting aside the question, 
for now, of whether anyone is ever really fully self-sufficient any of the time and what 
this fact means about our self-understandings, on this account it is only because we do 
not have bodies that are free of weakness and immune to illness or pain that we find 
ourselves in need of care. This is one way to think about care and it certainly does capture 
something true, namely, that human beings live much of their lives in relationships of 
asymmetrical dependency—for example, infancy, old age, illness, and disability. Care is 
directed towards the alleviation of what we experience as inadequacy and often suffering. 
This view emphasizes the importance of receiving care. Yet if we think about care as a 
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practice that cultivates and reflects human excellence, as something which helps us come 
more fully into our best possible selves, then we can begin to think about bodies as not 
only recipients of care but also as holding out the promise of giving care. 
Third, what are the reasons for the continued devaluation of care? This question 
has been asked by others but not adequately answered, and for important reasons. Most 
have argued that it is care‟s association with women that has caused it to be devalued. 
This is absolutely true, but I‟m not sure gender is the most useful or comprehensive lens 
through which to examine the landscape of carework. I propose that we shift our analytic 
lens to consider the fact that the association of care and dependency with a range of 
groups that have historically done bodily work and that are codified as bodily beings (as 
opposed to thinking beings) has greatly contributed to its neglect. This range includes 
many women, but not exclusively and not groups of women. The care literature has not 
made this point clear enough. Much of carework involves manual labor, using our own 
bodies to tend to and care for the bodies of others (changing bedpans, bathing, feeding, 
walking, lifting, breastfeeding, holding, cradling, etc.). As middle and upper-class white 
women enter the workforce, carework is being outsourced at growing rates and is 
increasingly performed by women and men of color, often immigrants and guest workers. 
This work is seen as something certain kinds of people (people of color, immigrants, poor 
people) do because they cannot do anything else. This suggests that there is an intimate 
and complicated relationship between care, the body, and inequality. Caregiving, which 
involves cognitive and embodied responses, is something that we as humans are born 
with the unique potential to develop but we do not acquire it without first being 
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habituated to care. Why, then, are some more likely to become caregivers than others and 
why should we care?  
 In bringing answers to these questions together, my dissertation investigates the 
specific political work that is necessary to cultivate caring dispositions and practices on 
the part of citizens. I offer a critical theory of embodied care that advances the idea that 
care is both a uniquely human virtue and is a practice to which we must be habituated; 
the way in which we are, or whether or not we are, depends a great deal on political 
communities. Embodied care is an ethic that understands individual and social morality 
as deeply bound up with the caring relationships and communities in which human 
beings are embedded, and which cannot be adequately understood without attending to 
the corporeal practices that constitute such relationships. Yet it is also a set of practices 
whereby individuals take up the work of caring for the bodies of others predominantly 
with and through their own bodies, but in a deeply mindful way. Further, a practice of 
embodied care is generally signified by a particular corporeal style, set of physical habits 
and techniques, and sustained engagement with body matter, as well as objects associated 
with material reproductive labor. I analyze the current unequal and unjust conditions of 
care and offer an alternative framework for conceptualizing the capacity and desire to 
care as integral to the best kind of life. In democracies, political institutions are both 
shaped by and shaping of citizens. If we as a political community fail to take care 
seriously, we misunderstand the selves we seek to govern and we limit the possibilities 
for realizing our fullest potential. Mine is a notion of care as both a human virtue and a 
civic ideal, as constitutive of our humanity and a practice that is informed and regulated 
by the work of politics. One measure of a political community, then, is the extent to 
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which it invests in cultivating a strong capacity and desire on the part of citizens to care 
for one another. I hope to show why we are not there yet and how we can get there. This 
theory of care is also transformative insofar as it suggests a path towards the 
transformation of our very selves into more caring citizens capable of cultivating better 
relationships to others and to ourselves.  
I have said that the importance of care to ethical and political life has been largely 
ignored in the humanities and social sciences, but it cannot continue to be so. Families 
struggle to find affordable, quality child care; workers are losing health care benefits as 
jobs are lost and hours cut back; children of aging parents can neither afford to stay home 
and care for them nor outsource their parents‟ care to costly facilities which often provide 
inadequate services. In our efforts to reflect, explain, and indeed improve the lives of 
human beings, a broad range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences need a 
more compelling account of why caregiving is not only crucial for survival and for 
achieving certain political and moral ends, but is also a practice that calls us to our 
highest selves, is itself constitutive of human flourishing, and integral to good citizenship. 
It is on these grounds that caregiving is worthy of our attention as scholars and of the 
difficult political work necessary for producing a more caring citizenry.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, AND THE WORK OF CARE 
 
 
For what we do in our dealings with other people 
makes some of us just, some unjust…To sum up 
in a single account: A state [of character] results 
from [the repetition of] similar activities. That is 
why we perform the right activities, since 
differences in these imply corresponding 
differences in the states. It is not unimportant, 
then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right 
from our youth. On the contrary, it is very 
important, indeed all-important. 
 
          —Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b14-22 
 
 
For the legislator makes the citizens good by 
habituating them, and this is the wish of every 
legislator; if he fails to do it well he misses his 
goal. Correct habituation distinguishes a good 
political system from a bad one. 
 
           —Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b4-7 
 
 
 We begin our investigation into the nature of caregiving not, as one might 
reasonably assume, with contemporary arguments for care, but with a trek back to the 
very beginning of political science, to Aristotle. This chapter attempts to recover in the 
father of our discipline some fruitful lines of thought that might give shape to an ethics of 
embodied care and point to the political work entailed in cultivating more widespread 
caregiving practices. Below, I briefly consider some points of contact between Aristotle 
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and contemporary care ethics before exploring some of the most valuable and as yet 
unexplored contributions Aristotle can make to an ethic of care that takes both the 
practice of ethics, in general, and forms of caregiving, in particular, to be constitutive of a 
happy and flourishing life. I have two related goals in this chapter: First, to make clear 
why ethics of care is indebted to Aristotle in the first instance. Second, to make clear why 
the particular ethic of care that I am advancing is indebted to Aristotle. Specifically, I 
seek to show why an explicitly corporeal ethic of care, one that values practices of caring 
for human beings in their weakest, most vulnerable, and “leaky” states, also holds out the 
potential to enrich our shared political life and contribute to the flourishing of individual 
citizens. 
 Although Aristotle is sometimes seen as a potentially fertile resource for care 
ethics, the most fruitful moments in his work, at least for thinking about problems related 
to caregiving today are missed. Grounding a critical theory of embodied care in 
Aristotelian thought and positioning Aristotle as a solid foundation for building a 
workable ethic of care will hopefully provide a more coherent and generative starting 
place for a theoretical inquiry into embodied care and democratic politics. In addition to 
constituting the theoretical ground for all that is to follow, this chapter is also 
foundational in the sense that I, along with Aristotle, believe that certain fundamental 
claims about what it means to be human and how we, as humans, ought to live together, 
claims which are not necessarily eternal or universal but which are nevertheless necessary 
as a starting point, are always central to political discussions.
25
 
                                                     
25 I discuss in more detail the necessity of an account of personhood for ethical and political 
thought below. For now, let me say that I contend some view of the human condition and human 
beings as such are always present in political theory. Sometimes these views are explicit, while 
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 A conception of personhood is particularly important for reflections on the 
relationship between care, embodiment, and politics. If we follow Aristotle, then we 
begin, as many have, with the idea that humans are social, dependent, vulnerable 
creatures who will need a variety of material and immaterial goods over the course of a 
lifetime in order to live well. An Aristotelian account of politics means beginning with a 
capacious account of the human condition, one that includes attention to our physical 
existence—beginning, as he does, with all that we share with the animal world, rather 
than all that sets us apart—and capacity for rational thought and action. If we do this 
earnestly, then we are less likely to admit structures, policies, and practices that ignore 
facts of human dependency and connectedness into our political scheme.
26
 Such a view is 
also more likely to lead to political arrangements that accommodate a wide range of 
human needs over a lifetime and reflect “Aristotle‟s this-worldy view,” which, in the 
words of Martha Nussbaum, “tells us that the body is the scene of all of our ethical 
achievements and that the deprivation of resources has not just material, but also ethical 
significance.” 27 
                                                                                                                                                              
other times they are lurking in the background or simply obscured in an effort to shift focus away 
from ontology and towards action. 
 
26 This is not necessarily a “humanist” view. Indeed, the point about needing to take into account 
our corporeal and emotional dependency when building a workable political world is precisely 
one that I take Judith Butler to be making in her recent work. For example, see: Judith Butler, 
Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London ;: New York: Verso, 2009), Judith Butler, 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London ; New York: Verso, 2004). 
Also, for an excellent discussion of the pervasiveness of contemporary constructions of the 
doctrine of atomism and the difficulties in overcoming them, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers 
of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006), Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
 
27 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning," in Feminist 
Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. Cynthia Freedland (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998), 254. 
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 Several Aristotelian insights that have thus far been overlooked by care theorists are 
central to my project. To the extent that Aristotle scholars have explored these insights, 
their implications for care in our shared political life have not been adequately drawn out. 
The first contribution that I wish to highlight is his understanding of the importance of 
actively giving care to a life well lived. Aristotle‟s acknowledgment of human 
dependency and vulnerability has been made much of by feminist theorists and care 
theorists, in particular, the connection he makes between politics and the human need to 
live deeply connected and interdependent lives. This work tends to briefly pick up on 
Aristotle‟s view of the person as dependent on the care of fellow citizens throughout the 
course of one‟s life. I will not take issue with the substance of these interpretations, only 
their scope. Our dependency is related to our animality and the deep bonds we share with 
others that sustain us over time are integral to happiness. Yet, for Aristotle, humans also 
require opportunities to give attention and care to others and doing so is not something 
we necessarily do out of obligation but something we might also do out of a deep desire 
to do what is just and fine. Aristotle canvases the enabling conditions that offer citizens 
opportunities to give care to others and he makes vivid the relationship between doing 
well by others within structures of care and living a good life. He understands activity 
that closely resembles something we would today call care to be integral to human 
flourishing (eudaimonia).
28
 In other words, I will argue that being a political animal for 
                                                     
28 My understanding of eudaimonia is “human flourishing,” which involves more than right 
knowing but also just action and the exhibition of excellence in accordance with reason. For a 
more detailed explanation of this interpretation, see John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in 
Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). However, I also invite the more 
conventional but perhaps more imprecise interpretation of eudaimonia as happiness. That is to 
say, my understanding of eudaimonia includes both a conception of flourishing, wherein a person 
will encounter many challenges and trials but nevertheless can still be said to be doing well, and a 
sort of psychological state similar to what we might call “happy” today. I take caregiving to be 
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Aristotle, in a distinctly human way, not only entails being dependent on the care of 
others but also actively giving it to our fellows in accordance with practical wisdom. This 
latter point is the second Aristotelian contribution that I take to be central to an ethic of 
care that emphasizes embodiment. 
 
I. WHY ARISTOTLE?  
 Care ethicists generally want to make explicit the salience of care in our daily lives 
and to clarify important questions around how we can treat care differently in social and 
political contexts. Caregiving relationships, theorists of care argue, are what sustain our 
political life and make ethics possible. Increasingly, work in the area of care ethics seeks 
to demonstrate the role care plays in politics.
29
 We know that caregiving is work that 
women have historically performed and, for the most part, it remains “women‟s work” 
globally. The gendered nature of care is likely a strong factor contributing to its almost 
total absence in Western moral and political philosophy. Care ethics became, then, a 
logical development within feminist philosophy, which seeks to make vivid certain 
features of our shared life that have been consistently ignored or devalued within 
mainstream philosophy and political theory. Aristotle‟s relatively low opinion of 
democracy and his elitism, in particular, his views on women, makes it a fair question to 
                                                                                                                                                              
both one of the finest activities an human being can undertake and, under the right conditions, one 
of the most pleasurable. For more on this interpretation of eudaimonia, see Richard Kraut, "Two 
Conceptions of Happiness," The Philosophical Review LXXXVIII, no. 2 (1979).  
 
29 See, Daniel Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (New 
York: The New Press, 2004), Selma Sevenhuijsen, Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist 
Considerations on Justice, Morality, and Politics (London ; New York: Routledge, 1998), Joan 
C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 
1994), Julie Anne White, Democracy, Justice, and the Welfare State: Reconstructing Public Care 
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). 
 28 
ask, why go back to Aristotle to make a feminist argument about the political and ethical 
relevance of caregiving? After all, Aristotle believed that gendered and racial hierarchies 
were necessary for a well-run polity and he drew conclusions about women‟s place 
within the political hierarchy that could only be characterized as regressive coming on the 
heels, as it does, of Plato and his Philosopher Queens.
30
 The greater part of this chapter is, 
in one sense, an attempt to answer that question. However, in the remainder of this 
section, I hope to put to rest the skepticism regarding “feminist appropriations of 
Aristotle” by articulating why it makes sense to ground an argument for an embodied 
ethic of care in the work of a philosopher who had such profoundly confused (and 
confusing) views on women.  
 Often readers of Aristotle are not only critical of his view that women are naturally 
inferior to men, but they are inclined to discount him as a resource for contemporary 
moral and democratic theory because of what we take to be rather archaic views on 
women and gender. Such readers quickly come to the conclusion that he was, at least by 
contemporary standards, ethically conservative and something of a misogynist. More 
charitable sholars of Aristotle will usually consider the cultural and historical moment in 
which Aristotle was writing. In contrast to critics like Spelman and Okin
31
, who focus on 
Aristotle‟s misguided sexism and racism, some have thought it remarkable that he even 
asked “the woman question” at all—that is, asked how ought we to understand the proper 
                                                     
30 Susan Moller Okin, "Philosopher Queens and Private Queens: Plato on Women and the 
Family," in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, ed. Carole Pateman and Mary Lyndon 
Shanley (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991). 
 
31 Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist 
Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988). 
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role of women in the Greek polis.
32
 This view perhaps sits somewhat uneasily with the 
fact that Aristotle‟s predecessor, Plato, not only asked the woman question but gave the 
answer that some women could not be citizens but could even become members of the 
ruling class, provided they too could achieve self-mastery, political courage and the 
transcendence of bodily needs and desires so important to the art of rule. 
 Some feminist critics don‟t get beyond such first impressions of Aristotle‟s views 
on women and see him as not seriously invested in thinking deeply about women‟s 
capacities and activities and what sorts of entitlements and responsibilities belonging to 
women might be said to flow from these.
33
 Still, others have defended Aristotle‟s 
potential to animate a feminist politics, despite what he said about actual women. Martha 
Nussbaum is perhaps one of the most enthusiastic defenders of Aristotle in this regard, 
arguing that Aristotle‟s “biological misogyny” is inconsistent with his ethical and 
political writings and therefore not a deep flaw in his methodology but rather a failure to 
properly apply his methods to women.
34
 Linda Hirshman makes a similar argument in her 
interesting, if somewhat anachronistic, essay, “The Book of A,” in which she argues that 
Aristotle was indeed a “feminist” and that a canvas of Aristotelian virtues positively 
illuminates many issues that confront feminism today, such as courtroom surrogacy 
                                                     
 
32 Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?," Review of Politics 52, no. 397 
(1990), Stephen G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political 
Philosophy, Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), Stephen G. Salkever, "Women, Soldiers, Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on 
the Politics of Virility," Polity 19, no. 232 (1986). 
 
33 See, for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and 
Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), Okin, Women in Western 
Political Thought, Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. 
 
34 Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning." 
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battles and the methodological and political challenges of feminist consciousness 
raising.
35
 Other defenders of Aristotle, such as Stephen Salkever and Jill Frank, are more 
interested in reconciling Aristotle‟s biology with his metaphysics and ethics, arguing that 
his conception of human nature was non-essentialist and that a person‟s nature was 
determined in large part by her activities and habits, thus making it perfectly sensible for 
a woman or a slave, both of whom performed activities that merely supported but did not 
constitute civic life, to remain well beyond of the gates of citizenship.
36
 
 My own view is that both “humanist” defenders of Aristotle, like Nussbaum, and 
those who present a more thoughtful (Salkever) or postmodern (Frank) Aristotle are 
correct. Indeed, it is certainly the case that on some fundamental level Aristotle failed to 
apply his methods to women, who were one among several blind spots in his ethical and 
political writings. Even the most elementary empirical investigation into the cognitive 
and deliberative capacities of women would surely have revealed that, at the very least, a 
portion of this class of persons is as capable of the same thoughts and actions of the 
noblest of men. Yet, at the same time, it must also be true that if Aristotle had thought 
even just a little more deeply about the way in which he cast the relationship between 
politics and nature, that is, one in which the latter is at least partly a function of the 
former, then he surely would have come to see that woman‟s distinct “nature” was to 
some degree a product of the deeply segregated space and activity that constituted the 
household and the polis, where women were, of course, relegated to the domestic realm. 
                                                     
35 Linda Hirshman, "The Book of 'a'," in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. Cynthia A. 
Freedland (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
 
36 Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), Salkever, "Women, Soldiers, Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on the Politics 
of Virility." 
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In other words, based on Aristotle‟s own account of how habits and dispositions are 
shaped by political institutions and education, we must conclude that if women were truly 
unable to acquire the kind of disposition and functioning Aristotle thought necessary for 
full participation in political life, then the activities assigned to them are at least partly 
responsible for this. Although he talks much of nature, I see Aristotle as a kind of 
classical constructionist, albeit a deceptive one, if what we mean by this is someone who 
thinks that what we become depends a great deal on how we are socialized, educated and 
habituated to choose and perform certain activities. This dominant element in his thought 
makes the following sort of claim puzzling indeed: “[W]e should look on the female as 
being as it were a deformity, though one which occurs in the ordinary course of nature.”37 
But I want to echo Martha Nussbaum on this point, who writes that, “while we should not 
forget what Aristotle said here, we may proceed to appropriate other elements of his 
thought without fear that they are logically interdependent with his political and 
biological misogyny.”38 
 Although I think we are right to respond to claims that Aristotle is the “founder of 
ethics of care” with deep skepticism—indeed, such notions are substantively dubious and 
rhetorically misleading—Aristotle remains a rich resource for an ethic of care that takes 
practice seriously and the shaping of citizens‟ caregiving habits and desires through the 
work of politics.
39
 To be clear, Aristotle is not a theorist of care in a strict sense, nor was 
                                                     
37 A. L. Peck, Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1953), IV, 775a. 
 
38 Nussbaum, "Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning," 250. 
 
39 For an argument that defends Aristotle as the founder of ethics of care, see Howard Curzer, 
"Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care," Journal of Value Inquiry 41, no. 2-4 (2007). This 
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he, quite obviously, a democrat, though there are many strands in his thinking that have 
proved very fruitful for democratic theory.
40
 However, his understanding of the way in 
which individuals acquire and maintain the virtues—dispositions that we have in one 
sense and activities we do in another sense—is productive for critically analyzing the ill-
formed caregiving arrangements that exist today and for thinking about how we can 
positively transform those arrangements into more reflective, nurturing, and widespread 
practices of care. Fostering the caregiving capacities of citizens is not only important for 
a well-functioning democracy but is, on Aristotle‟s account, a critical component of 
human flourishing. 
 
II. ARISTOTLE AND TRADITIONAL CARE ETHICS 
Politics and the Good Life 
 In most late-modern liberal democracies, much of political life seems wholly 
divorced from morality and this is seen by most as a virtue not a vice. It isn‟t that liberal 
countries are immoral, of course, though some on the right and the left may believe that 
to be true, but rather that most democrats today take the goal of politics to be, at least in 
one sense, the widening of the space of freedom in which citizens may choose for 
themselves which life is best. Joan Tronto has argued that care ethics, in contrast to this 
                                                                                                                                                              
essay focuses more on common themes rather than textual evidence in favor of Aristotle‟s 
valuing of something like caregiving.  
 
40 For examples, see Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy: Listening, Conflict, and 
Citizenship (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), Jill Frank, A Democracy of 
Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. Gerald 
M. Mara R. Bruce Douglass, and Henry S. Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), Stephen G. 
Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Studies in 
Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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view, necessarily understands politics and morality to be deeply intertwined and mutually 
reinforcing.
41
 She points out that this is a uniquely Aristotelian way of approaching 
politics and morality and that this is particularly instructive for care, which she argues 
can “serve as both a moral value and as a basis for the political achievement of a good 
society.”42 The consequences of redrawing the boundaries of politics to include morality 
are significant for several reasons. First, though political arrangements are partly meant to 
serve the political ends of late-modern societies, such as security, autonomy, and 
equality, political constitutions are also mechanisms that allows us to lead better, by 
which we mean more excellent and fulfilling, lives than we might otherwise have lived. 
Care ethicists, as I understand this group of thinkers, and Aristotle both agree: “It is 
evident that the best constitution must be that organization in which anyone might do best 
and live a blessedly happy life,” (Politics 1323a14-17).  
 Care theorists also acknowledge that politics shape our ideas about what the most 
choiceworthy life is, and that we are educated to see certain activities and arrangements 
as superior to others. For Aristotelians, the challenge of philosophy is to engage in deep 
reflection and discussion about the good life and about which political arrangements 
might best meet our needs and facilitate the achievement of that life for all citizens. We 
see this most clearly in the Politics when Aristotle says, “A person who is going to make 
a fitting inquiry into the best political arrangement must first get clear about what the 
most choiceworthy life is—for if this is unclear, the best political arrangement must 
remain unclear also,” (Pol. 1323a14-17). Martha Nussbaum refers to Aristotle‟s 
conception of the good life as thick, because it deals with human ends across all areas of 
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42 Ibid. 
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human life and includes the entire life trajectory rather than just an ideal level of 
functioning, but also vague because it proceeds by way of what Aristotle calls an “outline 
sketch” of the good life, which can always be revised in light of new information and 
experiences.
43
 Care theorists also understand the best sort of life as one lived in deep 
connection with other human beings, where moral dispositions are shaped through social 
norms, laws, education, and political discourses, and where the pursuit of the good life is 
a project shared throughout the whole of a community. 
Account of Personhood 
 Any normative political theory must include some coherent and persuasive picture 
of the human being. Both theorists of care and Aristotelians begin with a fairly detailed 
account of personhood and they do so because it is desirable to have some relatively clear 
idea of healthy functioning (physically, morally, and psychologically) when asking 
questions about human flourishing and the political conditions that contribute to it. In 
order to say how we ought to live together and how we might live better, we need to 
begin with a notion of our common tendencies, patterns, capacities, and vulnerabilities.  
 Discussions of care almost always proceed by way of sketching out a very 
particular picture of the human being who is embodied, vulnerable, and always embedded 
in relationships of dependency. Ruth Groenhout, a theorist of care who does begin with 
Aristotle but quickly leaves him behind for Levinas, has outlined four basic assumptions 
that form a rough sketch of the human person at the heart of an ethic of care.
44
 These 
strike me as distinctly Ariostoelian: 1) Relationships of care sustain human life. 2) 
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Humans are embodied and have particular bodily resources and limitations. 3) Humans 
are fundamentally interdependent and finite. 4) Human beings are social selves, desiring 
of deep affective and physical bonds with other human beings. I do not take this to be an 
exhaustive list of the features of human existence—indeed, the capacity for rational 
thought and practical reason is missing on this account—but I do think it‟s a good 
starting place for thinking about embodied care and it is consistent with the Aristotelian 
approach of drawing an “outline sketch” of the good life and the constitutive 
circumstance of human beings before proceeding to the particulars. 
 Nussbaum‟s understanding of how the thick vague Aristotelian conception of the 
good life and the human person works is particularly instructive for embodied care 
because it incorporates into its design the needs of a situated, embodied creature who will 
inevitably experience growth and decline: 
The basic idea of the thick vague theory is that we tell ourselves stories of the 
general outline or structure of the life of a human being. We ask and answer the 
question, What is it to live as a being situated, so to speak, between the beasts and 
the gods, with certain abilities that set us off from the rest of the world of nature, 
and yet with certain limits that come from our membership in the world of nature? 
The idea is that we share a vague conception, having a number of distinct parts, of 
what it is to be situated in the world as human, and of what transitions either “up” 
or “down,” so to speak, would turn us into beings no longer human—and thus 
since on the whole we conceive of species identity as at least necessary for 
personal identity) into creatures different from ourselves.
45
 
 
Nussbaum believes that from this exercise we can approximate a story about what counts 
as a human life and that story includes things like mortality, the human body and its 
needs (hunger, thirst, shelter, sexual desire, mobility), cognitive capability, practical 
reason, affiliation, relatedness to other species, and so on. I leave aside the question of 
whether we are still looking at an Aristotelian picture of the human being when we arrive 
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at the end of this long list of human functional capabilities. Instead, I want to highlight 
and endorse what I think is an important connection between Aristotle‟s view of the 
human being as neither beast nor god, that is, a creature rooted on this earth, in a 
particular body, with distinctly human capabilities and limitations. And here we also get 
an account of the cognitive capacities humans possess, which allow us to participate in 
the planning, managing, and processes of evaluating our lives. Of course, we don‟t all 
share in the capacity to reason and choose wisely all of the time. But we do collectively 
have this capacity for practical reason and this fact, coupled with the fact that we also, as 
a species, possess the embodied resources for taking care of others, makes caregiving as a 
political practice possible.
46
 
 Another important Aristotelian feature of personhood is that humans are creatures 
concerned with the well being of those with whom we share life projects. In other words, 
we are naturally other-regarding creatures. We can see this in Aristotle‟s discussion of the 
forms of friendship and the bonds between parents and children. But as Susan Bickford, 
John Cooper, and Sibyl Schwarzenbach have all argued, it is also true of those with 
whom we share a constitution, that is, our fellow citizens and not just carefully chosen 
friends or families into which we are born.
47
 Care ethics begins with an account of 
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personhood that is other-regarding, that understands mutual well-wishing and well-doing 
to be a fundamental feature of the human condition and of strong polities. Both Aristotle 
and care ethicists believe that our political arrangements ought to reflect and foster this 
tendency rather than ignore or stifle it. 
Context and Generality in Practical Judgment 
 Aristotle has a contextual moral theory that requires attention to particularity and 
movement towards subjective experience rather than abstraction. This is an important 
shared principle between Aristotelianism and care ethics; the work of care requires 
discerning the particulars of a person‟s caring needs so that we can best determine how to 
meet them.
48
 In Tronto‟s discussion of the limits of “rational moral theory,” by which she 
seems to mean something like Rawlsian liberalism, for solving the problem of caring for 
distant others whose lives may look very different from our own, she notes this shared 
feature:  
Our best solution to understanding how these problems [concrete, situated moral 
problems] can be resolved, is to return to an Aristotelian insight. Aristotle argued 
that virtue lies in a mean that depends upon context. What a care ethic requires 
from each individual or group in a caring process varies depending upon who are 
the involved people, groups, or objects. Aristotle‟s ideas further suggest this 
standard: since the task of care is to maintain, continue, and repair the world so 
that we can live in it as well as possible, we should do what will best achieve this 
end.
49
 
 
In other words, simply calling to mind an example of someone in need of care—Tronto 
uses the example of someone dying of AIDS—and then, from that exercise in abstraction 
attempting to put oneself in the shoes of that person to determine the best caring 
arrangement for a society is no guarantee that we will be able to discern and take into 
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49 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 145. 
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adequate account all of the morally relevant features of this particular situation. Rather, a 
better alternative is to steer clear of overly abstract role-reversals and attempt to perceive 
the particulars of caring dilemmas as they arise in our daily lives, as we encounter them 
in our personal and public lives—in family relationships, friendships, and communities, 
as well as in journalistic accounts and literary depictions that make vivid real suffering in 
the world, and so on. One aspect of this about which I shall have more to say in the 
following two chapters is that we need to think more deeply about the forces that make it 
more or les likely that one will encounter and possess the necessary form of attention to 
respond to caring dilemmas in their daily lives. 
 In Politics, Aristotle addresses the importance of law and the acceptance of 
fundamental rules for a well functioning society.
50
 Yet, for Aristotle, legal proceduralism 
is not an attempt to capture something divine or perfect, but rather embodies more 
complex forms of human intelligence. As Martha Nussbaum has described the law in 
Aristotle‟s thought, it is a kind of “summary of wise decisions,” on a given subject.51 It is 
also, however, inevitably general and often too vague to fit a situation, so new particulars 
will have to be brought to bear on every case. Of general versus particular statements, 
Aristotle writes that, “though the general ones are common to more cases, the specific 
ones are truer, since actions are about particular cases, and our account must accord with 
these  (Politics 1287a25-32). This reflects a basic tenet of care ethics: Our ethical 
responses in relationships of care are always contextual and grounded in actual 
experiences. Yet we need some general rules and principles to guide our thinking about 
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care, too, otherwise we could not make much progress on transforming care in the 
political realm. One consequence of this view for a theory of embodied care we have 
already seen. We must start with a basic understanding of the caring needs of humans and 
this understanding will generate conclusions, vague though they may be, that are 
universalizable yet revisable. Embodied care places much value on the knowledge we 
gain from considering the embodied and affective dimensions of particular people in 
particular situations but it also makes normative and empirical assumptions about the 
need for care in society. Aristotle is a resource for care ethics, then, because he is a moral 
contextualist, but one who balances attention to concrete details with a concern for justice 
and general principles.
52
 
 
III. STRUCTURES OF CARE IN ARISTOTLE  
 Now that I have highlighted some important points of contact between Aristotle and 
care ethics generally, I now want to turn our attention to the way that structures of care 
permeate Aristotle‟s ethical and political writings. It is true that we do not find in 
Aristotle a well worked out theory of care and that is certainly not the case I wish to make 
here. Nevertheless, many of his claims concerning the practice of virtue, political life, 
and the natural sociality of human beings suggests that the practice of some forms of care 
are actually quite central to ethical and political achievement. In this section, I will 
discuss the structures of care that underpin Aristotle‟s work. By doing so, I hope to make 
more vivid the centrality of caregiving to a flourishing human life and to begin laying the 
groundwork for an argument about coming to value caregiving not simply as a means to 
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other ends but as an end in itself. 
 Aristotle believes that humans, like most creatures, naturally desire certain ends 
that are fundamental to their flourishing. In Politics he states unequivocally that we are 
creatures who desire to live in the presence of others who are like us and with whom we 
share joint projects:  
Hence that the city-state is natural and prior in nature to the individual is clear. 
For if an individual is not self-sufficient when separated, he will be like all other 
parts in relation to the whole. Anyone who cannot form a community with others, 
or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is not part of a city-state—
he is either a beast or a god. Hence, though an impulse toward this sort of 
community exists by nature in everyone, whoever first established one was 
responsible for the greatest of goods (1253a25-30). 
 
This impulse to live with and to share a moral life with others is part of human nature, so 
much so that we could not even recognize someone as human if they were unable or 
unwilling to live with other humans (Pol 1253a15-30). Yet, he also emphasizes the 
importance of laws, institutions and rule in structuring the conditions within which shared 
ends are pursued and a moral code constructed. Like other animals, humans desire to live 
and to work with others who are like them in some fundamental way; in this way, 
humans are similar to bees, who are also “political,” just less so. Yet, we are quite unlike 
bees and other “political” animals because we understand that there is a distinct life that 
is best for us and we are able to deliberate together about how to achieve that life
53
: 
For as a human being is the best of the animals when perfected, so when separated 
from law and justice he is worst of all. For injustice is the harshest when it has 
weapons, and a human being grows up with weapons for virtue and practical 
wisdom to use, which are particularly open to being used for opposite purposes. 
Hence he is the most unrestrained and most savage of animals when he lacks 
virtue, as well as the worse where food and sex are concerned. But justice is a 
political matter; for justice is the organization of a political community, and 
justice decides what is just (Politics 1253a32-37). 
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Humans do have a nature and one can hardly get around this fact in Aristotle. Yet, at the 
same time, this nature can only be fully realized with a goodly amount of political work, 
habituation, and education. I take these two ideas—that some forms of life are more 
natural to humans than others and that the most natural is one that entails a great deal of 
social and political fashioning—to be central to a theory and politics of embodied care. 
 I wish to show that the practice of care is not only necessary for the achievement of 
ends but is also an end in itself, an activity that is choiceworthy regardless of the external 
goods it may bring about. Aristotle believes that the person who possesses practical 
wisdom (phronesis), and is in all respects the most virtuous, is one cared for by others 
and, importantly, also socialized within structures of care. The structures and practices of 
care advocated by Aristotle reveal something that contemporary care ethics misses: 
Human beings not only need care throughout the course of a lifetime but they also need 
opportunities to practice care. In the best possible circumstances, giving care is one the 
finest activities human beings can achieve. Further, because care is so central to a 
flourishing human life and to ethical achievement, it will be structured by the work of 
politics, that is, citizens working to give shape to the institutions and structures that can 
sustain their ethical life. 
The Virtue of Care 
 For Aristotle, those who are not living deeply connected lives with other human 
beings are hardly recognizable as human beings themselves. In Ethics, he remarks that it 
would be “absurd to make the blessed person solitary. For no one would choose to have 
all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is a political [animal], tending by 
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nature to live together with others,” (NE 1169b17-20).54 We are naturally disposed to live 
with others, not only because we need a community to help secure certain ends, but 
because we are happiest when we take an active interest in our friends and fellow citizens 
and have others take a strong interest in us (NE 1169b10-15). As we have said, his 
account of personhood includes relationality, rejects self-sufficiency, and has built into it 
the need and desire for affiliation. Although Aristotle asserts that we are all, each of us, 
“one in number,” with separate life plans, he also believes that political communities are 
necessary for flourishing and that friendship is “most necessary for our life. For no one 
would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods,” (NE 1155a5). 
 Political arrangements, then, should do much more than secure basic resources and 
material goods, though they should do at least that (Politics 1272a12-20, 1330b11, 
1329b39). Friendships, though fraught with conflict and challenges, are what hold cities 
together (NE VIII 13-14). Polities should concern themselves with civic friendships at 
least in so far as standards of justice and fairness are upheld so that all citizens can 
continue to participate in one another‟s life projects (including projects like the securing 
of basic material resources and moral development); such jointly shared pursuits are 
simply less likely if those bound together by a constitution are not behaving justly 
towards one another (NE 1160a9-14).
55
 In healthy polities, especially in democracies 
where there is both equality and plurality, we should see both justice and friendship in 
many forms: “Hence there are friendships and justice to only a slight degree in tyrannies 
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also, but to a much larger degree in democracies; for there people are equal, and so have 
much in common,” (NE 1161b9-11). Finally, political communities exist for the sake not 
of self-interested motives like securing property, but rather for “living well” and “for the 
sake of noble actions,” which, says Aristotle, can only happen where friendships and 
shared life projects are found (Pol 1280b35-40). In societies not defined by mere mutual 
commerce but rather by the joint pursuit of excellence, we still have the expectation of 
mutual benefit but we also take a strong interest in others‟ character and well-being.56  
 Contemporary ethics of care theorists also believe that the relationality of human 
existence places a special obligation on governments to take seriously the need for care. 
In this view, the reason why we live such deeply connected lives is largely a function of 
the facts of biological human need and dependency. Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly 
stressed the importance of Aristotle‟s conception of the person as vulnerable and in need 
of the love and care of others: 
[I] believe we need to adopt a political conception of the person that is more 
Aristotelian than Kantian, one that sees the person from the start as both capable 
and needy—“indeed of a rich plurality of life-activities,” to use Marx‟s phrase, 
whose availability will be the measure of well-being. Such a conception of the 
person, which builds grown and decline into the trajectory of human life, will put 
us on the road to thinking well about what kind of society we should design. We 
don‟t have to contract for what we need by producing; we have a claim to support 
in the dignity of our human need itself.
57
 
 
 In addition to needing basic material resources required for healthy functioning, 
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Nussbaum argues that we should include “affiliation” on a list of capabilities that every 
political society should secure. But beyond the brief mention of the person as “capable” 
above, nowhere does she discuss the fact that Aristotle sees humans as not only in need 
of care but capable and desiring of giving it. Nowhere does she explore the role that 
giving care plays in Aristotle‟s understanding of virtue. This is odd since structures of 
care are not only present in Aristotle‟s ethical and political writings, but practices of 
caring for others are absolute requisites for living an excellent life. I agree that Aristotle 
provides a picture of persons as needing care and a variety of life activities, but I think 
that more needs to be said about the value, for Aristotle and for us, of practicing care. On 
my reading of Aristotle, caring for others is one very available activity that aides us in the 
process of becoming our best possible selves. We know, of course, that friendships 
structure the good life for Aristotle and provide us with the necessary material to live 
virtuous and happy lives. What we need to better understand is that one of the main ways 
in which they do so is by serving as a structure of caregiving, a form in which practices 
of care are refined and contribute to an increase in the well-wishing of others in a very 
specific and in a general way. 
Friendship 
 Friendship (philia) is the mutually acknowledged and reciprocal exchange of 
goodwill and affection that exists between people who share an interest in each other on 
the basis of pleasure, usefulness, or virtue (NE 1156a). Friendships of this sort are 
voluntary, but Aristotle also includes in his definition of friendship non-voluntary 
relations of affection and care, such as those that exist among family members and 
fellow-citizens (NE 1159b25-30, 1161b15). Two things will be important for our 
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purposes: First, Aristotle‟s understanding of “friendship” is much broader than our 
contemporary understanding and includes many relationships that we don‟t tend to 
identify, in the first instance anyway, as friendships. So, for example, fellow citizens 
count as friends on Aristotle‟s picture, as do children and parents. Yet, at the same time, 
the sort of friendship he values most—character friendship—is characterized by a sort of 
thickness that is perhaps also unfamiliar to us today; character friendship is constituted by 
a shared commitment to practicing the virtues and living a good life.
58
 In other words, the 
best sort of friends are those who are equally commitment to living an excellent life and 
to helping one another pursue the respective projects that enable and reflect such a life. 
Because I want to consider the ways in which friendship is also a mechanism for 
activating virtuous thoughts and actions, character friendship will be most relevant here. 
Yet friendships defined primarily by inequality and caretaking, like parent-child 
relationships, also have the ability to cultivate the capacities for character friendship and 
grow to become a character friendship (NE 1166a25). For this reason, these are relevant, 
as well. 
 What exactly is it about friendships that make them necessary for our lives and for 
living virtuously? In other words, for Aristotle, why do we need friends? The answer is 
not simply, as some have interpreted, because friends are needed in order to properly 
practice the virtues Aristotle explicitly privileges, like courage, temperance, 
magnanimity, and so on.  Though this is certainly true, it‟s also the case that friendships 
are one important structure of care, that is, they require a goodly bit of care for their 
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success and yet also serve the purpose of habituating individuals to other-regarding 
thought and action. Even a cursory reading of Aristotle on friendship suggests that at 
least one reason why friends are valuable is because they care for us in times of need. On 
this view, affiliation is important because we need it for our own survival. Aristotle is 
quite clear on this point: “But in poverty also, and in the other misfortunes, people think 
friends are the only refuge. Moreover, the young need friends to keep them from error. 
The old need friends to care for them and support the actions that fail because of 
weakness,” (NE 1155a12-15). And surely parents care for their children and, in turn, 
children for their parents, when they are unable to do so themselves. Indeed, the fact that 
“in ill fortune we need others to benefit us,” necessarily makes friendship one important 
structure of care (NE 1169b13-16). 
 In On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State, Sibyl Schwarzenbach seeks 
to set herself apart from “feminist care theory” by grounding a feminist democratic 
theory in Aristotle‟s conception of philia.59 In this complex and innovative work (at one 
point, she offers an interpretation of Marx‟s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as 
an application of De Anima and an attempt to bring reintroduce both praxis and philia 
into modern contexts, which she believes he fails to do because he lacks a concept of 
social labor and does not reconcile socialist property with his production model of 
activity), she argues that we can construct a modern conception of civic friendship that is 
deeply rooted in the Aristotelian concepts of praxis and philia. Schwarzenbach makes the 
case that “a minimal civic friendship remains a necessary precondition of genuine justice 
in any state, including in the large, complex modern nation-state, and despite its historical 
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transformations.”60 She argues that the ethical reproductive praxis that constitutes 
personal and civic friendship is, unlike “feminist care,” concerned to foster egalitarianism 
and reciprocity, and “entails the capacity for consciousness of one‟s relations to the 
eternal and the divine, and hence the capacity for logos and its actualization.”61 In other 
words, on this reading, the existence of “some form of friend” is a necessary precondition 
for the actualization of human‟s unique function (ergon), logos, and without friendships 
one cannot exercise one‟s highest moral and intellectual capacities.62  
 I largely agree with this reading of friendship in Aristotle, though I think the link 
between the practice of care, which does entail a kind of “ethical reproductive praxis,” 
and friendship is somewhat murky here; specifically, the two seemed to be collapsed into 
one on Schwarzenbach‟s account, yet the emphasis on equality, reciprocity, and the goal 
of individual autonomy that characterizes philia for her does not sit easily alongside the 
reality of most caregiving relationships. Further, Schwarzenbach takes an overly sanguine 
view of Aristotle‟s own conception of political friendship, as well as what this might look 
like in modern contexts, and does not help us to think through the role of conflict in 
modern states and how her model of civic friendship may or may not be a resource for 
navigating inevitable political conflict. In contrast to Schwarzenbach‟s reading of the 
value of friendship, I wish to highlight the way in which Aristotle makes philia essential 
to the expression of care. In other words, although Aristotle was certainly invested in 
equality and reciprocity in certain forms of friendships, he also believed that some 
friendships entail considerable inequality and non-reciprocity; and these sorts of 
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friendships are marked by the practices of care, care that very often involves more than 
“ethical reproduction” and moral development, which I take to be valuable forms of 
bodily caregiving. Nancy Sherman points out that friendships are sometimes a kind of 
external good, like money or power, but they are also the “form virtuous activity takes 
when it is especially fine and praiseworthy.”63 On her reading, friendships of different 
types are important for virtue precisely because they provide us with the opportunity for 
excellent action and desirable sentiments that would otherwise be unavailable to us. This 
reading is certainly supported in passages that emphasize shared pursuits that are both 
virtuous and pleasurable, such as the following:  
For friendship is community, and we are related to our friends we are related to 
ourselves. Hence, since the perception of our being is choiceworthy, so is the 
perception of our friend‟s being. Perception is active when we live with him; 
hence, nor surprisingly, this is what we seek. Whatever someone regards as his 
being, or the end for which he chooses to be alive, that is the activity he wishes to 
pursue in his friend‟s company (NE 1171b33-35). 
 
Yet, it is not only in times of need or refuge that friends are desirable. Friendships 
provide us with the necessary context to do well by other human beings in need: “For 
how would one benefit from such prosperity if one had no opportunity for beneficence, 
which is most often displayed, and most highly praised, in relation to friends,” (1155a8-
10). Friends are most valuable not because they do for us in times of need but because 
they are the enabling conditions for our own acting and doing well, for living virtuously: 
It would seem absurd, however, to award the happy person all the goods, without 
giving him friends; for having friends seems to be the greatest external good. And 
if it is more proper to a friend to confer benefits than to receive them, and it is 
proper to the good person and to virtue to do good, and it is finer to benefit friends 
than to benefit strangers, the excellent person will need people for him to benefit. 
Indeed, that is why there is a question about whether friends are needed more in 
good fortune than in ill fortune; for it is assumed that in ill fortune we need people 
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to benefit us, and in good fortune we need others for us to benefit (NE 1169b9-
16). 
 
In other words, friendships are important for Aristotle not simply because they make us 
feel good or provide us with a sense of solace and security, though they surely do that, 
but because they call on us to do well by others, to act benevolently.
64
 
 In what does this benevolent behavior consist? Of course Aristotle explicitly says 
that monetary generosity is a virtue, but this is not all he has in mind for friends, at least 
not merely the economic generosity he speaks of early in Ethics. It seems important to 
note that Aristotle focuses on structures of care and concern that involve not just moral 
support but rather bodily care; the physical growth and development of children is central 
to the kind of love parents give children and Aristotle says explicitly that the elderly are 
cared for when weakness and failing make activity impossible without the support of 
others (NE 1155a12-15). Aristotle even goes so far as to say that “the excellent person 
labors for his friends and for his native country, and will die for them if he must; he will 
sacrifice money, honors, and contested goods in general, in achieving the fine for 
himself,” where achieving the fine for himself means doing well by a friend through 
these actions, actions which, we imagine, often entail much more than mere economic 
generosity but extend to a kind of corporeal generosity (NE 1169a19-22). 
 Friendship is not mere goodwill, then, but “consists more in loving; and people who 
love their friends are praised; hence it would seem, loving is the virtue of friends,” (NE 
11599b35-37). Interestingly, in his discussion of the role that giving and love play in the 
development and sustaining of friendship, Aristotle points to the pleasure that a mother 
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gets from loving her son (NE 1159a28-35, 1168a26-8). To highlight the value of caring 
about and for others in friendships, Aristotle asks that we consider a friendship defined 
primarily by radical inequality and, at least for some time, ongoing bodily care. Given 
Aristotle‟s examples intended to show the importance of love in friendships—friends 
who care for the elderly and mothers who care for their children—it seems reasonable to 
say that he is willing to admit, in perhaps an imprecise way, forms of bodily care into his 
conception of friendships.
65
  
 Aristotle‟s word for “love” in describing character friendship is strgein, which is a 
word that is most often used to apply to a mother‟s love for her children and other family 
attachments. This is significant both because this word emphasizes a deep emotional 
bond and a particular way of relating to another that goes beyond the kind of attention we 
might give to someone with whom we are not in a relationship of bodily intimacy or 
dependency. The care that is part of any friendship is active and ongoing. Indeed, friends 
provide us with opportunities for happiness that are unavailable to those who are solitary 
or childless (NE 1099b1-5). Although Aristotle says that friendship is more than 
goodwill, both because it is more intense and because it entails mutuality, the features of 
this mutuality are fuzzy. Aristotle says that what is required for friendship is the mutual 
wishing for good things and awareness of this reciprocal wishing; he does not say, 
however, that reciprocity in action is required for friendship. This point is made clear in 
the context of friendship between non-equals, where love has a kind of equalizing effect:  
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Friendship, then, consists more in loving; and people who love their friends are 
praised; hence, it would seem, loving is the virtue of friends. And so friends 
whose love accords with the work of their friends are enduring friends and have 
an enduring friendship. This above all is how unequals as well as equals can be 
friends, sine this is how they can be equalized (NE 1159a15-35) 
 
The example of the relationship of parent to child in the discussion of what we gain 
through friendship is especially important because it brings into focus the idea that 
complete reciprocity need not be present in friendships in order for us to find pleasure in 
them and to practice the excellences. This is in stark contrast to the view that character 
friendships are most valuable because they alone enable living an excellent life. To the 
extent that we have the opportunity to do well by another, even when we get very little in 
return, we have the opportunity to achieve excellence. 
 The value of care entailed in friendships is made even more vivid in Aristotle‟s 
chapter in Ethics on active benevolence and friendship (IX 7). Here Aristotle discusses 
the importance of benevolence to friendship, comparing the case of the benefactor to that 
of the craftsman. The craftsman, unlike the creditor who loans money to another who 
then becomes a debtor, loves what he produces because he has labored to produce it and 
he loves the finished product even though it does not have a soul and cannot pay him 
back. He says this is most true of the poets, “since they dearly like their own poems, and 
are fond of them as though they were their children,” (NE 1168a1-2). The benefactor 
resembles this case but he loves his beneficiary even more than the producer loves his 
product. Aristotle explains:  
The reason for this is that being is choiceworthy and loveable for all, and we are 
so as we are actualized, since we are insofar as we live and act. Now the product 
is, in a way, the producer in his actualization; hence the producer is fond of the 
product, because he loves his own being. This is natural, since what he is 
potentially is what the producer indicates in actualization. At the same time, the 
benefactors action is fine for him, so that he finds enjoyment in the person he acts 
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on; but the person acted on finds nothing fine in the agent, but only, at most, some 
advantage, which is less pleasant and loveable  (NE 1168a5-10). 
 
Again, we see that one important component of friendships is acting benevolently and 
this passage suggests that this activity, acting benevolently, is a kind of work that entails 
the moral, psychological, and physical growth of another human being. In the case of the 
benefactor, one is not merely loaning money to another, for that would be an instance of 
the creditor/debtor relationship. Nor is the work of benevolence similar to the friendship 
activities Aristotle says elsewhere constitute the activity of friendship, things like 
drinking, hunting, and doing philosophy (NE 1172a1-5). Quite the contrary, the work of 
benevolence seems to entail a certain kind of effort that runs deeper than merely caring 
about, in the way that Tronto discusses, or being financially generous. This is work that is 
bodily in nature, in addition to requiring cognitive and moral effort. Yet, as we will see 
below, despite what some of have interpreted as a strong disregard for bodily labor in 
Aristotle‟s work, here we see him placing a premium on bodily labor, at least in the 
context of the benevolence that characterizes the best sort of friendships. This work of 
producing or sustaining an other seems quite worth the costs and is even enjoyable to the 
one who “acts benevolently,” even though the fruits of that labor may never produce 
anything externally valuable. Aristotle says that this work of “producing” another is one 
of the finest activities because it is part of our own self-actualization (NE 1168a5). 
Further, he believes this laboring of helping other to flourish actually works over time to 
produce more love and fondness for those in our care: 
What is pleasant is actualization in the present, expectation for the future, and 
memory of the past; but what is most pleasant is the [action we do] insofar as we 
are actualized, and this is also most lovable. For the benefactor, then, his product 
endures, since the fine is long-lasting; but for the person acted on, the useful 
passes away... Moreover, loving is like production, while being loved is like being 
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acted on; and [the benefactor‟s] love and friendliness are the result of this greater 
activity. Further, everyone is fond of whatever has taken effort to produce; for 
instance, people who have made money themselves are fonder of it than people 
who have inherited it. And while receiving a benefit seems to take no effort, 
giving one is hard work. This is also why mothers love their children more [than 
fathers do], since giving birth is more effort for them, and they know better that 
the children are theirs. And this also would seem to be proper to benefactors (NE 
168a15-1168b28). 
 
In this way, doing well by others can lead to an increase in friendly feeling towards them.  
Of course, we know that doing well by others will not always feel good to us, moment to 
moment; in almost all caregiving relationships, we find feelings of resentment on the part 
of the caregiver and receiver of care, despite the fact that the one caring, even a non-
intimate caregiver who is paid for her services, often develops feelings of deep 
attachment and even love for the one cared for. Unfortunately, Aristotle glosses over the 
complicated nature of relationships of care, at least in the case of friendships and the 
mother-child dyad. The inequality that is such a central feature of caring relationships 
creates important challenges that he avoids discussion of entirely and though he writes so 
beautifully about the intrinsic worth of doing well by others, he does not help us to see 
the complicated feelings and thoughts involved in the work of friendship and care.  
 It is true that Aristotle‟s conception of justice, which is sketchy to be sure, would 
suggest that the one who does the work of care is deserving of more honors. The one who 
chooses virtue is the one who deserves our honor. Perhaps this is one way to think about 
his thoughts on friendships between unequals, wherein one person chooses the friendship 
because of its intrinsic value and the other for some external end. He writes that, “the 
superior person should get more honor, and the needy person more profit, since honor is 
the reward of virtue and beneficence, while profit is what supplies need (NE 1163b3-5). 
In other words, I am suggesting that Aristotle might say that the one who chooses to do 
 54 
the caring and benevolent work that sustains many friendships is deserving of our esteem; 
yet, for this to hold true, the work of care in family and friendship must be a real choice. 
And we know that free men could choose to care in ancient Athens and they can today; 
but women and slaves could not make that choice and many still cannot today—they do 
this work out of necessity, and they do it without the honor Aristotle would have us 
believe they deserve. Nevertheless, there is an important moment in the above passage 
for our thinking about embodied care and it comes in Aristotle‟s association of the love 
mothers feel for their children not with some essential quality that rests within women but 
rather with the work of laboring to develop capacities in someone else. His point is not 
the essentialist one that women are more loving towards their children simply because 
they are women, though this passage is sometimes interpreted this way; rather, Aristotle 
is saying that women come to love children more only as a result of the activity they have 
done (as women) for them, in particular, pregnancy, labor, and, I think we can infer, the 
labor of child-rearing in general. Presumably, fathers who do the work of care would be, 
on this account, better benefactors, caregivers, and friends to their children than women 
who give birth but do little else for their child. They would also be acting excellently, 
since participating in friendships, which requires this work of care, is one of the main 
ways that we express our virtue and our goodness. Good friends are benefactors of a sort, 
and this work of active benevolence suggests a caring for, not just about, others. Friends 
are valuable in Aristotle‟s conception of the good life both because they are co-partners 
in our agency and also because they provide opportunities for us to take up the activity of 
giving care.  
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Family 
 We can also think about the importance of caregiving for Aristotle in terms of the 
way he conceives of the work that goes on in the family (oikia) and its relationship to 
political life. As has already been noted, feminist theorists often criticize Aristotle for 
excluding women from the political realm and from participation in virtue and practical 
wisdom. These criticisms are warranted but they do not go deep enough to investigate the 
contributions the family makes to political life, even if only to subvert the strain that too 
much civic mindedness can put on individuals and communities. Stephen Salkever argues 
that familial life is important to Aristotle, not only because it prepares us for political life 
by instilling in us a notion of shame and a desire to do noble things, but because “it 
provides a separate focus of attention and care—a real job to do—which can check the 
danger of excessive civic mindedness that seems always to threaten to turn the most 
tightly knit cities into armed camps.”66 Similarly, Arlene Saxonhouse has argued that 
Aristotle insists on the importance of the family “for concern for affectionate ties of care 
and love between human beings. He insists that the sense of oneself as an individual, as 
different in form, must be prior to a sense of oneself as a political equal.”67 This is 
consistent with Salkever‟s reading of Aristotle as striving to undermine rather than 
support the evaluative hierarchy of civic life over and above family life, which draws 
heavily on Aristotle‟s criticisms of an intensely political life in Book 2 of Politics. In 
counter-balance to the virility and masculinist nature of the political realm, the family, for 
Aristotle, is one important arena in which we develop a capacity for deliberative choice, 
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care, attachment, and ethical perception. Salkever explains: 
For Aristotle, our human identity—as beings who can come into our own through 
living thoughtfully—requires both polity and family, and the latter even more (in 
one sense) than the former. This argument, itself thoroughly biological in 
character (in that it is a teleological explanation of human relationships in terms 
of the specific life and needs of human beings), serves as the ground for the 
Aristotelian derogation of the Greek attachment to virility and love of honor, and 
to the hierarchy and differentiation of gender roles which is its consequence.
68
 
 
Salkever wants to highlight the humanizing work that the family does for Aristotle 
insofar as it is within families that we find relationships and activities (e.g., care, love, 
friendship, moral education) through which we realize the needs that uniquely define us 
as human beings. On Salkever‟s reading, families are certainly a separate focus from 
politics. Yet, it is also clear that Aristotle believes that living well in a city-state depends 
upon the health of families and friendships in a way that necessitates taking caring 
relationships seriously for political purposes. For him, more is required for a city-state to 
exist than a common location and mutual exchange: 
Rather, while these must be present if indeed there is to be a city-state, when all of 
the are present there is still not yet a city-state, but only when households and 
families live well as a community whose end is a complete and self-sufficient life. 
But this will not be possible unless they do inhabit one and the same location and 
practice intermarriage. That is why marriage connections arose in city-state, as 
well as brotherhoods, religious sacrifices, and the leisured pursuits of living 
together….And a city-state is the community of families and villages in a 
complete and self-sufficient life, which we say is living happily and nobly (Pol 
1280b30-40). 
 
Friendships and families provide the context for living happily and nobly, both to act 
benevolently as benefactors, that is, to do the labor of producing and sustaining another 
human being, and to participate in the relationships that help us correctly discern the kind 
of creatures we are and how we ought to live our lives. In and through these relationships 
of care and dependency, we find many opportunities for excellence and we discover and 
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rediscover our humanity.  Recall that, for Aristotle, this project of self-understanding, 
which is sustained through different kinds of activities in the public and private realms, is 
integral to human flourishing. Further, as Schwarzenbach has argued, the nurturing and 
caring work that goes on in the home, work that women have historically performed and 
are largely responsible for today, furthers philia in Aristotle‟s view, which is not only 
intrinsically valuable to the good life but is also important political work, since friendship 
is what, according to Aristotle, “holds states together,” (NE 115a22). 69 
 Care, then, is an activity, a virtue, that we should seek as an end in itself, even as 
we acknowledge that it has very important external ends related to the flourishing of 
those who are in need of care, preparation for the duties of political life, or, if it happens 
to be an occupation, a steady income so that we may live well. Of course, to count as full 
virtue, we must come to enjoy an activity for its own sake such that it constitutes its own 
end, regardless of whether or not it achieves its planned goals (NE 1105a30-34). This is 
consistent with Aristotle‟s understanding of eudaimonia and the virtues. We do not, for 
example, only act courageous when we know that we will defeat whatever threatens us. 
But what does it mean to say that one must come to enjoy the practice of a particular 
virtue for its own sake? Is it the case that one must always finds pleasure in it, moment to 
moment? Although it is clearly the case that we are happiest when we live a good and 
virtuous life, happiness in Aristotle‟s view does not amount to a mere psychological state 
or a particular feeling.
70
  
 The relationship between virtue and pleasure is somewhat unclear in Aristotle. But 
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we can at least say that whether or not a person finds pleasure in a particular activity 
depends not on the activity itself per say, but rather on whether or not the person is 
someone who, in general, acts well for the right reasons and so is someone we can say is 
good; someone with a stable disposition to acting well. In Books II-IV of Ethics, we see 
that virtue requires not just intellectual understanding but the proper direction of 
emotions and desires. It is true that only the virtuous person performs virtuous activity 
without feeling strained and finds a kind of pleasure in them. But virtue also requires a 
deep commitment to living one‟s life in a particular sort of way despite the challenges 
that living virtuously might entail. Otherwise, Aristotle could not say that the truly brave 
person, “stands firm against terrifying situations and enjoys it, or at least does not find it 
painful, he is brave; if he finds it painful, he is cowardly. For virtues of character is about 
pleasures and pains,” (NE 1104b5-9). This passage suggests that whether or not a person 
feels pleasure while being virtuous depends both on the person and on the activity itself. 
Caregiving, like courage, will entail moments that are not pleasurable, but they are done 
in the service of something that brings one a great deal of pleasure—living an excellent 
life. Further, habituation to the virtues involves properly training desires such that one 
comes to find pleasure in a certain practice over time. This will involve not just the 
normalization of a task that once proved difficult, but also finding pleasure in more 
skillfully and successfully engaging in an activity over time. One might still find 
weariness, frustration, and even anger in the activity of caring, just as one might still feel 
fear while acting courageously. Yet these feelings do not necessarily constitute pain or 
the absence of a deeper pleasure, nor do they necessarily threaten to compromise the 
virtuous person‟s deeper commitment to doing just actions. 
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 Aristotle takes seriously the desire human beings have to form strong attachments 
and to give care to others. At the same time, his discussion of the work that goes on in 
friendship and families cannot be said to require unthinking devotion to an other; indeed, 
this care work requires a concern for the self and for the other, as well as sharp cognitive 
and perceptual judgment. I am not claiming that Aristotle is defining morality in terms of 
what we owe to other people, for such an ethic would potentially foster women‟s 
tendency to disregard their own needs in the activity of tending to others‟ needs. Rather, I 
am arguing that Aristotle thinks that all of us are more complete when they actively do 
well by others with whom they share a moral life and a political constitution. It should be 
all the more appealing, then, to theorists of care who rightly worry about too much self-
sacrifice, self-abnegation, and a lack of critical distance between the caregiver and the 
cared-for. In doing well by others, says Aristotle, “the excellent person awards more of 
the fine to himself,” such that even if we decide to give our lives for the sake of another, 
we are, at the same time, “choosing something great and fine” for ourselves (NE 
1169a35-7, 25-30).  
 
IV. EMBODIED CARE AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
 Thus far I have been making a case for why Aristotle‟s ethical and political treatises 
are fruitful resources for an ethic of care that takes the activity of caregiving to be 
constitutive of a life well lived. Aristotle, of course, includes monetary generosity in his 
list of virtues and there is certainly a caring desire to do well by others that motivates 
these acts of generosity. Further, his understanding of the good life is one that is deeply 
enriched by friendships, family, and civic association, which, as we have seen, are 
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defined in part by the sincere interest we take in the flourishing of others, in wishing 
them well and doing well by them. At this point, we should be able to see at least an 
outline of care in Aristotle‟s thought that cannot be captured by the concept of labor; nor 
is it a sentiment that is necessarily associated with women only. Indeed, what is 
remarkable, to my mind, is that care is an important activity for human flourishing and 
citizenship in Aristotle‟s view, and yet it is an activity that is associated with women, a 
group that Aristotle at times seems to believe are not quite fully human and obviously 
unworthy of citizenship. 
 Recall the definition of embodied care that I offered in the introductory chapter. I 
said that embodied care is an ethic that understands individual and social morality as 
deeply bound up with the caring relationships and communities in which human beings 
are embedded, and which cannot be adequately understood without attending to the 
corporeal practices that constitute such relationships. I also said that it is a set of practices 
whereby individuals take up the work of caring for the bodies of others predominantly 
with and through their own bodies, in a mindful way. Further, and as we will see in 
Chapter Four, a caregiver adopts a particular corporeal style, has a unique set of physical 
habits and techniques in her repertoire, and is often engaged in ongoing interaction with 
body matter and caregiving objects and materials necessary for material and social 
reproduction. This is, at best, implicit in Aristotle‟s thought, as well as that of most 
theorists of care; yet, the elucidation of the embodied nature of caregiving is crucial for 
improving our understanding of the inequality that characterizes much “carework” and 
for thinking about how to produce more subjects capable and desiring of giving care.  
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It seems a fair question to ask at this point, how much can Aristotle really 
contribute to a care ethic that values all aspects of care, specifically the most bodily forms 
of caregiving? Could Aristotle accommodate the view that caring for vulnerable, 
diseased, and “broken” bodies is constitutive of virtue and doing well? In other words, 
does Aristotle help us to imagine that the person living an excellent life is one who is also 
doing the “dirty work” of caring for those who are unable to care for themselves? 
Aristotle does not, as is well known, value the activities that we today conceive of as the 
messy work of caregiving (changing diapers, bathing the infirm and elderly, dressing 
wounds, and so on); indeed, at times he explicitly devalues that work. The magnanimous 
person is likely not going about changing bedpans, wiping up vomit and shit, serving as 
midwife to women in labor, or helping the elderly to die. This was work that women and 
slaves performed, of course, not citizens.
71
 Despite his insistence that the good life is one 
that is deeply bound up with the flourishing and happiness of others, we would be hard 
pressed to make the case that, for Aristotle, a genuine wish to contribute to others‟ 
flourishing and happiness in any way corresponds to a practice of embodied care.  
The question of whether or not Aristotle should defend embodied care is a much 
more promising one, however, especially given his views on human flourishing, activity, 
and doing well by others. Aristotle is not a thinker who entirely eschews the body, as his 
close attention to practice, habit, and activity—and, importantly, their relationship to 
human knowledge—all show. Unlike his predecessor, Plato, Aristotle believed that moral 
subjects were never free from bodily desire and that our own well being is deeply 
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dependent on the care others take with us, as well as features of the natural world beyond 
our control; further, these facts about human existence are not something to be overcome 
but rather something to be valued. I believe that his contributions to our judgments about 
the way that humans might live flourishing lives as rational creatures with fully animal 
bodies are inconsistent with his failure to address the value of performing even the most 
“unpleasant” acts of care. I will now connect some of Aristotle‟s beliefs about 
personhood and the good life to a set of arguments for why the messy bodily practices of 
care are also integral to human excellence. 
We might think about the justifications for my claim as circulating around 
different forms of knowledge—knowledge of our bodily limitations and possibilities, as 
well as knowledge related to various ways of self-consciously inhabiting one‟s body, 
mindful of the goal of achieving excellence through care. Recall that for Aristotle every 
species and living creature has its own nature, reflected in the particular function (ergon), 
or work, common to that creature; the function of a particular creature, if properly 
cultivated and nurtured, will reflect its nature in the fullest sense. The work of the human 
being is, of course, not caregiving, but rather action in accord with reason; our unique 
work, then, is choosing the right end, for the right reasons, and then acting in such a way 
as to bring about that end.  We are the deciders of which path is best for us in achieving 
the best life possible, and that life must include numerous opportunities for deliberating 
and deciding. Humans decide how we will live together. Another way of saying this is 
that knowing is part of the action of being good.
72
 It is my view that the knowledge about 
our uniquely human condition that we gain by practicing embodied care, as well as the 
potential to transform ourselves into more caring human beings that becomes available 
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through such practices, enriches our lives in a way that is consonant with Aristotle‟s 
understanding of the work of human beings and their potential for human excellence. In 
what remains of this chapter, I will offer an outline sketch of some ways that embodied 
care is related to the work of human beings. Each of these suggestions will be more 
capaciously filled out in the chapters to follow. 
Account of Personhood, Or Self-Knowledge 
As Aristotle makes clear, what we first want in constructing (or revising) a vision 
of the good life is a clear and vivid picture of the kind of creature for whom such a life is 
possible. Constructing such a vision will most certainly entail empirical observation, but 
it will also mean acquiring knowledge through activity. Despite the special place 
Aristotle holds out for theoria, he also shows us that we come to understand our actions 
more deeply by cultivating a practice around whatever it is we seek to know or to do 
well.
73
 Through cultivating a practice we come to better grasp relevant particulars and are 
able to exercise our capacities for finely tuned discernment and judgment based on what 
we have learned through practice. What we want, then, is to engage in a range of 
activities that reveal to us the unique kinds of creatures we are, possessing a plurality of 
possibilities and limitations. This kind of work will help us immensely in determining 
what sorts of things we need our political institutions to aim at.  
Embodied care, in a very real way, forces us to confront and negotiate the 
radically vulnerable and contingent aspect of all our lives. In caring for the bodies of 
others, we come to better understand what we are, human beings inhabiting distinctly 
animal bodies. Our bodies in their most unsettling state—weak, leaky, deficient, 
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decaying—confront us. And when caregivers enter into relationships of care, they stand 
before some potential version of themselves; that picture, while often destabilizing, is 
important to developing a self-understanding that admits of limitations and weaknesses.  
Practical Wisdom, Or Knowledge of Ends and How to Achieve Them 
For Aristotle, human beings should seek knowledge of all things, but most 
especially how we are meant to live, so that they may flourish as fully actualized beings 
that deliberate together and decide wisely. Embodied care prompts us to identify certain 
ends and then to begin the difficult work of formulating political and ethical responses to 
facts of dependency and need. This is true in at least two senses. First, in a very general 
way, as a practice that always entails the facts of necessity and imperfection, embodied 
care can reorient our thoughts and feelings about what a human life should be and what 
sorts of achievements are even possible or desirable, living as we do, in an animal body. 
We come to see that some of us have severe limitations that frustrate things like progress, 
physical achievements, autonomy, inviolability, and sufficiency. And these are quite 
permanent states for many of us. In other words, some human beings will not experience 
a great deal of “improvement” in their physical or mental states, they will never “get 
better,” a fact that does not fit comfortably within the many post-enlightenment narratives 
of progress that permeate political discourses and worldviews in late-modernity. In other 
words, we often seem quite unwilling to accept that some of us are simply where we are 
and where that is might be less than ideal, or perhaps pretty awful. Cultivating a practice 
of embodied care should involve an acceptance of human limitations, coming to 
understand human frailty and need, and the development of the emotional, physical, and 
cognitive skills required to properly care for ourselves and for others.  
 65 
Even more concretely than a new awareness around human finitude, then, the 
activity of practicing care is crucial for acquiring the precise techniques and habits of 
caregiving. We cannot develop the proper affective, physical, and cognitive skills 
appropriate to giving care if we are not first habituated to that activity. Mastering 
knowledge of the right tones of voice, forms of touch, methods and techniques for 
bathing, feeding, nursing, changing bedpans, cleaning and dressing wounds, and simply 
comforting the sick, requires participation in caring relationships. Further, these are skills 
that must not only be developed and sharpened through habituation; they must be 
preserved in and through ongoing practice. The more we care for others, the more we 
discover about the caring needs of human beings, and the more we discover about our 
own potential needs. Embodied care is fundamental to human flourishing because 
without it we would have a very incomplete picture of ourselves, of what it means to be 
fully human. It is also necessary for gaining knowledge of the forms that good care can 
take, care that we have come to see, through tending to the bodies of others, is a central 
feature of human existence. 
Ethical Emotions and Affective Knowledge 
Caregiving can orient our attention to body-mind connections and encourage 
forms of corporeal mindfulness that can otherwise be difficult to achieve in a culture that 
emphasizes efficiency and virtuality at the expense of mindfulness and presence. As 
creatures with both affective and deliberative capacities, humans have the potential to 
train or shape their emotional responses to the external world. What does this work look 
like? I am certainly not suggesting that one can or even should try to tell oneself not to 
feel sadness when tragedy has struck, or anger in the face of an injustice simply because 
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such feelings are not pleasurable to us; this would be neither effective nor wise. Indeed 
these emotions can be productive and quite correct. But it does mean that our emotions 
are not always appropriate or effective and that sometimes they need to be adjusted to 
better fit a situation in which we are called on to act morally.  
Taking up the challenging activity of embodied care opens up several quite 
unique opportunities to alter our current emotional states when it comes to bodies that 
violate norms of health and beauty. As we have said, caregivers use their senses to do the 
work of care and they frequently interact with bodily fluids, waste, and material that 
many of us typically recoil from. But, following Aristotle‟s view of habituation and the 
virtues, we know that we can alter even the most visceral responses, such as fear or 
desire, through practice. Ongoing interaction with bodies that appear frightening or even 
contaminating to us can actually go a long way towards recalibrating our responses to 
such bodies and to our own bodies when they seem to fail us. A dirty diaper may never 
come to smell good to the parent or caregiver who must tend to them day in and day out, 
but it must be the case that the more one changes dirty diapers, the more indifferent one 
becomes to the smell and sight of human waste. Cultivating a critical practice of 
embodied care has the potential to alter reactions of disgust and fear of bodies in need of 
care. Another way of saying this is that a practice of embodied care can function as an 
antidote to anti-democratic forms of normalization, encountering bodies that resist 
dominant ideals of personhood. 
Freeing Ourselves Through Care 
An ethic of embodied care has the power to lead to democratic transformations of 
the self. To begin with, embodied care can provide the context for cultivating practices of 
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self-care and self-governance by offering a structure and set of norms within which we 
might cultivate a “disposition to steadiness” in our relations with the self and others.74 
These new pictures of the self that come into focus through embodied care can cultivate 
feelings that aide us in becoming more free, by which I mean less gripped by unrealistic 
images of the bodies we inhabit. Embodied care also has the power to make vivid for us 
connections between the emotional, intellectual, and corporeal aspects of human life. 
When we witness, from some critical distance (which is, an achievement and not a given 
in caring relationships), just how powerfully beliefs or emotions can shape bodily 
experiences—for example, how a person‟s sadness, fear, or emotional trauma is related to 
their physical pain—we are confronted with the reality that bodies are much more 
complicated than objects that function independently of our self-understandings and 
emotional well-being. Bodies anticipate and respond to cultural norms in a multiplicity of 
ways. Ideas—about wellness and disease, pain and pleasure, beauty and unattractiveness, 
normality and abnormality, what sort of life is grievable and what sort of life is not—are 
instantiated corporeally. Using our own bodies to care for the bodies of others creates 
opportunities to foster mindfulness about this fact and illuminate the difficulties of 
compartmentalizing the body and viewing it as separate from the realm of ideas, norms, 
and discourse. By practicing embodied care we begin to see that bodily experiences are 
shaped and conditioned by the world around us and by perceptions of that world.  
For example, many in the medical community believe that one of the most 
common causes of back pain is clinical depression. Confronting whatever is going on 
with a patient psychologically or emotionally is often necessary in order to properly 
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“treat” the pain, though it must be said that the medical community has also done a poor 
job of actually developing more integrative methods for treatment in this regard. 
Similarly, eating disorders and self-starvation are much more prevalent in wealthy 
Western societies that are often extremely image-conscious and obsessed with weight-
loss and dieting. Drawing on the work of Foucault, feminist theorists and social-
psychologists have argued that these illnesses are evidence of the powerful grip that 
social power and dominant ideologies can have on bodies; women‟s disordered eating 
and distorted self-perceptions about body size are can be understood as reflective of deep 
and widespread cultural psychopathologies related to beauty and gender norms.
75
 
 Where is the bodily potential in all of this? Further, what does the fact that bodily 
existence is partly constituted by political discourses and processes of normalization have 
to do with care? First, a concept of embodied care that acknowledges the power of norms 
to shape self-understandings points to the possibility of transforming those social 
imaginaries and problematic modes of inhabiting bodies. I do not mean to suggest that we 
can think ourselves out of illness or disease by practicing embodied care, but rather than 
we can begin to take seriously the idea that bodily habits and corporeal styles are deeply 
connected to the socio-political realm we construct for ourselves. Taking this seriously 
would mean urging democratic transformations that work to secure healthier bodies and 
corporeal styles that reflect rather than contradict democratic values. In short, it would 
mean acknowledging the political dimensions of bodily subjectivity, accepting that there 
is a range of constraints—natural, material, discursive—that constitute and fashion 
bodies. There is a certain kind of freedom that comes about with this knowledge, a 
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freedom that stands in stark contrast to the Cartesian conception of freedom as free will 
or Berlin‟s notion of negative liberty as the freedom to simply be left alone.76 Indeed, 
bodily necessity and constraint complicates both notions of freedom. Rather than 
desperately trying to tear necessity away from freedom, we might rethink the relationship 
between the two.  
 Cultivating a disposition to steadiness must also entail learning how to be gentle, a 
quality that might be captured by Aristotle‟s conception of mildness, but also qualities 
like generosity and kindness. The gentleness required for care is related to the kind of 
freedom mentioned above; it requires accepting the limitations of our friends, family, but 
also our fellow citizens. To be gentle in our interactions with others requires relaxing our 
expectations and desires for things to always go well and for others to succeed as 
embodied subjects. This is indeed difficult to do because so much of our own well-being 
and ends (political and otherwise) are, as Aristotle teaches us, bound up with the 
happiness and flourishing of others. Yet gentleness does not require passivity, but in fact 
it may work to heighten our awareness rather than relax it. We must develop new forms 
of attention that encourage us to focus on the particulars of the sick person‟s state. We 
must learn to listen and to see differently and these forms of attention require a turning 
away from the various distractions of our own “discrete” lives. The point I wish to make 
is not that care requires that we all be gentle all of the time, certainly not. But rather that 
the gentleness and patience care demands are also features of a society that accepts that 
we don‟t always get to determine the course of our lives, to construct our own stories. 
Gentle is a mode of being in the world that strikes me as undervalued today, yet much 
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needed. 
 We might object to all of this and say that care simply cannot be constitutive of 
flourishing for the simple fact that it does not bring us enough pleasure and is often quite 
miserable. But we must remember that for Aristotle, flourishing is not synonymous with 
a psychological state of happiness, and this calls us to rethink the relationship between 
pleasure and excellence more generally. In other words, doing well will not always feel 
like we are doing very well in his account of the good life. Aristotle tells us that, “[N]ot 
all the excellences give rise to pleasant activity, except to the extent that pleasant activity 
touches on the end itself,” (117b15) and he gives the examples of courage and 
temperance (Ethics, 1117b10). The courageous soldier will experience fear in the face of 
danger and surely pain upon being stabbed with the enemy‟s sword, yet he will also, and 
hopefully simultaneously, experience a certain kind of pleasure in attaining the end that is 
practicing courage. So this isn‟t a classical republican conception of virtue where “virtue 
is its own reward” and we do good deeds, not because they are pleasurable, but because 
we have to. We do find pleasure in practicing human excellence but there is also 
challenge and pleasure is something that may be less immediately present at different 
times. It is also the case that we become more excellent, the more we engage in excellent 
activities. So, following Aristotle, we become more generous the more we practice 
generosity, more temperate the more we practice temperance; it is reasonable to imagine 
that progress with respect to a particular practice will coincide with a quieting of the 
inner-conflict that can attend practicing the virtues. 
 I think this is a useful model for thinking about how to conceptualize embodied 
care; in other words, feelings of disgust, fear, and even resentment might be inescapable 
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in the practice of embodied care, at least at the start, but the more we take up the activity 
of caregiving, the better able we are to practice care. However, as I said, for some virtues 
(like courage and temperance, and I would add to this embodied care), there is likely to 
always exist some sort of conflict with respect to our emotions and feelings, but this is 
certainly no reason for us to reject out of hand the possibility of a (sometimes) deeply 
unpleasant activity to count as constitutive of a flourishing life 
To summarize, then: Embodied care is central to human flourishing because it (1) 
is an experience that gives us a more realistic picture of personhood, and self-knowledge 
is an integral part of human excellence, (2) prompts ethical and political responses to 
facts of embodiment and need, and living ethically and politically is something that 
humans are naturally disposed to do, (3) is an important context for altering our current 
emotional and visceral responses to bodies that violate norms of health and beauty, and 
coming to see things more correctly is also an exercise in human reason and practical 
wisdom required for flourishing, and (4) promotes a healthier mode of embodiment, one 
that involves gentleness, patience, and acceptance of forces that are very often beyond 
our control, thus encouraging us to rethink the relationship between freedom and bodily 
necessity. Relationships and communities of care lead to the discovery of knowledge 
about human beings—self discovering, of a sort—and they open up the possibility of 
transforming our actions in accordance with this knowledge. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Making practices of embodied care a feature of any polity entails the acceptance 
that a moral self cannot develop and flourish outside of social relationships that are, 
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among other things to be sure, communities of care that call on us to discover truths 
about who we are and to transform our actions in accordance with these new discoveries. 
Care and the gentleness it requires are constitutive of a political life, a life lived in 
common with others who are imperfect, who are in need, and who are also reflections of 
ourselves. Aristotle thought that the virtuous person seeks the truth in all things, but 
especially knowledge as it relates to the sort of creatures we are and might become. For 
this reason, he should accept that embodied care is constitutive of human excellence, and 
so should we. The bodily work of care forces us to confront the facts of human animality 
and fragility, but it does much more than this, as I hope to have shown. It calls on us to 
make use of the uniquely human capacity to take that knowledge and, through the 
transformation of our actions and habits, put it in the service of human excellence.  
If we follow Aristotle‟s understanding of political inquiry as largely directed 
towards determining how to best promote the good life, then to say that caregiving is 
constitutive of that life is to also commit oneself to the idea that our polity is responsible 
for creating the conditions that make caregiving possible. Recall that this is an important 
point of contact between traditional care ethics and Aristotle, and it‟s one that I, too, 
endorse. Living excellently requires community and politics is the activity through which 
we collectively structure our shared life. Now I want to very briefly consider some of the 
practical considerations of what I have said. I will discuss each of these in more detail 
Chapter Five, but for now let me just make a few remarks that point us in that direction. 
 First, a conception of caregiving as necessary for living an excellent life means that 
it must be widely shared and not withheld from particular individuals and groups. Of 
course, caregiving is currently widely devalued and frequently outsourced, so this is an 
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odd way to put the point; caregiving, it would seem, is not an activity or a good that most 
currently believe to be so valuable that its denial to citizens actually constitutes harm.  
Indeed, our society has failed to restructure work/family policies since women‟s entrance 
into the labor market and, although more men are taking on caregiving roles than they 
once did, we know that women continue to do the majority of carework in and outside of 
the home. We have not successfully secured caregiving for men, through social norms, 
education, and public policy aimed at restructuring work/family arrangements, and we 
have made it immensely difficult for women from all class backgrounds to both work and 
be the primary caregivers in the household (though many, of course, do both). And if we 
want these individuals to flourish, then we must find ways that allow all workers to also 
care for their loved ones. 
 Similarly, care can no longer be the work of the marginalized and oppressed, 
which, as I shall show in Chapter Four, it has always been to some extent and is 
increasingly associated with immigrant labor and undocumented workers. This is a 
problem not only because those of us who are privileged miss out on something that 
contributes to our actualization as human beings, but also because the exploitation of 
careworkers and the continued devaluation of this work by dominant groups only 
engenders feelings of resentment on the part of those performing care, which threatens 
caring relationships. I am also not suggesting that caregivers in the current system of care 
are morally superior to non-caregivers; indeed, the unjust arrangements of care that 
constitute and contribute to the “care crisis” we face today appear to exclude the 
possibility of precisely this sort of excellence that a more ideal ethic of embodied care 
reflects. Further, when care is the work of devalued persons, it reflects and reifies the 
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myth that some people are just naturally nurturing and really enjoy doing carework, 
despite its devalued status in the labor market and in society, thus making it “easier,” in a 
sense, to keep them in a marginalized and relegated position. This is another way of 
romanticizing care and, in turn, contributes to the codification of certain kinds of people 
as natural caregivers. And all of this only makes a widespread achievement of embodied 
care more challenging, as well as the taking up of carework by people in positions of 
privilege or power. 
 So we will need to think seriously about how we might habituate all citizens to 
care, which may be accomplished in and through educational programs and a range of 
social services that teach people how to care and help to provide support systems so that 
caregivers are less isolated. Indeed, this is not an altogether unfamiliar concept in the 
West, as many Western European countries have free programs for new parents to help 
them learn how to care for their infant children; in the States, too, these sorts of programs 
are in place, but usually only for low income mothers, the assumption being that they are 
the only people who need an education in how to care for their dependents. But one 
imagines that many new parents need this sort of education and perhaps many of us will 
need some kind of training and support for caring for our aging parents too. This could be 
provided by social programs that seek to cultivate in citizens the requisite skills and 
techniques. Outsourcing is only one option but, though necessary sometimes, it is far 
from the best. Although this does presume that individuals and not states per say will 
perform carework, I see this possibility as fundamentally different from the current 
system which just throws back onto citizens caregiving responsibilities without giving 
them the necessary skills to perform that work and the ethical and material resources that 
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make caring for others possible and a desirable choice. 
 It is also useful to consider how we can work to support—materially and 
civically—communities of care. We might imagine public care in a variety of ways, 
depending on context. We know of successful “communities of care” in which able-
bodied and disabled persons, dependents and caregivers, live and work together. Let me 
give just one example: In Living Gently in a Violent World: The Prophetic Power of 
Weakness, authors Stanly Hauerwas and Jean Vanier write about L‟Arche, a non-profit 
organization which establishes and operates caring communities where individuals who 
are in some way dependent on a great deal of care and abled-bodied people come to live 
together.
77
 I have something very much like these communities in mind when thinking 
about how we might structure and support public communities of care. Founder of 
L‟Arche, Jean Vanier, talks explicitly about the power that caring for and living with 
severely mentally and physically disabled individuals has to transform the non-disabled 
person‟s self-understandings and even their bodily habits. Vanier comments on his earlier 
experiences of personal growth and development through embodied care at L‟Arche: 
We began living together, buying food, cooking, cleaning, working in the garden, 
etc. I knew really nothing about the needs of handicapped people. All I wanted to 
do was to create community with them. Of course, I did have a tendency to tell 
them what to do; I organized and planned the day without asking their opinion or 
desire. I suppose this was necessary in some ways, for we did not know each 
other and they came from a very structured situation. But I had a lot to learn about 
listening to the needs of handicapped people; I had a lot to discover about their 
capacity to grow.
78
 
 
The authors go on to discuss the limits of political theory for revealing to us the value—
to us and to those for whom we care—of living with those who are unable to care for 
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themselves. “Significance,” they write, “found in sharing one‟s life with another 
person—a significance that will usually come as a surprise—cannot be found outside the 
activity itself.”79 Interestingly, the authors go on to criticize and set themselves apart 
from Aristotle, claiming that this sort of friendship, on which L‟Arche is founded, is far 
superior to Aristotle‟s understanding of friendship, which, according to them, does not 
allow for friendships between radically disabled and able-bodied persons. As should be 
clear, I think there is textual evidence to suggest that this is more of an open question for 
Aristotle and, in fact, it strikes me that there is a deep tension in Aristotle‟s work around 
just this point: If friends really do love nothing more than to live together always and if 
friendships are most necessary for the good life because friends care for us in times of 
need and afford us opportunities to become excellent through good deeds, then it makes 
very little sense to cut out from friendships the important work of embodied care, which 
is so fundamental to human fragility and excellence.  
 That aside, I do think the authors miss another deeply Aristotelian moment in their 
own thinking and it has much to do with the relationship between practice and 
knowledge. Caregiving communities based on the necessity of caregiving for “becoming 
human” and not solely on the instrumental goals of care are evidence of how we might 
still benefit from Aristotle‟s understanding of political and ethical inquiry, which begins, 
not with exercises in abstract moral reasoning, but rather with what we observe when we 
take a look around.
80
 Participating in communities of care is both a way of living 
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by Jean Vanier (1998), in which he discusses the role that caregiving has played in his own life in 
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excellently and an important method for determining how to best achieve the excellence 
that is caregiving. Many liberal theorists have advanced political principles defending 
why we ought to care about those in need of care; in other words, they have shown why 
children, the disabled, and the terminally ill have a share in justice despite their inability 
to live up to the liberal account of personhood.
81
 But if embodied care is truly a virtue, 
then we need to better understand why we ought to live with such people rather than 
merely secure the material conditions that make their care (by someone else) possible. 
We need to come to see how living with those who need our care in order to live well can 
enrich our own lives. This kind of knowledge can only come about when we have 
sufficient opportunities to live just this way, in communities of care. It may be the case 
that we cannot even know what constitutes justice with regard to the radically dependent 
until we live with such people; but it is most certainly the case that we cannot know how 
caring for them will change who we are and widen our own possibilities for excellence 
and freedom until we do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
helping him to understand what it means to be human. See: Jean Vanier, Becoming Human (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1998). 
 
81 For examples, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 
Nussbaum, "The Future of Feminist Liberalism.", John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), West, "The Right to 
Care." 
  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
DOES EVERY BODY CARE? 
CULTIVATING A CRITICAL PRACTICE OF CARE 
 
 
At the very moment when I live in the world, 
when I am given over to my plans, my 
occupations, my friends, my memories, I can 
close my eyes, lie down, listen to the blood 
pulsating in my ears, lose myself in some 
pleasure or pain, and shut myself up on this 
anonymous life which subtends my personal one. 
But precisely because my body can shut itself off 
from the world, it is also what opens me out 
upon the world and places me in a situation 
there.  
 
       —Merleau-Ponty,  
        Phenomenology of Perception 
 
And so the virtues arise in us neither by nature 
nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able 
to acquire them, and we are completed through 
habit. 
 
       —Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics   
 
Care theorists and feminists from a wide range of disciplines have successfully 
shown us some of the dangers—for philosophy and for politics—of failing to 
acknowledge the facts of human dependency and vulnerability. All human beings share 
an ongoing need for a considerable amount of care over the course of a lifetime and, it 
has been well argued, we would do well to take that fact into account when designing 
political institutions and the principles by which we are to govern ourselves. Yet, 
although care is quite obviously a necessary feature of our bodily human existence, care 
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theorists have not yet seriously explored the bodily dimensions of care, in particular the 
embodied practice of giving care.  
This chapter offers a critique of one of the few sustained theoretical investigations 
into the body and care, Maurice Hamington‟s work entitled Embodied Care: Jane 
Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics.
82
 Hamington is an exception to 
others who have overlooked the body in discussions of care.  He relies almost exclusively 
on Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology of the body in order to “attend to the corporeal 
aspects of mortality,” and to emphasize the ever-present character of care in human 
relationships. I shall argue, however, that despite the centrality of the body to this 
particular formulation, he offers little insight into how the experiences and habits 
constitutive of good caregiving become available to individuals who regularly practice 
care. Instead, with Hamington, care continues to exhibit a kind of taken-for-granted 
quality, but in a distinctly non-gendered way. Care is naturalized in his phenomenological 
picture and what emerges is a wholly undifferentiated, universal subject in possession of 
a shared “embodied knowledge of care,” the precise features of which remain as murky 
as the account of how it is acquired.  
In the second half of the chapter I continue to draw on insights from Aristotle in 
order to sketch out a theory of embodied care as critical practice. This view understands 
the cultivation of caring habits and dispositions in individuals as a distinctly political 
enterprise. Specifically, and in contrast to the phenomenological view, I explore the 
formation of caring habits, the role of choice in embodied care, and what it means to 
practice care in a way that is both fully corporeal and fully rational. I advance the 
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Aristotelian view that a caring disposition and practice, as part of an individual‟s 
character, is not something that is dependent upon given, internal qualities but is rather 
something that must be achieved and sustained through political education and 
habituation. 
 
I. CONNECTING CORPOREALITY TO CARE 
 Contemporary political thought has taken a “corporeal turn” in recent years and 
pure rationalism, it seems, is giving up the ghost.
83
 Scholars from a diverse set of 
traditions and disciplines with widely different intellectual interests and normative 
commitments are increasingly focusing on the body‟s relationship to politics and 
philosophy. Words like “corporeality,” “embodiment,” “biopolitics,” and the “lived 
body” are no longer exclusively the domain of obscure phenomenologists or 
postmodernists but are now commonplace in new book titles from a range of disciplines 
in the humanities and social sciences.
84
 In political theory, which has exhibited strong 
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tendencies toward Kantian-influenced philosophy for at least the past four decades, such 
titles are particularly alluring and seem to stand out for their sharp turn away from more 
common themes, such as distributive justice, political right and equality, public versus 
private, transnational justice, sovereignty, and political obligation.
85
  
The flesh‟s rise to fame likely has much to do with a deep and abiding interest in 
the work of Michel Foucault, who wrote most prolifically and persuasively on the 
relationship between power, bodies, and subjectivity.
86
 Indeed, much of the recent work 
on the body in political theory today is an extension of or a response to Foucault‟s 
thinking, shaped by the thought of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
and others who were concerned in various ways with the material, bodily aspects of 
human existence.
87
 Questions concerning the disciplinary nature of bodies and the way 
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that powerful discursive and disciplinary forces both hold “bodies in their grip” and 
constitute subjectivities remain a popular area of study in political thought. 
Perhaps more simply, though, the corporeal turn has a great deal to do with a 
desire to recover the body from a Western philosophical tradition that has, at best, 
relegated it to the margins and, at worst, explicitly rejected its relevance to philosophy 
and ethics. It is no surprise that the first and most insightful contributions in this area 
came from feminist theorists, queer theorists, and critical race theorists, all of whom have 
been concerned to make connections between the relegated status of the body in 
philosophy and the relegated status of persons in society associated with bodies in 
general and the particular kinds of bodies they inhabit—e.g, women, people of color, 
queers, disabled individuals. Elizabeth Grosz has gone so far as to claim that “since the 
inception of philosophy as a separate and self-contained discipline in ancient Greece, 
philosophy has established itself on the foundations of a profound somatophobia,” 
wherein the body, beginning with Plato‟s Cratylus and continuing up through much of 
contemporary liberal political theory, is regarded as a source of interference in and a 
threat to the functioning of reason.
88
 This mind/body distinction maps directly onto the 
association of men with the mind and of women with the body, where mind is to hold 
sway over body and man is to hold sway over woman. This particular mapping explains 
feminism‟s interest in recovering the body; for Grosz and others, recovering the 
experiences of women necessarily entails investigations into the body: 
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Given the coupling of the mind with maleness and the body with femaleness and 
given philosophy‟s own self-understanding as a conceptual enterprise, it follows 
that women and femininity are problematized as knowing philosophical subjects 
and as knowable epistemic objects. Woman…remains philosophy‟s eternal 
enigma, its mysterious and inscrutable object—this may be a product of the rather 
mysterious and highly restrained and contained status of the body in general, and 
of women‟s bodies in particular, in the construction of philosophy as a mode of 
knowledge.
89
 
 
Grosz and other feminists believe that the coding of femininity with corporeality must be 
analyzed and revealed as a particular construction of Woman rather than a natural, 
discoverable given. 
 At the same time, feminists also seek to reevaluate the relevance of corporeality 
for politics and to refigure the body in political thinking, which, they argue, has much to 
gain from a better understanding of how embodiment is related to cognitive, emotional, 
and moral capacities. It is not just women but men, too, who are embodied, reasoning 
creatures, after all. As Aristotle and Merleau-Ponty both understood, we live in a world 
that is incomprehensible outside of the particularity of specific bodies and interests and 
not context-free facts that hover in the atmosphere. Indeed, one way for women to 
subvert the problematic association of femininity with the body is for female 
philosophers to engage in critical inquiry into the corporeal nature of our moral and 
political life, as well as the political and moral dimensions of corporeality. 
 There is much disagreement among political thinkers regarding precisely how 
much weight and attention to give to the bodily character of our lives, or even whether it 
is wise to talk about things like affect, disposition, and disciplinary practices lest we risk 
constructing bodies as more real—or, natural—than they perhaps are.90 Perhaps because 
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of this worry, much of the literature in gender and cultural studies focuses on 
representations of the body but has the odd effect of actually obscuring bodies in favor of 
discussions of language, symbols, and belief.
91
 Emphasizing constructions and 
representations of the self and of bodies, which is one popular mode of theorizing about 
the body that risks losing sight of bodily practices, tactics of the self, or, as Nancy Luxon 
has recently named, in a discussion of Foucault‟s on parrhesia, ethical self-governance.92 
In my exploration of the relationship between care and embodiment, I aim to focus on 
both; that is, how bodies and bodily habits are fashioned by social and political forces and 
the ways in which individuals can and do cultivate expressive ethical practices, like care, 
in the broader context of internal and external constraints.  
 A less controversial area in political and moral thought has emerged alongside 
discussions of the body over the past few decades: ethics of care. As discussed in Chapter 
One, this literature developed largely out of the debate between Nel Noddings and Joan 
Tronto over how to best think conceptualize care and what it‟s proper role is in social and 
political life. Is it best conceptualized as a distinctly “feminine morality” properly 
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assigned to a domain occupied by women or, at the very least, distinctly feminine 
subjects? This view draws heavily on Gilligan‟s famous work In a Different Voice and is 
representative of the position articulated by Noddings in her book Caring, A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, which argues that an ethic of care should be 
based on the mother-child relationship and women‟s natural predisposition towards 
kindness, generosity, and care.
93
  
 Alternatively, we might conceive of care as a political practice that has, at least in 
the modern era, been associated with the moral disposition of women but is properly 
understood as a practice that is necessary for a flourishing democracy and must be 
cultivated in all citizens, regardless of their identity. This view moves us away from a 
focus on caregiving as both an individual and specifically gendered enterprise and urges 
us to more closely consider the false boundaries between the private and the public, 
individual need and collective responsibility, morality and politics. This is Tronto‟s 
position and it remains the most compelling argument to date for the relevance of 
caregiving to political thought and to the everyday functioning of a healthy society.
94
 
What has come to be called “ethics of care” has grown considerably since the publication 
of Tronto‟s Moral Boundaries: Recent literature in this field has expanded to include 
more complex issues, such as the relationships between care and global ethics, economic 
justice, education, democratic politics. 
Despite the turn to corporeality and the expansion of the ethics of care literature to 
include a wide range of topics and research agendas, there has been relatively little focus 
on the relationship between corporeality and care. With few exceptions, the significance 
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of corporeality to caregiving and the epistemological, political, and moral questions that 
arise from the fact of our embodiment continue to be obscured in the ethics of care 
literature. In much of the current work in this area, there is virtually no mention of 
bodies, despite the fact that caregiving is obviously an embodied practice.
95
 Questions 
about the rights of caregivers and dependents, what the demands of justice are when 
weighed against the needs of care, women‟s exploitation in carework, and what quality 
care looks like are all important areas of inquiry but they do not exhaust the range of 
issues related to care, nor do they strike me as the most pressing questions if what we aim 
at is a deep and wide-ranging transformation in our political life to include more and 
better practices of care.  
Care ethics does generally begin with one basic assumption relating to the body: 
Our status as embodied beings that necessarily require care in order to live well is a 
relevant moral and political fact and one that has been consistently dismissed in the 
Western philosophical tradition. This is further reflected in our political arrangements, 
which must be transformed to accommodate the needs of care.
96
 What these and other 
care ethicists have focused on, though, and what some still dismiss as irrelevant to 
politics and to philosophical inquiry in general, are the fundamental features of 
                                                     
 
95 See, for example: Daniel Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).. Also, Peggy DesAutels and Rebecca 
Whisnant, Global Feminist Ethics, Feminist Constructions (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2008). Finally, see Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. 
 
96 See, for example, Groenhout, Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethics of Care, 
Nussbaum, "The Future of Feminist Liberalism.", Selma Sevenhuijsen, Citizenship and the Ethics 
of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality, and Politics (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 1998), Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, West, 
"The Right to Care.", White, Democracy, Justice, and the Welfare State: Reconstructing Public 
Care. Although she is less inclined to focus on the political dimensions of care, see also 
Noddings, Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. 
 87 
dependency and vulnerability that mark the human condition, features which follow from 
the fact that we are not just rational but also animal creatures.
97
 In these formulations, the 
agentic, active, and intentional qualities that bodies exhibit in practices of caregiving are 
not generally remarked upon; instead, the focus tends to be on the body‟s tendency 
towards passivity and deprivation in moments of care. 
Theorists of care have not gone far enough in investigating the relationship 
between corporeality and practices of care. Instead, they have focused too narrowly on 
corporeal dependency at the expense of exploring the body‟s potential for ethical and 
political achievement in and through the practice of care. What is needed, then, is a 
compelling story about the work that caregivers perform with their bodies. Such a story 
should say something about the precise nature of caring habits and how they take root in 
bodies; the role of choice in shaping and sustaining practices of care; and, finally, how 
politics figures into the fashioning of caregiving dispositions and subjectivities.  
 
II. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMBODIED CARE 
 
In this section I consider the only serious investigation to date of the relationship 
between the body and care, Maurice Hamington‟s book Embodied Care: Jane Addams, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics.
98
 Hamington‟s work is an exception to the 
tendency to overlook the importance of the body in our thinking about care‟s importance 
to social and political life. He argues that once we come to see the embodied dimension 
of care it will lead to the moral mandate that we “experience one another” more fully and 
completely. His critical discussion of traditional attempts to decouple bodies from minds 
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and, more specifically, care ethics from lived experience, is persuasive and compelling. 
However, Hamington‟s phenomenological framework lacks the resources necessary for 
analyzing at least two important dimensions of care as embodied practice, draining the 
theory of any real critical value. First, he ignores difference with respect to bodies and 
care and so misses entirely the importance of the fact that there is no one essential 
structure of perception that leads to caregiving habits for everyone and in the same way; 
and this is true not only because different bodies have different internal qualities and 
objective structures but, more importantly, because certain individuals are more or less 
likely to be habituated to care.
99
 Second, although Hamington arrives at several policy 
conclusions towards the end of his book, he does not consider carefully enough the role 
that politics and power play in shaping caring habits and dispositions. Instead, he 
consistently invokes a naturalized body and offers no account of the ways in which we 
actually learn to be caring, or learn to be something else entirely. But before I elaborate 
on the incompleteness of this picture, allow me to give a more detailed account of 
Hamington‟s phenomenology of embodied care.  
Care is an embodied practice. This is true in at least two senses: First, although 
good care necessarily involves a range of affective, moral, and cognitive capacities, we 
ultimately care with and through our bodies. Even when tending to a friend‟s emotional 
needs, we find that we typically do so with a set of physical gestures and movements, 
such that tactility and physicality seem to go hand-in-hand with setting a loved one, or 
even a stranger, at ease. Second, we quite obviously care for others who are embodied; 
often, we care primarily for bodies, which is to say, caring usually entails attending to 
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someone‟s physical needs. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, caregiving, whether in a 
professional or non-professional setting, often involves encounters with the less desirable 
material stuff of bodies (feces, urine, vomit, blood, etc.), tending to sores and wounds, 
and cleaning up after someone who has not yet mastered, already lost, or never quite had 
control over his bodily functions. It is perhaps easy enough to see these embodied 
dimensions of care. Hamington, however, makes a considerably stronger claim: Human 
bodies, he argues, are “built to care,” and all human share a fundamental embodied 
knowledge that constitutes the necessary resources for a widespread ethic of care.  
The core of Hamington‟s argument is simple. Care cannot be fully understood 
without attending to its embodied aspects. Broadly, this means that any care-based 
approach to ethics must confront corporeality and the affective aspects of knowledge that 
are rooted in the body.
100
 Hamington defines care as “an approach to personal and social 
morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective 
knowledge in a manner that can be fully understood only if care’s embodied dimension is 
recognized. Care is committed to the flourishing and growth of individuals yet 
acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence.”101 In addition to a shift in 
focus away from rationality and towards corporeality, and these two things remain starkly 
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contrasted through the book despite phenomenology‟s commitment to seeing the two as 
intertwined, Hamington‟s definition also urges a shift in methodology. 
 Traditional modes of explanation that rely on highly abstract axioms and appeals 
to principles are not going to be very helpful to our thinking about care. I agree with 
Hamington that a Kantian-based philosophy, while not necessarily hostile to a theory of 
care, is not going to be as useful as a framework that begins with the human being as 
embodied and embedded in particular social situations and relationships of care.
102
 As 
argued in Chapter Two, care is always practiced in a particular context with specific and 
knowable others and so philosophical discussions about care push us to consider the 
contextualized nature of moral action. Indeed, it may be that theorizing care pushes us to 
ask more questions rather than provide us with universal solutions to problems. 
Hamington suggests that it is precisely because of the contextuality and particularity of 
care in our daily lives that it has not been adequately addressed by Western philosophy, 
which has tended to direct its focus towards the abstract and generalizable. Peta Bowden 
also reminds us that care confronts the vagueness of the human condition because it 
recognizes that no one moral idea or abstraction can capture the practical, interrelated, 
and process-oriented quality of social relationships.
103
 A focus on relationships of care 
and dependency also urges us to confront the unpredictability and contingency of human 
life, disrupting traditional philosophical efforts to rid our thinking of the complexity and 
messiness of moral life. 
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In order to attend to particularity and context, Hamington adopts a 
phenomenological approach, which he argues best facilitates paying attention to the lived 
experience of care. In his view, it also provides a robust understanding of the body‟s 
capacity and tendency to care. Although he acknowledges the fact that caring is 
something we learn to do in specific ways in and through specific kinds of corporeal 
interaction with others, Hamington also argues that there is a certain kind of tacit 
knowledge rooted in the body, a moral knowledge even, which we tend to overlook in 
our thinking about care. The focus on perception, essences, and primordial experiences in 
Merleau-Ponty‟s brand of phenomenology, make it particularly well suited for 
understanding embodied care in Hamington‟s view.  
Drawing heavily on the work of Merleau-Ponty and excluding entirely others in 
the phenomenological tradition who might be equally or even more instructive, such as 
Heidegger, Levinas, and contemporary political theorist Iris Marion Young, Hamington 
makes use of the concepts of lived experience, embodied epistemology, and habit which 
are invoked in Primacy of Perception and Phenomenology of Perception to make his case 
for an impulse to care that is, first and foremost, rooted in the body and somehow far 
downstream of cognitive processes.
104
 Merleau-Ponty argues that the body has both 
meaning and knowledge embedded within it in the form of habit. As such, our lived 
experience is a source of valuable knowledge and habits are the proof of that special 
knowledge, even if we cannot verbally articulate it, which we all possess and which is 
prior to rational determinations and justifications. Lived experience is also a kind of 
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continuously replenished well from which we draw more knowledge of our world and 
what it means to live well in it. 
Hamington argues that the body captures a certain kind of meaning related to care 
in the form of habit. Caring habits comprise all those “bodily movements that contain the 
body‟s understanding of how to care in and adapt to new situations.”105 Hamington 
argues that habits are more than a familiar or merely repetitious movement; they are 
related to knowledge because there is an understanding attached to the movement. Habits 
are a form of embodied knowledge wherein the body “captures movement” and imbues 
that particular movement with meaning. Merleau-Ponty describes this process as the body 
“catching” certain kinds of movement and then comprehending more fully that particular 
action the more one performs it. Hamington takes up the notion of habit and extends it to 
care, such as capturing the movement of gentle stroking a child‟s head to soothe her after 
a fall; most of us would do this or something similar automatically and we would, if 
pressed, concede that we understand our movement to carry with it a very precise kind of 
meaning, care. Caring habits are those that exhibit a regard for growth, flourishing, and 
well-being of another, and includes things like gentle tactile interactions, speaking in a 
soft tone of voice, tending to the sick, teaching someone to read, and even something as 
simple as a nod of the head. Hamington explains the complexity of the relationship of 
lived experience to caring habits in a discussion of three central phenomenological 
concepts: perception, figure-ground phenomena, and the flesh. These three phenomena, 
along with bodily motility, provide the necessary material out of which caring habits 
become possible.   
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 An argument for the body as a proper subject of moral theory and ethics 
necessitates a theoretical linking of corporeality to rational judgment in a way that makes 
clear the relationship between the two and why that relationship matters for politics. For 
Hamington, this link is made via the concept of perception; we perceive our political and 
social world through our bodies first and foremost, so says Hamington, thus making 
disembodied formulaic ethics largely unhelpful for thinking through questions related to 
care.  
  For Merleau-Ponty, we are organisms with a set of ongoing dialectical processes 
between body and mind, such that the two can barely be made out as distinct entities. 
Hamington explains with a long quote from Merleau-Ponty: 
Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the 
movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal 
form and at others moves towards personal acts. Psychological motives and 
bodily occasions may overlap because there is not a single impulse in a living 
body which is entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single 
mental act which has not found at least its germ or its general outline in 
physiological tendencies. It is never a question of the incomprehensible meeting 
of two causalities, nor of a collision between the order of causes and that of 
ends…they psycho-physical event can no longer be conceived after the model of 
Cartesian physiology and as the juxtaposition of a process in itself and a cogitatio. 
The union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually 
external terms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is enacted 
at every instant in the movement of existence. We found existence in the body 
when we approached it by the first way of access, namely through physiology.
106
 
 
The body is not a mere appendage to the self in this view but is rather a constitutive part 
of the self, a self from which we have become disconnected since the Cartesian split 
between body and mind. Merleau-Ponty believes that by “remaking contact with the body 
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and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, since, perceiving, as we do with our 
body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception.”107 
 In this phenomenological tradition there is an authentic bodily experience that 
takes seriously the idea of a “truth” to the body.108 Although Merleau-Ponty blurs the 
Cartesian boundary between mind and body, there is little attempt in his work, and many 
who follow him, to theorize the ways in which one‟s self-understandings, experiences 
and interpretations of the world are mediated by social forces. Hamington does not depart 
from Merleau-Ponty here in any significant way, a point I shall return to below. 
 Unlike traditional accounts of perception, which rely on a distinction between the 
object of knowledge (the known) and the subject of knowledge (the knower, as mind not 
body), Merleau-Ponty‟s account of perception blurs this boundary because perception 
occurs with the body as well as the mind. By privileging corporeality and intertwining it 
with the mind, phenomenology constructs perception as less a matter of knowing the 
world as it exists outside of the individual, but rather a way of being in it.
109
 Merleau-
Ponty believes his body schema and theory of perception can speed along the process of 
returning to a primordial way of knowing: 
We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective and 
detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which we have of it in 
virtue of it always being with us and of the fact that we are our body. In the same 
way, we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in 
so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the 
world through our body.
110
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For Merleau-Ponty, as well as Hamington, we can make choices regarding whether or not 
we want to attend to bodies and tap into our embodied knowledge or become increasingly 
alienated from our bodies, our/selves, and others. In thinking through the body‟s 
relationship to care, Hamington shares Merleau-Ponty‟s intuition regarding the power of 
unarticulated, unnoticed and even unconscious understanding that resides in our bodies 
and in “webs of understanding” created by and through our relationships with others. 
 Perception is rooted in what Merleau-Ponty calls the figure-ground structure, 
which entails the discrimination of one object from all perceptible objects in a particular 
field. In such moments we are not paying attention to the body‟s processes, that is, we are 
not actively perceiving at the moment of perception, or at least not actively aware that 
and how we are perceiving. Although the body takes on a recessive quality upon 
perceiving a particular object, it is not consigned to a passive role but rather actively 
learns about the particularity of the other through this phenomenon. Caring habits do 
involve a commitment to other-regarding behavior. Hamington wants to connect this fact 
to Merleau-Ponty‟s figure-ground phenomenon in just these brief passages:  
The body has the spectacular ability to place itself in the background and put the 
other in the foreground. It is not that the body does not continue its perceptual 
dance with the environment; rather, conscious attention is focused outward, 
making it possible to care for an other.  
The phenomena that Merleau-Ponty describes as the body‟s being built 
around a perceptual focus also establish the body as built around care. When 
confronted with another person, my senses focus on the other, and I become part 
of the background. The other is the foreground, or source of perceptual focus. The 
transition makes care possible…The ability to pick the subjectivity of another 
embodied being out of a flood of perceptual data is similarly crucial for 
care…Care would be difficult without the foreground-background distinction to 
restrict the myriad objects that would otherwise equally vie for my attention. 
Fortunately their embodiment makes them stand out in my perceptual sphere as 
possible subjects for complex relationships that may include care, differentiating 
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them from, say, a chair with which I cannot have a rich relationship. The focus 
phenomenon facilitates many different types of actions, but it is important for 
caring knowledge because it allows us to attend to other embodied individuals as 
object and subjects.
111
 
 
We should note the force of the claim. Such a view assumes that all individuals appear 
before the perceiving subject as embodied persons worthy of attention and emerging as 
such “out of a flood of perceptual data.” Specifically, they appear before the subject as 
potential subjects for relationships of care. This formulation rules out from the start the 
possibility of the perception—or, to be more accurate, the misperception—of certain 
human beings as mere objects, things no more complex or worthy of interpersonal 
engagement than, say, a chair. There is no account of how one learns to perceive relevant 
features and to disregard others, nor is there any discussion of about the fact that such 
things—that is, discerning the particulars of situation—are at least partly a matter of 
social and political conditioning. Hamington also notes the importance of caring activities 
that occur in the background, where the perceptual foreground of the other, constituted by 
an array of visual, tactile, and olfactory data is able to transfer knowledge to the 
perceptual background in the “silent dance that occurs between the bodies involved.”112 
The figure-ground resource is here conceptualized as a primordial habit of the body that 
makes caring habits possible and, to Hamington‟s mind, even probable. 
 The flesh is the final resource for caring habits and it is the most difficult 
conceptually for Hamington, in part, because it is not clearly articulated by Merleau-
Ponty, and is confusing even to scholars of Merleau-Ponty.
113
 In any case, in addition to 
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providing the grounds for a knowledge and ethics rooted entirely in corporeality, the flesh 
also offers a kind of metaphysical understanding in so far as it is “not matter…, not fact 
or sum of facts „material‟ or „spiritual‟…the flesh is in this sense an „element‟ of 
Being.”114 It is, as Hamington says, our “entrée into the lifeworld,” which is given to us 
in and through other embodied persons. We are intertwined and interconnected to others 
and to the world we inhabit through the flesh. Participation in the “world of the flesh” is 
facilitated by our bodies and allows for all sorts of ambiguous relationship moments, such 
as, being touched by and touching an other, being seen by and seeing another, being 
cared for by and caring for another, and so on. Because corporeal existence is shared with 
other human beings, so too are our sensory perceptions and understandings. In essence, 
the flesh is what leads to shared knowledge, or an “intercorporeal understanding” of the 
world and of one another. This is crucial for our understanding of embodied care 
precisely because it creates the potential for sympathetic perception, which is both what 
makes care possible and helps us to distinguish it from other kinds of habits. Hamington 
closely links Merleau-Ponty‟s rough theory of intersubjectivity and relational knowledge 
to the potential for caring knowledge and habits, arguing that it is the continuity of the 
flesh that allows us to have a shared, and in this case, preperceptional meaning. In other 
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words, the meaning that is attached to my own movements and which I have a 
precognitive understanding of creates the potential for understanding the meaning of 
others‟ movements.115 
In order to move care beyond intimate and familial relations and extend it to a 
large community, like the broader democratic society in which we live, the imagination 
must do some work when actual physical encounters with others are not possible. 
Hamington begins to develop the concept of “caring imagination” as a mechanism for 
achieving imaginative transcendence.
116
 The caring imagination is animated by the 
intimate knowledge we have of our own embodied experiences and is a vehicle for 
bridging gaps between ourselves and unknown others. Similar to the moral imagination 
developed in philosophic discourse, the caring imagination focuses more on an 
overarching consideration of care, and has three forms of imaginative transcendence: 
imagination as empathy, which allows us to transcend physical and social distance; 
imagination as critical reflection, which assists us in transcending time; and imagination 
as psychosocial context, which allows us to transcend the subject position and see 
ourselves as objects of care rather than simply caregivers. These imaginative processes 
establish the link between habits of care and a larger social ethic of embodied care, the 
possibility of which Hamington demonstrates through a consideration of the life and 
work of Jane Addams. 
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III. RETHINKING EMBODIED CARE: IS EVERY BODY REALLY BUILT TO CARE?  
 
 There are at least two possible prima facie reasons to object to Hamington‟s 
articulation of embodied care. The first is his uncritical appropriation of Merleau-Ponty‟s 
phenomenology to make his case that “the body is built for care.” It is certainly the case 
that Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological tradition in general has much to contribute 
to feminist and care ethics, in particular the emphasis on lived experience, the body-
subject, and the way that our embodied experiences and experiences of our bodies shape 
our understanding of the world. Yet, as Elizabeth Grosz has pointed out, it is significant 
that all feminist writings on his work, even those that endorse certain elements in his 
thinking, are quite critical of him for a variety of reasons.
117
 The focus of such criticisms 
range from his emphasis on vision over and above the involvement of other senses in 
subject-object relations, his avoidance of the question of sexual difference, and his 
unacknowledged debt to femininity and maternity, which, as Luce Irigaray has argued, 
structure his conceptual foundations.
118
 In other words, given the skepticism of Merleau-
Ponty shared by feminists from a variety of different traditions, I am suggesting that we 
ought to be skeptical of Hamington‟s overly enthusiastic endorsement of his project to 
support his theory of care. At the very least, a more nuanced, richer reading of Merleau-
Ponty seems in order. 
 Another reason we might reject Hamington‟s approach from the start is because 
he too facilely collapses normative claims about how the body should behave into 
empirical claims about how the body does behave, naturally. This presents a few 
problems that are related to one another. First, if it is in fact the case that “the body” is 
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built for care, one wonders why a complicated philosophical argument for an ethics of 
care need be made in the first place. In other words, this theory of embodied care which 
takes physiological capacities and proclivities for care as a natural given risks making 
similar mistakes as Noddings‟ “feminine morality” approach to care which I have already 
discussed in Chapter One. It is unclear why embodied care should be brought into 
political discourse at all if it is always already naturally occurring, regardless of how we 
as theorists and everyday citizens choose to conceive of and interpret the caring work that 
bodies do or the various bodies that perform such work. Second, though Hamington‟s 
specific claims about the caring body and the phenomenological grounds on which his 
argument rests should be viewed with skepticism, a red flag is raised when it becomes 
obvious that Hamington has committed Hume‟s is-ought fallacy. It isn‟t immediately 
clear why care, in the way that Hamington conceives of it, ought to be valued as a good 
simply because, according to Hamington anyway, the body is built to perform it. There is 
no normative argument here about why care is a good thing and when it is not a good 
thing, if ever. Third, arguing that we ought to care more for others, especially others who 
are not “like us,” simply because the body is built to care and we all share this corporeal 
capacity obscures considerations and arguments in favor of choosing not to care. In other 
words, if we are in so many ways compelled to care because our bodies are meant to do it 
and all we need do is to see this fact more clearly, how do we then negotiate the many 
difficult challenges and conflicting considerations that are often prior to and arise within 
relationships of care? Again, Hamington does not provide a good answer to these 
questions. 
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Setting aside these concerns, I would like to focus on two additional failings in 
Hamington‟s theory of embodied care. A closer examination of these problems can begin 
to point us in the right direction for an alternative framework for embodied care, one that 
draws on important Aristotelian insights regarding habituation and the shaping of moral 
character and human action. Hamington‟s first mistake is this: he overstates his case with 
respect to a shared corporeal experience of care and a shared bodily knowledge of 
caregiving, thus leaving out any discussion of the particular corporeal experiences 
undertaken by individuals who inhabit different “body types” (i.e. female versus male 
bodies, feminine versus masculine bodies, white versus brown or black bodies). His talk 
of the body and it‟s capacity for giving care has the (by now too familiar effect) of 
universalizing experience and, more importantly, presents a wholly inaccurate picture of 
who is likely to exhibit caring habits and become a care laborer, whether in the home or 
in the labor market. 
There are multiple types of bodies with numerous relationships to caregiving. Not 
only does Hamington, and this is also true of Merleau-Ponty, tell us very little about what 
bodies are actually like and how their structures affect our perceptual experiences and 
caring habits, he is silent about the fact that different bodies are obviously imbued with 
different meanings and ascribed different statuses within society.
 119
 Indeed, it is 
especially strange that this is absent in his work since feminists and theorists of care have 
so diligently attended to connections between femininity and carework in public and 
private spaces! Regulatory ideals and processes that work to shape who will be 
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responsible for the caring activity of material and symbolic reproduction that makes 
human existence possible help to determine how one comes to view and experience 
oneself, including whether or not one is a “caring” person. Further, bodies are marked 
with a multiplicity of meanings and interpreted in ways that shift depending on context. 
Some features of a person‟s identity, such as their caring disposition, will be obscured at 
times, and made more salient at others. The imaginings and representations of different 
kinds of bodies that circulate in public discourses, the media, political institutions, and so 
on, are fluid and change over time, thus changing the way we inhabit our own bodies and 
the way we care for and interact with others.  
This brings me to the second but related problem in Hamington‟s articulation of 
embodied care: the concept of care he advances is wholly embodied, by which I mean 
that there is no discussion of the cultivation of conceptual and emotional capacities 
necessary for both developing habits of care. Indeed, the notion of care as a practice to be 
cultivated and sustained seems largely incompatible with Hamington‟s view of care as a 
kind of nonconceptual, corporeal coping that we “learn” by virtue of having been cared 
for ourselves and by being born with a body that can feel pain just as everyone else can 
feel pain. For Hamington, it seems enough to say that caring habits are deeply rooted in 
“the body‟s affective knowledge,” which is “less explicitly discrete than propositional 
knowledge and therefore often not entirely possessed,” by which he means to suggest that 
we do not always have complete mastery over our habits.
120
  
What is troubling about this view is that Hamington‟s rendering of Merleau-
Ponty‟s concepts of perception and habit leaves very fuzzy the role of cognition and 
practical judgment. On this view, it is our bodies that possess knowledge of how to care, 
                                                     
120 Hamington, Embodied Care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics, 56. 
 103 
even if we are not cognitively aware of our body‟s potential for care and the myriad ways 
in which we already do.
121
 Of course, we often do things “without thinking,” but that 
doesn‟t mean that we should or that care is not a practice that requires both perceptual 
and critical capacities, and moreover, that those perceptual capacities can‟t themselves 
rely on critical thinking and cognitive discernment. Further, Hamington makes no attempt 
to explain how the caring habits that he constructs as largely nonconceptual might be 
transformed into a skill or practice with conceptual content.
122
 It is true that Hamington 
does say in a very brief sentence that caring habits are not instinctual but learned and also 
says, shortly after a remark that caring habits are often performed “without much 
reflection,” that caring is always something that is chosen. But he never once elaborates 
this point, and the use of Merleau-Ponty‟s body schema and theory of embodied 
subjectivity leaves the reader with the sense that caring habits and impulses are actually 
quite natural and not something shaped by the social and political world we inhabit and 
the choices individuals make based on the education and acculturation they receive. We 
are given no account of how habits become routinized and what exactly the role of 
conceptual capacities and choice play in caregiving. Instead, it is the essence of the body, 
specifically the intertwining and reversibility of the flesh and the notion of a corporeal 
impulse to perceiving others‟ caring needs (made possible by the physiological capacity 
of vision), which does all of the work in terms of not just the capacity but also the 
impetus to care. This is insufficient. We need a richer account of the habituation of a 
caring disposition, one that constructs care as a kind of practice and includes the 
cultivation of choice and mindfulness in caregiving. 
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Additionally, there are normative and political questions that must be considered 
by political communities regarding what kind of capacities, skills, habits, and desires 
constitute and sustain an embodied ethic of care if care is to be considered a democratic 
value. Two claims, then, can shed new light on Hamington‟s statement that “the body is 
built to care”: First, there are political processes that produce and normalize ethical 
action; in this deeper, politicized and constructivist sense, bodies may be built for care, 
but, depending on the body, they may be built for something else entirely. Indeed, as I 
explore in the next chapter, the bodies of some individuals are more likely to be codified 
as caregiving, while others less so. Cultivating an enriching care ethic, one that is 
consistent with other democratic values, is a political enterprise that must be achieved 
and practiced, not simply rediscovered as always already operating by virtue of our 
shared corporeality. Second, in addition to the transformation of our political institutions, 
structures, and discourses to better promote practices of care, habituating individuals to 
care must also entail the development of rational and critical thinking capacities wherein 
part of learning to practice care means leaning to make choices and to continuously 
exercise judgment in one‟s caring practice. For more on this, we need to turn, once again, 
to Aristotle. 
 
 
IV. TOWARDS CARE AS CRITICAL PRACTICE 
 
 In the beginning of this chapter, I said that political theory has taken a corporeal 
turn as of late, and that we are witnessing an increasing interest in the link between 
politics, ethics, and embodiment. Specifically, a “corporeal turn involves focusing on 
complex relations, layered combinations, and indiscernible zones between corporeality 
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and culture, embodiment and discipline, techniques and governance, and affect and 
sensibility.”123 In his book on just such a corporeal turn in political thought, John 
Tambornino argues that the best sort of theoretical attention to corporeality entails 
identifying and developing practices of reflection that give prominence to embodiment 
and to ethical sensibilities and social arrangements that best express it. He suggests that 
we be critical of harmful disciplinary practices and tactics of the self that work to 
diminish freedom and plurality, giving the example of “faith-based healing” that entirely 
rule out treatments that include medicine and psychiatry for reform drug addicts and 
juvenile delinquents. I would add to this disciplinary and normalization techniques, such 
as weight-loss dieting, cosmetic surgery, and various other beauty techniques that seek to 
limit the range of what might count as an acceptable appearance (mostly for women) 
rather than enlarge it.
124
  
Importantly, however, Tambornino also suggests that a corporeal turn in politics 
should also attend to the various ways in which politics inevitably shapes bodies, 
emotions, and desires and the productive potential of politics to cultivate healthier 
citizens with desires and habits that are both self-conscious and reflect wider democratic 
values. In other words, we need to acknowledge that governing embodied subjects always 
involves some form of “discipline” and “normalization”—we might more generously 
describe this activity as moral and civic, or habituation to acting well—“yet seek ways in 
which this can be more thoughtful, careful, and acceptable.”125 Although Tambornino 
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ultimately turns to the self-conscious materialism of philosopher Stuart Hampshire to 
develop a theory for how to go about doing this, I think that Aristotle‟s understanding of 
the way in which a citizen learns to be virtuous and is habituated to acting well and 
practicing virtuous activity is most fruitful for furthering our conceptualization of 
embodied care. On mine and others‟ readings, these processes involve the moral 
development of citizens and the habituation of individuals to ethical action. Learning to 
be a caregiver also entails the cultivation of decision-making (prohairetic) capacities and 
activities in citizens, which Aristotle believed involved both desire and thought, moral 
and intellectual virtue (NE 1139b1-5).  
 Why do we need a concept of care as critical practice? If care is to be brought 
fully into the political realm, as I and other care theorists have argued, then it needs to be 
both critical and a practice. It should be critical in the sense that public policy and 
institutions related to care, as well as individual caring practices and habits, should be 
frequently reflected on, subjected to judgment, and decided about. Public care and 
political policies, institutions and discourses that shape caregiving arrangements and 
practices should not only be judged by citizens and revised on the basis of those 
judgments, they should be vigorously deliberated about in the public sphere, produced by 
citizens themselves, and based on their life experiences and needs. Indeed, that is what 
the work of democracy demands of us. Individual caregiving habits and practices should 
also be subjected to internal critique and revision; embodied care, as I shall argue 
following Aristotle‟s notion of virtuous activity, is a thought-full practice, not merely 
mechanical bodily movement.   
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Care is also a practice because it is not the product of divine or natural law, 
though nature does provide the necessary material for a practice of embodied care; it is an 
activity that is sustained by agents‟ intentional actions and decisions. In other words, it 
lacks the “always already occurring” (without reflection) quality that Hamington suggests 
actually defines care. Rather, caregiving is something that must be achieved by 
individuals and societies, quite literally, through habituation and a certain kind of work, 
including work on oneself. It is true that care can appear natural, probably because our 
bodies require care to survive and are also the primary vehicles through which we care 
for others, about which I shall say more in Chapter Four. Yet, performing care in a way 
that is intentional and directed towards the project of maintaining, continuing, and 
repairing our world, in particular, the corporeal and psycho-emotional worlds we inhabit, 
is something to which we must be oriented and habituated. It is an activity that requires 
the acquisition, refinement, and continual use of certain emotional, bodily, and 
intellectual skills. 
 I have said that Aristotle‟s understanding of how one becomes virtuous, or how 
one acquires the necessary skills and disposition to properly practice virtue, can provide a 
solid framework for an understanding of care as a practice that is both critical and fully 
embodied. Central to Aristotle‟s virtue ethics is also the idea that certain actions and 
activities, often those done in concert with others, are moral and just, not simply the 
product of biological necessity. If we take an Aristotelian view, we can also see that the 
normative component of caregiving, which drops out in the phenomenological 
framework, is what necessitates our orientation to it in the first place. Let us begin with a 
review of Aristotle‟s understanding of the process of habituation toward moral action, 
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before considering the implications of this for cultivating an ethic of embodied care. 
Although there is no explicit, well worked out model of a child‟s moral and intellectual 
development in Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, or even Politics, the last two 
books of which include prescriptions for a child‟s physical and practical education, some 
scholars have urged that we look beyond Aristotle‟s grouping of the child with the 
animal, whom he says at various times are both lacking the deliberative and decision-
making capacities (prohairesis) and action (praxis) that we find in mature, ethical adults 
(NE 1111a25-7, 1111b8-9, 1144b8, 1147b5, EE 1224a25-30 1240b31-4).
126
 Indeed, in 
Book I of Politics, Aristotle says that the child has “a deliberative part” (to bouleutikon) 
and that his virtue is not relative to him, the child, but relative to the one who has 
authority over him (1260a13-14, 32-3). This passage seems to Nancy Sherman to invite a 
developmental model “in which the child is viewed not statically, but as in progress 
toward full humanity, on his way towards some end.”127 This is important for my 
purposes since I will need to say something about the earlier stages of learning to feel 
compassion and practice care. The right place to begin, then, is the education and 
habituation of young children, who may tend towards excess and immoderation—though 
not, according to Aristotle, egoism (NE 1144b3-5)—but for whom the aim of education is 
to shape desires and actions in such a way that they correspond to, and eventually follow, 
reason and deliberative capacities. 
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 Early in Book II of Ethics Aristotle states clearly that virtue requires that 
individuals (1) act knowingly, (2) choose virtuous actions and choose them for their own 
sake, and (3) act virtuously from “firm and unchanging states” (NE 1105a32-35). Then 
later, Aristotle says that children may be born with a kind of “natural virtue,” or they may 
not, but if they seem to possess a virtuous character, this is deceptive.
 128
 An individual 
cannot be said to act from the kind of full virtue outlined earlier until she is brought to an 
understanding of why a particular act or activity is virtuous, which requires (1) an 
habituation to that activity relatively early in one‟s life and continuing as one ages 
(1103a19-26, 1180a1-5); (2) the guidance of an adult (Aristotle specifies the father) who 
will also serve as a model for the child (1103a1-4); and (3) the cultivation of the child‟s 
own deliberative and choice-making capacities—i.e. practical wisdom—such that she or 
he is able to judge for herself which action is right and thus desires to choose that action 
it in accordance with reason (1113a10-14). Aristotle is clear about the distinction 
between what appears as natural virtue and what actually counts as fully virtuous action: 
For each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent by nature; for 
in fact we are just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, 
immediately from birth. But still we look for some further condition to be full 
goodness and we expect to possess these features in another way…For these 
natural states belong to children and to beasts as well [as to adults], but without 
understanding they are evidently harmful. At any rate, this much would seem to 
be clear: Just as a heavy body moving around unable to see suffers a heavy fall 
because it has no sight, so it is with virtue.  
 But if someone acquires understanding, he improves in his actions and the 
state he now has, though still similar [to the natural one], will be fully 
virtue…What we have said, then, makes I clear that we cannot be fully good 
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without prudence, or prudent without virtue of character (NE Book VI, 13 
1144b4-17, 1144b32-3).  
 
So for Aristotle it is not enough to perform a good action either because one experiences 
pleasure in it or even because one “knows” that it is good (in so far as one as one acquires 
a sense that this activity is either pleasurable or good). Rather, one must come to know, in 
the stronger sense, that something is good through one‟s own experiences of performing 
the activity and internalizing the knowledge of why it is good by weighing reasons and 
judging for oneself. Only then can we be said to truly love a particular activity or doing a 
noble action.
129
 I‟ll return to this point below. 
It is also true that we must perform virtuous actions in the right way and for the 
right reasons (NE 1103b33-5). So if I do a good thing, like care for an elderly family 
member on death‟s doorstep, but do it for the wrong reasons—say, to ingratiate myself in 
order to get an inheritance—then I am surely not acting virtuously on Aristotle‟s account, 
despite the fact that my outward actions are all well and good. A more detailed example 
might be useful here. Let us take for granted that it is better for the environment for 
individuals to ride a bike than to drive a car whenever possible and that it would be a 
great achievement if more people did commute via bike than do now and certainly than 
do drive vehicles. We can probably all agree, at least initially, that this practice of riding 
one‟s bike regularly to get around is a virtue, for it shows a deep commitment to the well 
being of our shared planet. Now suppose I decide to sell my car, buy a bike, and use only 
this to get around, no matter the weather, no matter the distance needed to travel, and no 
matter how tired I am feeling. We are tempted to say at the start that this is an unqualified 
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virtuous act, one that can only be counted as good, and that it would be a better world if 
more people followed suit; for it decreases the release of toxic carbon emissions into the 
atmosphere and lessens traffic on the roads. But suppose that after having made this 
choice, perhaps for virtuous reasons to start, I am overcome with feelings of moral 
superiority and begin to derive a great deal of pleasure from feeling more virtuous and 
more committed to the environment than my fellow SUV driving neighbors. In fact, 
although others cannot see as much in my actions, I am pleased each morning to know 
that I will be the one to shoulder the burden of sacrifices that must be made for a cleaner 
world, while my counterparts are too weak and unable to moderate their desires to do so. 
Now the situation has changed; while the action remains good, my feelings are no longer 
so. My conscientiousness about the environment only betrays a certain kind of 
priggishness about being more virtuous than everyone else.  
 We can see more clearly now that virtue requires the right actions in accordance 
with the right feeling and with practical wisdom; these take time and a good deal of work 
to develop in individuals. The implication is clear for the practice of care: Although each 
of us is born into a body that can experience all manner of pain and pleasure, we are not 
born with the technical knowledge required for care, which is why we need habituation; 
we are not born with the deep understanding, the practical wisdom, about why it is good 
to practice care; and, finally, we are not born with the experience and critical skills 
required for properly finding pleasure in its practice These are things that must be 
cultivated in us. We must learn both how to participate in virtuous and noble activities 
and we must be predisposed to have the right sorts of feelings while doing them. But 
how? To begin with, since we cannot depend on nature, Aristotle is clear that an 
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individual must first be well brought up (NE 1095b5-15, 1179b25-30). By this, he seems 
to mean both well served by teachers who can cultivate “habits for enjoying and hating 
finely” and by laws that not only prescribe various guidelines and practices for bringing 
up children well but also support the pursuit of all things noble and good (NE 1180a1-5).  
This is important because, although we start from unreasoned beginnings in our 
moral education (Aristotle refers to children as the “nonrational part” who must listen to 
and obey the “rational part,” a parent or some adult), we must still have the correct 
orientation towards the good and a concept of what is just and noble, as well as a desire 
to know more about why (NE 1102b32-35). In other words, if someone is not brought up 
to want to be good and to desire to understand better what, precisely, that entails and 
why, then they are not likely to achieve full virtue and perform virtuous actions in the 
right way, for the right reasons. They can have little hope of achieving the goal of the 
study of ethics and politics, which Aristotle says is not mere knowledge but virtuous 
action (1095a5-6, 1103b26-31, 1179a4-9).
130
 
 Although parents have a role in shaping children‟s orientation toward the good 
and love of noble actions early on, the parents‟ practices and commitments will also be 
shaped by politics, specifically, by a polity‟s constitution, legislators, and laws.131 All of 
these work in tandem to normalize good practices and values where the moral 
development of children is concerned: 
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It is difficult, however, for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his 
youth if he has not been brought up under correct laws; for the many, especially 
the young, do not find it pleasant to live in a temperate ad resistant way. That is 
why laws must prescribe their upbringing and practices…(1179b33-6). 
 
And on the commitment of the legislators to this project: 
For the legislator makes the citizens good by habituating them, and this is the 
wish of every legislator; if he fails to do it well he misses his goal. Correct 
habituation distinguishes a good political system from a bad one (1103b8-13). 
 
And, again, on the importance of law in helping to shape and provide a moral context for 
individual teachers‟ and parents‟ decisions in helping children to see rightly: 
Now a father‟s instruction lacks this power to prevail and compel; and so in 
general do the instructions of an individual man, unless he is a king or someone 
like that. Law, however, has the power that compels; and law is reason that 
proceeds from a sort of prudence and understanding. People become hostile to an 
individual human being who opposes their impulses, even if he is correct in 
opposing them, whereas a law‟s prescription of what is decent is not burdensome 
(1180a19-24). 
 
This likely leads Aristotle to make the following recommendation in Politics: 
 
No one would dispute, therefore, that legislators should be particularly concerned 
with the education of the young, since in city-state where this does not occur, the 
constitutions are harmed. For education should suit the particular constitution. In 
fact, the character peculiar to each constitution usually safeguards it as well as 
establishes it initially….and a better character is always the cause of a better 
constitution. Besides, prior education and habituation are required in order to 
perform certain elements of the task of any capacity or craft. Hence it is clear that 
this holds for the activities of virtue. (1337a10-20). 
 
Aristotle does not go so far as to follow Plato in suggesting that families live and raise 
children communally, yet he is clear that “training for communal matters should be 
communal,” and this entails community involvement and structuring of the moral, 
intellectual, and physical education of children (Politics 1337a26-7). This is seen as a 
public concern and not a private one for two reasons. First, Aristotle believes that it will 
not do to only have parents privately educating and shaping their children‟s moral and 
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political character (Politics 137a20-26). Not only does this show us a concern on 
Aristotle‟s part that polities secure the necessary conditions for a basic education and a 
shared set of habits, dispositions, and capacities to be instilled in young people, but it also 
reveals an understanding that different people will have different capacities and 
dispositions depending on their education and habitation at a young age. In order to 
secure in the citizenry a basic orientation towards things like courage, generosity, 
temperance, and care, a polity must take care to give children an early education in such 
things and it is simply more practical to do this collectively and to have some basic 
guidelines.  
It‟s more than pragmatic for Aristotle, however. He also sees the shaping of 
young people‟s character and habituation to virtuous action as a public matter because it 
concerns the bodies, minds, and souls of future citizens who will act in accordance with 
and in the spirit of a state‟s constitution; as a part of that larger political project and 
achievement it is necessarily up to the entire citizenry to participate in the “supervision of 
all” not just their own children. Questions about what kind of education should exist, the 
particulars of the subject matter, and how it should be carried out, says Aristotle, should 
be debated vigorously and decided on based on collective judgments with an eye to what 
will best promote virtue. In any case, Aristotle seems to have preemptively understood 
one of the aims of Tambornino‟s “corporeal turn,” which is that we must acknowledge 
that governing embodied subjects always involves discipline and normalization, which 
Aristotle does not equate with restrictions on freedom but rather with securing the 
conditions necessary for citizens‟ flourishing by giving them a good moral education 
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early on, one that they desire initially and will come to see, by dint of their own reason, 
truly is excellent.  
If one is to give a full account of how a person learns to be virtuous, it may be 
necessary to say what is involved in the acquisition of each virtue in Aristotle‟s schema. 
Since I have already made a case for coming to view caregiving as an Aristotelian virtue 
in Chapter Two and will say more about the specific qualities that accompany a 
caregiving disposition in the next chapter, I aim here only to show, in a general way, that 
a virtue like care is something to be acquired, practiced, and eventually chosen for its 
own sake. So I will follow others in approaching virtue as a combination of perceptual, 
affective, and intelligent capacities, rather than taking each one in turn.
132
 And I have 
already said that care, too, is a complex of these three types of capacities. Yet, too often, 
caregiving has been associated solely with affect and emotion, where emotion is 
understood as disconnected from reason and conceptual faculties.
133
 In these 
formulations, care is something that people, usually women, perform because it is their 
nature to be altruistic, kind, and self-sacrificing. Aristotle, however, saw emotions as 
intentional and viewed them as perfectly educable.
134
 In Rhetoric he makes a case for 
understanding passions not as blind feelings that spontaneously enter our bodies and play 
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out in our lives beyond our control.
135
 Rather, emotions are selective responses to salient 
features of the environment, features which appear thusly as a consequence of evaluative 
beliefs and a cultivated disposition to notice certain circumstances of a situation that call 
for a particular kind of response. Emotions both affect and are based on judgments; they 
are intricately connected to beliefs that we hold and our ability to correctly evaluate a 
moral dilemma and make judgments (Rhetoric 1378a8, 30-20). It follows, then, that if 
our judgments and evaluations are correct, then emotions can also be more or less 
appropriate, some will be correct and others entirely inappropriate.  
Since emotions have cognitive components and are based on beliefs about the 
world that shape and constitute emotions, educating individuals‟ passions will be a key 
part of developing their character and teaching them to practice care in a critical way. 
This entails shaping some beliefs about what is good and what is not but, more 
importantly, it also means helping young people to develop the cognitive, perceptual, and 
affective skills necessary for discerning the ethically relevant particulars that will 
facilitate the proper calibration of emotions, as well as the communication of those 
emotions to others. This is Nancy Sherman‟s conclusion, too: “Cultivating the 
dispositional capacities to feel fear, anger, goodwill, compassion, or pity appropriately 
will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances that warrant these 
responses.”136 We can say that one task of those who are in some way responsible for 
bringing up children (e.g., parents, child care workers, school teachers, legislators, and, 
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for Aristotle, citizens who are not parents but nonetheless have some stake in the 
dispositions of future citizens) is to help them learn how to “see aright.”137  
Although there is no detailed discussion in either the Ethics or Rhetoric on the 
relationship of the emotions to the skills necessary for fine and accurate discrimination, 
several commentators have made convincing arguments based on some of Aristotle‟s 
presuppositions about the study and practice of ethics, the power of discernment within 
the activity of perception (phantasia), the qualities of the phronimos, and what he does 
say about the education of children.
138
 Burnyeat offers us a picture of the starting points 
necessary for moral education in Aristotle‟s account: You need a good upbringing and 
the guidance of older, wiser people not just to tell you what is good and what is bad, 
though you do certainly need this, but, more importantly,  
[Y]ou need also to be guided in your conduct so that by doing the things you are 
told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been told is true. 
What you may begin by taking on trust you can come to know for yourself. This 
is not yet to know why it is true, but it is to have learned that it is true in the sense 
of having made the judgment your own—Hesiod‟s taking it to heart.139 
 
This is Burnyeat‟s interpretation of the passage in Book I of Ethics, which emphasizes 
habits and familiarity with those activities that are noble:  
[W]e need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be adequate students 
of fine and just things, of political questions generally. For we begin from the 
belief that something is true; if this is apparent enough to us, we can begin 
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without also knowing why it is true. Someone who is well brought up has the 
beginnings or can easily acquire them (NE 1095b5-10). 
 
There is a difference for Aristotle, according to Burnyeat, in having been told that a 
particular activity is just (sharing one‟s belongings with others, for example) and having 
learned for oneself that it is good by taking pleasure in doing the just activity.
140
 How 
does one begin to make a judgment that an activity like sharing one‟s belongings is good 
if one does not yet possess the practical wisdom necessary for understanding why a 
particular activity, desire, or feeling is the right and noble one? Learning to be good and 
learning that a particular activity is good and indeed pleasurable is a long process. It 
involves first learning to experience an activity and then learning to make finer 
distinctions and decisions for oneself within that activity; only then, after being oriented 
to the good, habituated to fine actions, making fine distinctions and decisions for oneself, 
can one finally come to find pleasure in an activity and choose it for its own sake. Let‟s 
look at this process more closely. 
Aristotle is clear that being habituated to doing virtuous actions precedes an 
understanding of why such actions are good and so ought to be taken up (NE 1103a14-22, 
1105b10-12). Yet, it is certainly the case that all the while one performs the actions, 
much is going on for the young cognitively, as well. Conceptual capacities are 
developing in the process of habituation, and, as we will see shortly, learning to make 
decisions and to find pleasure in certain actions cannot be easily separated from our 
habituation to them. We have already said that aiding another in acquiring virtue and 
acting virtuously will involve helping them to “see aright.” This means helping a learner 
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to develop the critical capacity of discernment and cultivating in them a wide range of 
emotional and perceptual experience that they can draw on and put in the service of 
moral reasoning and virtuous action.  It means helping those who are not yet fully 
rational to see the important features of particular situations that call for certain emotions 
and actions. A teacher, parent, or caregiver must help children to interpret situations in 
particular ways such that they come to understand what counts as a fair judgment and an 
appropriate feeling about a situation or person. This will involve helping children to 
sometimes see from the point of view of others. It might mean helping a child to 
overcome feelings of anger, resentment, and jealously at the idea of a sibling going on a 
special outing with while they must stay behind. What the child took to be favoritism is 
really an effort to help her sibling manage feelings of loneliness and rejection as of late, 
and the parent will need to reassure the offended child that taking her sibling to the park 
is not a reflection the parents‟ greater love for the sibling, but is rather an attempt to help 
him along and work towards peace in the family. The child will need to be shown that 
sympathy and concern are the proper feelings in this instance, not anger and jealously. 
Sherman points out that this sort of education is not meant to merely produce certain 
actions and emotions, but is rather a matter of bringing the child to more critical 
discriminations.
141
 The goal, then, is not manipulation of emotions and desires and an 
emphasis on outcomes that are good (“do this,” “don‟t do that”), but is rather the 
development of patterns and trends that produce generous and thoughtful ways of 
noticing and seeing.  
So one might very well perceive with one‟s eyes and ears, in the physiological 
manner of Merleau-Ponty, that others are smiling and laughing in one‟s direction. But 
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without an education in the skills of discerning and discriminating other ethically relevant 
features (for example, that these people are my friends, that these people have a long 
history of kindness and generosity towards me, that these people are happy to see me 
after a long separation, that these people are pleased with my appearance before them), 
one may misperceive a situation in a way that could very well be harmful. In order to 
perceive properly, however, it takes the cultivation of the abilities to discern particulars, 
to notice the ethically relevant features of a situation, to remember certain facts about the 
past that are relevant to the here and now, and to imagine the perspective and needs of 
others, all of which makes use of one‟s emotional and cognitive skills. The learned skill 
of properly perceiving and noticing what things call for an ethical response is, as I shall 
show in the next chapter, a necessary condition for being a good cargiver. One must be 
properly attuned to others‟ needs and feelings, and this requires the development and full 
use of cognitive, affective, and corporeal capacities oriented towards identifying others‟ 
caring needs and meeting them. 
Caregiving also involves making decisions; both in terms of one‟s own practice of 
care and with respect to public policies that shape the political and social arrangements 
that facilitate and support care. And, as we have said, prohairetic reasoning is a necessary 
condition of full virtue. Of course, any child can make a choice to do one thing (like be 
selfish with one‟s toys) and not another (share one‟s toys with others); but the fully 
rational, mature individual will make decisions with respect to their overall ends and 
objectives, which have been conceived from a more global and complex point of view 
that takes into consideration long-term goals and allows for the possible revision of one‟s 
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goals in light of new information. Aristotle is clear that practical wisdom goes well 
beyond the simple means-ends reasoning we might see in a child:  
It seems proper to a prudent person to be able to deliberate finely about things that 
are good and beneficial for himself, not about some restricted area—about what 
sorts of things promote heath or strength, for instance—but about what sorts of 
things promote living well in general (NE 1140a25-29). 
 
This sort of reasoning is what begins to develop following the cultivation of discernment, 
of finely nuanced and emotionally sensitive judgment about moral action. As Sherman 
suggests, full virtue is perhaps not yet present at this stage, but the learner is certainly not 
simply mimicking the actions of others, as one does in acquiring a skill. (Indeed, this is 
Hamington‟s suggestion about caregiving when he says that we learn to care by having 
been cared for ourselves. This will not do since caring involves deliberative thought and 
action, not rote memorization.) Rather, she is reacting to circumstances that she has been 
trained to “read” by carefully considering them and then deciding for herself how best to 
act. In the case of caregiving, practicing care will necessarily involve coming to work out 
for oneself—with guidance, models, and the proper encouragement—what to do; it is to 
practice making choices about whether or not to go forward with giving care in light of 
other considerations (such as, whether or not one has the proper resources and desires to 
give care), as well as how to best provide that care.
142
 But, of course, as I have already 
said in Chapter Two, deciding to practice care for some other external ends, like the 
alleviation of someone‟s pain or the achievement of equality, while important, does not 
constitute a fully virtuous action. In order to count as a virtue, care must be chosen for its 
own sake, as well as for the benefits care brings to the cared for. It is the action of 
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caregiving itself that must come to be valuable and the agent must eventually, through 
practice and habituation, come to find pleasure in that activity which expresses virtue. In 
this way, developing good character generally, and learning to be a caring person 
specifically, requires more than complex deliberation and judgment about external ends 
and how to best achieve them; it requires learning to experience pleasure in doing an 
activity over and over again, though not in the same unreflective way every time.  
 It is clear enough that Aristotle takes habituation to be fundamental to the 
acquisition of virtue and to its ongoing practice (NE 1103a14-22, 1105b10-12). But 
surely it is not the case that he simply believes that the more we do a thing, the better we 
will become at it, and then, finally, the more we will love it. This reading, as Burnyeat, 
Sherman, and Sorabji have all argued in various ways, is to leave out many steps in 
Aristotle‟s thinking. Indeed, it cannot be that the mere repetition of an activity means we 
will improve at it. Further, it clearly doesn‟t guarantee that we will develop a true love of 
the activity, especially if it something that requires, at least initially, a considerable 
amount of fortitude, sacrifice, and strength. The refinement of one‟s actions with respect 
to a particular virtue and an increase in pleasure when performing it are intricately linked 
to one another and both can only come from a commitment to a critical practice of 
whatever the virtue may be. In the case of caregiving, we can only improve upon it if we 
take it up as a critical practice. Once we do this, we will come to find true pleasure in 
performing care precisely because it is in and through this activity that we are able to put 
to full use and in a particular way the set of capacities—cognitive, corporeal, and 
affective—that belong distinctly and solely to human beings.  
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 Aristotle believes, regardless of the subject or activity at hand, that human beings 
take delight in figuring things out, in learning “what a thing is” and “that a this is a that,” 
(Poetics 1448b4-17). This is easy enough to see in the realm of intellectual pursuits, but 
Aristotle also believes that we enjoy puzzling things out in the ethical sphere, too. In a 
discussion of the function of mimetic enactment in learning music and poetry, which 
contains ethical modes since it is meant to express character or mood of the people 
featured in the songs or dramas, Sherman says that learners are not only mimicking but 
also coming to feel from the inside the relevant qualities of character and emotion.
143
 On 
this reading, ethically judging fine and just actions, and with the corresponding emotions, 
comes about by performing the role of someone who acts justly and enjoys virtuous 
activities. There is textual support for this view. In Politics, Aristotle explicitly makes the 
connection between being exposed to certain emotions (in this case, through music and 
drama) and critically practicing them such that we work on their refinement until our 
own performance approximates a model: 
And since music happens to be one of the pleasures, and virtue is a matter of 
enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way, it is clear that nothing is more 
important than that one should learn to judge correctly and get into the habit of 
enjoying decent characters and noble actions. But rhythms and melodies contain 
the greatest likenesses of the true natures of anger, gentleness, courage, 
temperance, and their opposites, and of all the other components of character as 
well. The facts make this clear. For when we listen to such representations are 
souls are changed. But getting into the habit of being pained or pleased by 
likenesses is close to being in the same condition where the real things are 
concerned (1340a15-28).  
 
The idea that music, literature, art, and drama are integral to our moral education is 
persuasive and certainly many great philosophers have thought so.
144
 What is important 
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in the above passage for a critical practice of care, though, is that when we habitually act 
as a noble and good person, or, when we act as someone who cares (that is, when we 
“perform” the role of caregiver over time), keeping in view the models we wish to follow 
and the work we must do in cultivating our capacity for sensitive judgment and ethical 
discrimination, then we come to know what it is like to truly possess all of the feelings 
and emotions that characterize someone as caring. In this way, “going through the 
motions” of giving care to another and doing well by them, can eventually lead to a more 
authentic and deeper well-wishing and genuine kindness towards another. To practice 
care in a critical way is to perhaps mimic at first, when one is just learning, but then to 
refine and improve upon one‟s own actions as one matures emotionally and morally, 
reflecting a deeper understanding for what it means to, say, stand firm in the face of fear, 
as in the case of bravery, or remain steadfast in one‟s devotion for another despite the 
challenges such caregiving brings.
145
 
 Aristotle is more direct on this point in Ethics when he outlines correct 
habituation, versus bad teaching. Correct habituation is repetitive and critical, that is, it is 
aimed at improving upon previous actions; otherwise we would not need good teachers:  
Virtues…we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having first activated 
them…we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate 
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actions, brave by doing brave actions…And so we must examine the right ways of 
acting; for, as we have said, the actions also control the sorts of states we acquire 
(1103a32-1103b1, 1103b30-2). 
 
Bad habituation would not strive to hit the mean, but would let in activities that are likely 
to carry one farther away from one‟s goal (of temperance, bravery, care, etc.). Good 
habituation both orients learners towards properly performing an activity, which leads to 
feeling pleasure while doing so. 
 Habituation is not only mindful and linked to reason, but it is also concerned with 
desire. It may be that, initially, external pleasures are linked to practicing the virtues. 
Indeed, if we have not yet perfected something, like care, then we are likely to enjoy the 
practice of it less. So we may not intrinsically love caregiving from the start, but may 
only enjoy the external pleasures that are associated with our practice of it; these may 
come in the form of rewards (though that is certainly not the case in our current political 
arrangements), or simply the knowledge that we are trying to learn to perform something 
that is noble in a more perfect way. Over time, though, as one slowly improves in the 
practice, the learner is being habituated to find pleasure in getting right the perceptions 
and discernments that the particular virtue demands. Sorabji says that as this inductive 
process, “gives him an increasingly general conception of what is required, habituation 
makes him like that general idea,” that is, that there is a moral way to act and that he can 
figure it out and then put the response into action.
146
  
This emphasis on powers of discernment leading to pleasure, rather than the 
particular features or qualities of an activity, further supports the idea that an activity or 
practice that is critical and reflective, and to which we must be critically habituated, is 
something we will over time come to value in itself. Perhaps this is what Aristotle meant 
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when he said that the “best activity is the activity of the subject in the best condition in 
relation to the best object of the capacity,” (NE 1174b17-9). The one in the best condition 
is the one who has the best perceptual capacities, has the skills and technical knowledge 
necessary for practicing care, is motivated by the rights sorts of feelings and concerns, 
and has a lot of experience from which to draw on in making judgments and decisions 
about how to best care. And perhaps this is why Aristotle says that when first learning to 
be good we do not begin with a defense of the good life or of the individual virtues (NE 
1095b4-8). Indeed, if we follow Aristotle, then we agree that we ought not have to begin 
with a theoretical justification and explanation of the pleasures intrinsic to caregiving if 
the learner has been properly brought up to value care from the start. Instead, we begin, 
quite simply, with a commitment to care as part of the good life. In this way, it is only 
when we have actually learned through critical practice what it is to be caring, that we 
can give a full and persuasive account of its pleasures.   
CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to show why we need a concept of care, one that allows for a 
notion of care as a fully embodied and reflective practice. After arguing that theorists of 
care have not gone far enough in investigating the relationship between corporeality and 
caregiving, I said that what we need is a compelling story about the way that politics 
figures into the fashioning of caregiving dispositions and subjectivities. By drawing on 
Aristotelian insights concerning the acquisition of virtue and critical habituation, I hope 
to have shown that an embodied ethic of care that does not adequately attend to the 
processes by which one learns to practice care and make use of a complex of cognitive, 
perceptual, emotional, and corporeal capacities is insufficient. With Aristotle, I also 
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understand the cultivation of virtuous habits and dispositions, in which I include 
caregiving, as a distinctly political enterprise rather than something that follows from the 
fact that we inhabit bodies. Specifically, and in contrast to the phenomenological view I 
have considered in the first half of the chapter, I include the practice of deliberative 
thought and decision, as well as the experience of pleasure, in my understanding of 
embodied care. Following Aristotle‟s view of how one develops character and acquires 
the virtues, the practice of care is not something that is dependent upon given, internal 
qualities but is rather something that must be achieved through political education and 
habituation. Without a model of how we might better produce caregiving habits and 
dispositions, we cannot see politics as a way forward in cultivating a more widespread 
ethic and practice of care. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Fashioning Caregiving Bodies: 
Inequality, Bodywork, and Care 
 
 
In short, any real society is a caregiving and 
care-receiving society and must therefore 
discover ways of coping with these facts of 
human neediness and dependency that are 
compatible with the self-respect of the recipients 
and do not exploit the caregivers. This is a 
central issue for feminism since, in every part of 
the world, women do a large part of this work, 
usually without pay, and often without 
recognition that it is work. They are often 
handicapped in other functions of life. 
            —Martha Nussbaum 
      The Future of Feminist Liberalism  
 
This chapter investigates the relationship between caregiving, inequality, and 
corporeality. In the previous chapter I argued that a phenomenological theory of 
embodied care does not, by itself, provide us with the necessary conceptual resources for 
understanding the political dimensions of caregiving. In particular, such a view 
naturalizes bodily habits and universalizes embodied subjectivity, while saying very little 
about how the structures of “the body” actually affect our perception and habits; it does 
not attend to the role that politics plays in shaping caregiving habits. Alternatively, I 
suggested that we move away from this picture of care as a kind of nonconceptual 
embodied coping and instead conceptualize it as an embodied critical practice, a 
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distinctly political enterprise entailing both the habituation of caring habits and the 
cultivation of particular cognitive and perceptual capacities in citizens. 
Now that we have an idea of care as critical practice in view, I want to return to 
the bodily dimensions of carework for two reasons. First, more needs to be said about 
those features of carework that contribute to its devaluation in society. Although I have 
argued that care, properly understood, is a practice that makes full use of one‟s 
conceptual and choice-making capacities, it is also true that carework is a form of 
“bodywork,” both in the sense that it tends to bodies and must be performed with one‟s 
body, and as such it occupies a marginal, devalued status in our society. Second, a critical 
theory of embodied care should attend to the codification of certain kinds of persons and 
the bodies they inhabit as “naturally suited” to the work of care. The institutions, policies, 
and structures that participate in this codification have anti-democratic affects, including 
the unequal distribution of carework, the reification of stereotypes concerning caregivers, 
and socio-economic arrangements that are inconsistent with other democratic values. 
Most have argued that it is care‟s association with women and femininity that has 
led to its devalued status in society. While it is certainly the case that work historically 
performed by women continues to be low-status and low paying (if paid at all), this is 
only part of the story. I argue that a more accurate account of care‟s devaluation must go 
beyond an analysis of gender and consider the fact that carework is a form of bodywork. 
The bodily nature of carework and its association with groups that have historically done 
bodily work, and so are themselves associated with the degradation of bodily functions, 
has also contributed to its neglect. This still includes women, but it is certainly not 
limited to them.  
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The ethics of care literature has tended to focus its attention on gender and 
carework and the threats posed to democracy by failing to cultivate an ethic of care that is 
compatible with gender equality. This analysis, though correct, fails to get at other 
characteristics of caregiving that contribute to its undervalued status in society. Much of 
carework involves manual labor, using our own bodies to tend to and care for the messy 
and “failing” bodies of others (changing bedpans, bathing, feeding, walking, lifting, 
breastfeeding, holding, cradling, etc.). As middle and upper-class white women have 
entered the workforce and thus caused a significant shift in work/family arrangements 
and needs, carework is being purchased and outsourced more frequently; it is 
increasingly performed by low-status workers, women and men of color, often 
immigrants and guest workers.
147
 This work is seen as something certain kinds of people 
do because they cannot do anything else. Indeed, the caregiving habits and techniques 
constitutive of the embodied experiences of care laborers give them the appearance of 
having been, as Maurice Hamington says of all of us, “built for care.” This suggests that 
there is a complicated relationship between care, the body, and political inequality. 
Citizens do not possess the knowledge, skills, and will to care without first being 
habituated to it, without being fashioned into a caregiver. This chapter first sketches a 
picture of the corporeal style of caregivers and the corporeal nature of carework. I then 
consider why it is that certain kinds of people are more likely to be habituated to care 
than others. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on the dangers posed to democratic 
societies by the codification of certain subjectivities with the bodily work of care.  
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I first offer a reformulation of carework as a form of bodywork, focusing on the 
bodily dimensions of caregiving, including the “corporeal styles” of caregivers and the 
material nature of the work they do. Then I connect these bodily aspects of care to an 
investigation of the processes whereby certain kinds of bodies are codified as caregiving 
and are marginalized in the labor force and in society. I argue that these processes 
threaten democracy in so far as they seek to restrict rather than enlarge the range of 
choices individuals can make with respect to caregiving, discourage a critical practice of 
care that is consistent with other democratic values, and obscure from us care‟s 
importance to the flourishing of individuals and societies. 
 
I. CARE AND SUBJECTIVITY  
Turning to the bodily dimensions of care is important for several reasons. First, 
we need to better understand the features of carework that have contributed to its 
devaluation in society. Specifically, we should go beyond an analysis of gender to 
understand why it is that care, and the people who perform it in occupational and familial 
settings, are denied respect and recognition in any number of ways. Second, a clearer 
picture of the nature of carework, as well as the corporeal habits and dispositions of 
caregivers, is necessary in order for political institutions and policies to effectively 
cultivate more and better practices of care in society. Properly understood, care is a 
practice that makes full use of one‟s conceptual and choice-making capacities. Yet, it is 
also true that carework is a form of bodywork, both in the sense that it tends to bodies 
and must be performed with one‟s body. More needs to be understood about the bodily 
work that care demands of us.  
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Finally, any theory of care must attend to the fact that certain features of identity 
are integral to the status and social position of subjects and one way that this is 
manifested is through the codification of certain kinds of bodies as “naturally suited” to 
the work of care. This is what Hamington misses in his undifferentiated phenomenology 
of embodied care. The institutions, policies, and structures that participate in this mode of 
fashioning caregivers produce anti-democratic outcomes, including the unequal 
distribution of carework, the burdening of some with the corporeal work of others, and 
socio-economic arrangements that are inconsistent with and disruptive to other 
democratic values. Most importantly, the association of the corporeal work of caregiving 
with things like sex (women), race (non-whites), citizenship status (immigrant workers), 
and class (low-status workers) all conspire to obscure not only the fact that every human 
being has been and will be a receiver of care and most of us are able to have the 
capacities and desire to care cultivated in us. The cultivation of an embodied ethic of care 
that enriches democratic values entails the elevation of care as an end worth pursuing in 
itself and the habituation of all citizens to practices of care, not just those for whom it is 
imagined nothing else can or should be achieved    
Shifting the focus to the bodily work of giving care prompts us to rethink, or 
perhaps simply expand, our notion of what care is relative to those who sustain an 
ongoing and habitual practice of it. As discussed in Chapter One, some have argued that 
care is best conceptualized within a virtue ethics framework, while others think care is 
best understood as a practice.
148
 Often this picture is bound up with the idea that care is a 
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virtue necessarily associated with certain types of people, usually women.
149
 But, as we 
have seen in Chapters Two and Three, this need not be the case.
150
 Care is also often 
referred to as a practice.
151
 Tronto writes, “to call care a practice implies that it involves 
both thought and action, that thought and action are interrelated and that they are directed 
toward some end.”152 Practice is an important part of care because it connects action to an 
underlying ethic and attempts to disrupt the persistent association of care with feminine 
values. Yet, despite my claims in the previous chapter that we need to emphasize both 
action and judgment in care, neither care as a virtue nor care as a practice can adequately 
explain the relationship between power—specifically, the constellation of political 
institutions, discourses, and polices—and patterns that emerge concerning the kinds of 
people who consistently perform carework. I think we need to introduce a new dimension 
of care to better understand why caregiving remains so central to the experiences of some 
and so far removed from the experience of others. 
Care should be rethought as a constitutive element of subjectivity, like gender, 
which is fashioned, manipulated, and sustained by powerful, though often invisible, 
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forces. Such a conception will help us to see more clearly what it means for a person to 
embody care and can serve as a starting point for theorizing the formation of caring and 
non-caring subjects from within our current political and social constraints—that is, a set 
of contraints that distinctly prohibits the cultivation of a more democratic distribution of 
caregiving in society.
153
 Foucault said that if we want to understand how power operates 
in a particular society, we should study what kind of body that society needs to 
function.
154
 Societies, of course, need more than one type of body to function, yet every 
society needs human caregiving bodies since care is not something we seem, thankfully, 
quite ready to abandon to technology and robotics, though technology certainly enhances 
care.
155
 One way that societies secure care is by aligning caregiving with particular 
identities such that certain kinds of people are compelled to perform care in order to 
“successfully” actualize themselves and be fully intelligible to others. Socio-political 
arrangements work to thrust carework upon the less powerful members of society 
because this work involves tending to (“imperfect”) bodies and, importantly, with one‟s 
own body. Carework both produces and is the product of major inequalities in our 
society. Another important reason to turn to subjectivity and the embodied nature of care, 
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then, is be more precise about why care is not a highly regarded activity and why persons 
on the margins of society perform it. 
  
II. CAREWORK AS BODYWORK 
 The term „bodywork‟ has historically been used to describe the work that 
individuals do on their own bodies, or have done to them, often for aesthetic or health 
purposes.
156
 Julia Twigg notes that the term has recently been expanded to refer to “paid 
work done on the bodies of others who thus become the objects of the worker‟s labour. 
The aim of such interventions can be medical, therapeutic, pleasurable, aesthetic, erotic, 
hygienic, symbolic.”157 In a study of caregivers for the elderly, Twigg considers the 
bodily elements that constitute carework, which has thus far been a missing dimension in 
analyses of caregiving occupations. She identifies three primary elements of bodywork in 
carework: First, carework involves dealing with human waste and as such it involves 
managing dirt and disgust; second, carework involves negotiating nakedness in a society 
that restricts images of naked bodies to those that are sexually appealing and conform to 
standards of beauty; and, finally, carework involves touch and intimacy, which are 
necessarily “written into” caring exchanges, even if they are not always sought or 
welcome by the cared-for. Twigg goes on to argue that it is for these reasons that 
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carework is work of low esteem and so has a dematerializing tendency whereby higher 
status occupations and positions, even in the health care sector, are constituted by a 
retreat from bodily contact and are occupied by individuals who are privileged by virtue 
of their gender (male) and race (white). 
 Although Twigg‟s research focuses solely on occupational cargiving, this analysis 
calls our attention to the fact that the activity of caregiving often entails the “dirty work” 
of caring for dependent bodies. I would like to expand Twigg‟s conception of carework 
as bodywork in two ways. First, caregiving can take place in occupational settings but it 
is also important to keep in view the non-occupational practices and relationships of care 
that permeate social relations. Whether carework is paid, as in the health and childcare 
sectors, or whether it happens in the home, it is still a kind of work that tends to the 
bodies of others. Of course, the fact that it is a kind of work requiring a great deal of 
conceptual and technical skills and fortitude, regardless of whether one is rewarded 
monetarily, does not rule out the possibility of altruistic motives or the experience of 
pleasure while doing it.
158
 Although the trend in dual-earner households has been towards 
outsourcing elder care and child care, the vast majority of carework has historically been 
and remains unpaid, which means that much of it continues to be performed in the home. 
This is partly the result of our collective political failure to restructure work and family 
life following middle and upper-class white women‟s entrance into the workforce. It 
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might also reflect a response to the rising costs of care. Yet, the fact that care remains a 
central feature of family and social life reflects something significant about the nature of 
care and those who depend on it—that is, all of us—for survival: care relationships and 
networks are not contained in occupational settings but rather permeate every aspect of 
our lives. We are embedded in families and friendships that create moments of care and 
require them for their existence. This is true but so difficult to see, since care is contained 
and segregated in many ways, marked off from public life. 
 The second revision to Twigg‟s conception of carework as bodywork, and the one 
I would like to focus more on in this chapter, is the expansion of our analysis to include 
the corporeal nature of caregiving. Care both has as its object the bodies of others and 
calls for the caregiver to use her own body in particular sorts of ways in order to properly 
perform such work. When a notion of embodied care is not also linked to something like 
Twigg‟s conception of carework as bodywork, that is, work that tends to the bodies of 
others, one is likely to miss important connections between care, bodies, and inequality. 
Because carework requires activity directed toward the bodies of others (bodies that are 
viewed as disgusting, uncontained, broken, deformed, or just not yet fully developed), 
and since we live in a society that recoils from, and sometimes views as contaminating, 
“imperfect” bodies, the question of who is likely to embody care turns on another 
question: Who is considered fit for this kind of work? In the remainder of this section, I 
will explain what I have in mind when I say that a caregiver is one who embodies care. 
Specifically, we need to consider some of the modalities of subjects embodying care, and 
the corporeal styles and configurations common to them. 
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It will be helpful to distinguish between three different categories of analysis 
when thinking about how carework is both embodied and bodily—attunement, technique, 
and materiality. Although it is specific caring needs which must be used to determine 
what care will look like and how to measure the quality of it, there are enough similarities 
across a range of practices of care—paid, unpaid, childcare, elderly care, short-term 
illness, long-term disability, etc.—for these three analytic categories to illuminate certain 
aspects of the complex relationship between bodies and care. It will also be useful to keep 
each dimension conceptually distinct, even though they clearly overlap in practice. 
Caring Attunement 
In a rich exploration of female body experience, Iris Marion Young has written 
that “there is a particular style of bodily comportment that is typical of feminine 
existence, and this style consists of particular modalities of the structures and conditions 
of the body‟s existence in the world.”159 Caregivers, most of whom are female, also have 
a particular corporeal style. Specifically, they embody an attunement to the needs of 
others and adopt an other-regarding disposition and openness that signals receptivity and 
concern for others. A caregiver can register the existence of others‟ needs and is able to 
make a judgment that a particular need should be met. Tronto describes something like 
this in her discussion of the importance of attentiveness to the practice of care.
160
 On this 
point, she writes: 
If people in the first world fail to notice everyday that the activities spurred by a 
global capitalist system result in the starvation of thousands, or in sexual slavery 
in Thailand, are they inattentive? Is this a moral failing? I suggest that, starting 
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from a standpoint of an ethic of care where noticing needs is the first task of 
humans, this ignorance is a moral failing.
161
  
 
This reminds us that we cannot begin to practice care without first cultivating, or having 
cultivated in us, the capacities to discern the particular and relevant facts about situations 
that call for care. What is obscured in Tronto‟s account, however, is that even this first 
phase of care—of noticing others‟ needs—can and often does correspond to a certain 
kind of bodily attunement.  
What can we say about caring attunement? Specifically, how is it expressed? 
Maurice Hamington has invoked Merleau-Ponty‟s conception of perception to make 
vivid the bodily habits and expressions of care.
162
 Merleau-Ponty‟s epistemology of the 
body might be a rich resource for thinking about connections between self-
understandings and how we perceive the world. And although I mostly accept Merleau-
Ponty‟s view of the function of perception to (sometimes) ground how we understand 
ourselves in relation to others, I think it is perhaps more helpful to begin with the concept 
of receptivity when talking about a physical attunement that corresponds to care. The 
concept of perception advanced by Merleau-Ponty and endorsed by Hamington in his 
work on care lacks an explicitly moral component. It is possible to physiologically 
perceive someone without ever feeling morally compelled to acknowledge others, let 
alone tend to them. Further, some feminist theorists have argued that Merleau-Ponty‟s 
privileging of sight overlooks other important corporeal resources for perception and 
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receptivity, such as sound, touch, speech, and hearing.
163
 Practices of care go beyond 
visual perception and draw on multiple modes of receptivity, which entail being open to 
witnessing others‟ weaknesses and to discerning and understanding their specific 
caregiving needs. To be receptive as a caregiver is to be open to receiving important 
information about the suffering and needs of others through and with the entire sensing 
body. There is no one single way that this kind of receptivity is embodied, or 
communicated to others, but there are a few things we can say about how one 
communicates and makes use of receptivity in a way that constitutes a kind of caring 
attunement.  
One way to begin to sketch out a picture of the receptivity central to attunement is 
to start with physical comportment. Bodies can be either open or closed off to receiving 
information about the world around them and caregivers, in particular, have an awareness 
that their bodies are an important vehicle for signaling a willingness to respond to 
someone else‟s needs. Let us consider an example that might make more vivid caring 
attunement and receptivity. Imagine that a student who has been absent from class for the 
past two weeks has come into her professor‟s office to discuss why she has missed so 
much class time. She tells her teacher that her uncle has recently died and that she was 
not able to be in class last week because of funeral arrangements and family 
commitments. A generous but purely procedural response on the part of the professor 
might be to simply accept this explanation as an excuse for the student‟s absence and 
abruptly dismiss her. This would fail to be a truly caring response, though. Non-receptive 
corporeal motility might include a hurried-ness such that the professor only gives the 
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student a few minutes and makes his own work a priority over taking the time to listen 
and be present with his student, who is clearly anxious about the conversation and still 
suffering from the sadness of the loss of a family member. The professor might be 
disinclined to move away from his computer to turn toward her and meet her eyes with 
his own. He might only halfway listen as he continues to do other things at his desk, 
occasionally nodding in an effort to hurry her along. He might say very little in the way 
of sympathy or regret for her loss, and might exhibit a general discomfort and displeasure 
with the distraction. This image of a person who is closed off and generally inaccessible 
to others, even those who may have a legitimate claim on one‟s receptivity and 
generosity is, unfortunately, not very difficult to call up in our minds.  
Now let us imagine what a person who is properly attuned to his student in a way 
that embodies and signals care and concern. Being receptive necessitates that the 
professor move away from his computer and the work he may have been hoping to get 
done by the day‟s end. It further requires that he reposition his chair and body in a way 
that signals to his student that he is fully present and ready to listen. Caring attunement 
entails embodying responsiveness by meeting another‟s eyes and crafting a thoughtful 
and honest verbal response, which one cannot do if one is not truly listening and 
reflecting on what the student might need to hear in order to be both comforted about her 
loss and her worry about having missed class. If he is properly attuned, he responds in a 
way that lets his student know that she has been heard, that he empathizes with her, and 
that he is willing to work with her to accommodate the situation. When we move in the 
world with a corporeal style of receptivity and generosity towards others, we both signal 
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that we are caring and open ourselves up to the possibility of future caring moments that 
follow from important information that we have received. 
Active listening is also importantly related to receptivity and is a key component 
of the corporeal generosity we should show others with whom we share certain kinds of 
projects. Susan Bickford has argued that active listening is a democratic practice of 
citizenship, citizenship that is necessarily interdependent, yet is often adversarial and 
deeply conflictual. Also drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Bickford argues that 
listening “cannot mean abnegating oneself; we cannot hear but as ourselves, against the 
background of who we are.”164 I agree that listening is a necessary practice of citizenship 
in the context of conflict and dissonance, and that being a good listener means both 
placing oneself in the background and foregrounding the other‟s concerns and 
perspective while never fully disavowing one‟s own perspective. Both attentiveness, 
which requires a kind of closeness, and distance are required for active listening; 
closeness when listening to someone else happens in that moment when we are able to 
quiet our own voice temporarily and put space between the self and what is 
foregrounded. Bickford notes “without moving ourselves to the background, we cannot 
hear another at all.”165   
Listening also enhances care, which is certainly integral to democratic citizenship. 
Listening is a way to signal to the other person that they are being heard and that we are 
making a good-faith effort to take that person‟s feelings and thoughts into consideration 
when making a judgment about how to respond. For Bickford, Merleau-Ponty‟s 
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conception of perception and the figure-ground relationship allows for an openness in 
listening constituted by a willingness to construct relationships of attention in which 
neither partner has meaning without the other. Citizens who are willing and able to 
engage in this kind of listening even and especially in contexts of discord, disagreement, 
and dislike are central to the deliberation that takes place in democracies; as such, active 
listening is an important political practice. Yet, listening is also an embodied practice that 
opens the door to practices of care, bringing us closer to our fellow citizens and perhaps 
opening up some space for the cultivation of more friendly feelings towards those we 
may not initially like or feel as though we do share in certain projects.. In this way, 
listening is also a deeply moral act. It is what we owe our fellow citizens, but it can also 
lead to better practices of care, which has the potential to make us better citizens.  
Listening is one way that caregivers cultivate knowledge and understanding about 
moral situations that call for a particular kind of (caring) response; this is a skill that is 
central to democracies concerned to make citizens‟ actual lives, needs, and experiences 
the basis for public policies. Hamington looks to Jane Addams as an excellent example of 
someone who used the practice of listening as a way to better care for the individuals and 
groups in her work at Hull-House and to act politically.
166
 I think this description of 
Addams‟ own practice of listening illuminates what Merleau-Ponty was after when he 
said, “there is a relationship of consultation and exchange with others which is not the 
death but the very act of the self”: 
Much of what is communicated between people is found in the subtleties of facial 
expressions, hand gestures, posture, inflection, and eye contact. When one is 
actively attending to someone else face to face, these subtleties can be absorbed 
consciously and subconsciously through the body. Hull-House allowed Addams 
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to be physically present and thus to listen actively to the stories of the poor and 
oppressed in a way that an outside visitor would have a difficult time replicating. 
Addams used what she learned through listening to people‟s stores to inform her 
writing and her activism…She used what she learned to help meet the needs of 
the neighborhood.
167
 
 
This is particularly instructive because it links the act of listening to practices of care, 
around which she was able to cultivate a politics and program for social change.  
 The person who lacks receptivity to the caring needs of others and does not 
engage in active listening has gone a long way towards hindering the possibility of 
becoming a more caring person. This is partly true for the simple reason that she has 
foreclosed the possibility of perceiving certain facts about the world. We can register the 
effects of such a foreclosure on two levels: First, she cannot perceive and so come to 
undertand anything meaningful about the particular person before her who is in need of 
care. Second, she makes it difficult for herself to fully comprehend and confront the 
fragility of human beings, which is something that must be taken seriously and inform 
citizens‟ choices and actions regarding how we will care for one another. By not being an 
active listener and so not being properly attuned to the needs or suffering of others, she 
participates in rendering invisible to herself a fundamental part of what it means to be 
human. Listening is both constitutive of corporeal attunement and contributes to better 
practices of care; and care, in turn, strengthens citizenship in so far as it better habituates 
us to thinking about the needs and interests of others who may not be like us but who 
nevertheless have important claims on us and our shared political resources. 
The information we receive in the practice of active listening is filtered through 
language, perspective, and choice on the part of the speaker about what to include and 
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what to leave out. Let us consider one final, very bodily, example of how caring 
attunement is embodied and marked by an openness and receptivity that precedes acts of 
care. Caregivers, especially those of infants and babies, rely on smell for important 
information about the bodies of the cared-for. Because caregivers “work with” the 
emission of substances and smells in a way that makes their work more effective, they 
necessarily challenge Western ideals of individual autonomy and boundedness. Of the 
significance of smell to the work of caregiver, Twigg writes:  
It extends the patients corporeality in such a way that intrudes and seeps into 
others‟ spaces. Odours by their nature cannot be easily contained; they escape and 
cross boundaries. This boundary-transgressing quality acts to threaten the abstract 
and impersonal regime of modernity...Smell and disintegration undermine 
individualistic constructions of the person as stable, bounded, and autonomous. 
Careworkers, in dealing with bodies, have to negotiate their way through these 
ambivalences and deal with aspects of bodily existence that modern society is 
reluctant to acknowledge openly.
168
 
 
It is not only the case that careworkers “negotiate” ambivalence around smell, though 
they do this at times, but that their own corporeality is, in a sense, also extended as they 
invite, or at the very least confront, the smells of bodies which many of us recoil from in 
disgust or shame.
169
 Caregivers must be receptive to smells that we might otherwise wish 
to avoid. Smell is what lets them know when a diaper is dirty, a sore is infected, 
something dangerous or unhealthy has been ingested. It is true that caregivers, especially 
in the beginning, often need to resist a reaction of disgust or perhaps shock around certain 
smells in order to be sensitive to the care-for, yet there is more to it than this. They must 
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learn to resist what seems to us an instinctive mode of not breathing in through the nose 
or mouth, so as not to become sick ourselves, because doing so would actually close 
down receptivity and prevent one from discerning the kind of care that is called for or if 
care is needed at all. 
The caring attunement that is signified through bodily comportment, active 
listening, and smell does not by itself constitute a caring relationship. Instead, this picture 
reveals that caring moments are made possible by adopting a disposition and corporeal 
style that is properly attuned to the needs of others. Such an attunement suggests that one 
is predisposed to give care and that much of the moral groundwork requiring bodily 
adjustments has already been laid. Caring attunement is necessary for good caregiving, 
but it is not sufficient. 
Techniques of Care 
If caring attunement captures a kind corporeal disposition and style, then the 
concept of techniques of care captures the more precise habits that are common to a wide 
range of caregivers. Techniques and habits of care are directed towards maintaining, 
nurturing, or restoring the life of another human being, and they are best characterized by 
intentionality and the use of one‟s body to directly care for the bodies of others. At the 
start, it‟s important to note that techniques of care express a certain degree of agency and 
intentionality that is less easy to see with the concept of attunement. An analysis of caring 
techniques and habits can tell us something more specific about the particular practices of 
care that caregivers take up on a regular basis, and it can challenge some conceptions of 
feminine motility that emphasize passivity, vulnerability, and inhibition. 
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Hamington describes caring habits as those that “comprise all those bodily 
movements that contain the body‟s understanding of how to care in and adapt to new 
situations.”170 In this view, when a mother immediately moves to pick up her crying baby 
and cradle the child to give it comfort, she is doing so less because she has learned that 
this is the proper moral response but rather because her “body has captured the subtle 
movements necessary to communicate care,” in that moment.171 But this is too vague. 
Hamington does go on to say that caring habits also “exhibit a regard for the growth, 
flourishing, and well-being of another.”172 The specific examples he gives are using a soft 
tone of voice, cradling a baby, tending to a sick person, and even teaching someone to 
read. It is true that these are caring acts, but his analysis of these habits, which rests 
mainly on the overly simplistic claim that, “human interdependence creates moments of 
care,” is not helpful for discerning the systematic patterns of behavior and actions that 
largely shape the lived body of individuals whose identities are tightly bound up with 
caregiving. I will describe only a few techniques of care here. 
Caregiving involves a lot of heavy lifting. Specifically, it requires the lifting and 
transporting of persons who are incapable of moving themselves—infants, toddlers, sick 
people, injured people, disabled people, and elderly people. As any parent of young 
children will tell you, caring for someone who cannot walk very well on their own (or, 
who can walk too well, but lacks judgment about when and where to walk), is a familiar 
and exhausting aspect of caregiving. And is often the case that a person who is unable to 
walk is also unable to bathe himself or herself. Bathing is another common practice of 
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care that involves negotiating and moving someone that could be quite heavy or helpless, 
or both. Lifting and bathing are important parts of jobs like nursing and physiotherapy 
and often caregivers in these situations must act as though they are, at least in some ways, 
the bodies of those for whom they care. I want to highlight that lifting and bathing bodies 
is very common in caregiving, that many caregivers do it without a great deal of 
cognitive reflection, and that it requires a certain degree of physical strength and intimacy 
with the cared-for. Lifting and bathing other human beings generally requires a relatively 
strong and healthy body, at least if it is to be done properly and with the requisite care.  
Caregivers also physically nourish and provide sustenance for the cared-for. Of 
course, not every dependent requires assistance in feeding, but many do. This is 
important to highlight because physical nourishment is something that is so fundamental 
to our well being, yet is so often looked upon with shame and disgust. Feeding others 
always involves careful attention to the movements and needs of someone else. It can 
involve preparing and serving food, and very often does, but it can also mean literally 
bringing food to another‟s mouth and helping them to ingest it. It entails monitoring how 
much food the cared-for has actually taken in to ensure that it is enough, and it sometimes 
involves helping someone physically swallow; in circumstances where acid reflux is a 
problem, such as with many cancer patients and diseases affecting the digestive tract, 
massaging the throat when necessary or helping to regulate the breathing of the cared-for 
in a way that works to keep food down is quite common. 
Breastfeeding is one of the most remarkable techniques of care, both for its degree 
of intimacy and for the way that it throws into sharp relief the way that the body is so 
often the primary vehicle for caregiving. In breastfeeding, care takes the form of the 
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literal transference of nutrients from one person‟s body to another. Pregnancy is, of 
course, an even more vivid example of this, yet more complicated because the boundaries 
between two subjects are even more blurred in pregnant experience.
173
 Second, 
breastfeeding brings the relationship between touch, intimacy, and caregiving into better 
focus and so vividly illuminates how an epistemology based on touch, rather than sight, 
might be possible. In her essay “Breasted Experience,” Iris Young explains how the 
experience of touch is relevant for feminine subjectivity. She describes the retreat from 
universalisms and abstractions fundamental to an epistemology that relies heavily on 
touch and emphasizes the “fluidity” of bodies, rather than a masculinist metaphysics of 
self-identical objects; this epistemology is relevant to caring habits, breast-feeding among 
them because it emphasizes alternative ways of apprehending the world, mainly, through 
one‟s bodily senses.174 
Even more than caring attunement, caring techniques, which utilize touch so 
frequently, illustrate the blurred boundaries that often exist between two subjects—the 
caregiver and the cared-for. Young‟s account of the centrality of touch to female 
experience highlights the importance of physical presence and begins to shed light on the 
way that other habits of care involving touch—such as soothing, bathing, tending to 
wounds, managing pain, and feeding in ways other than breastfeeding—reflect and are 
generative of a different way of discerning relevant information and acting based on 
information gathered through touch. Although I think Young tends to overemphasize 
embodiment and gives inadequate attention to cognition and judgment in her 
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phenomenological work, the way that we might utilize touch as a resource to determine 
how to act in a moral context is instructive. 
Caring habits exhibit a corporeal intentionality that is often not present in 
women‟s bodily experiences outside of care. This is an important point given that most 
caregivers are women. Feminist theorists, including Young, have pointed to the ways in 
which women‟s bodily movements and comportments are unlike men‟s. Women tend to 
restrict their movements, drawing inward, and often fail to move with assertiveness when 
it comes to moving towards and around other objects and people.
175
 Young gives the 
example of lifting, writing that women “often do not perceive themselves as capable of 
lifting and carrying heavy things, pushing and shoving with significant force, pulling, 
squeezing, grasping, or twisting with force.”176 She goes on to say, “a woman frequently 
does not trust her body to engage itself in physical relation to things.”177 This is true in 
many arenas of women‟s experience, especially athletics and sexuality, but it is 
absolutely untrue of women‟s experiences as caregivers.  
Embodied care, unlike Young‟s picture of feminine bodily existence, involves 
uninhibited intentionality, which indeed “projects the aim to be accomplished and 
connects the body‟s motion toward that end in an unbroken directedness that organizes 
and unifies the body‟s activity,” thus requiring a deep connection between aim and 
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enactment. I am pointing to a dissonance between embodied care, which is often enacted 
by women and certainly feminized subjects, and Young‟s account of feminine 
subjectivity as characterized by inhibited intentionality and passivity.
178
 One problem is 
that Young doesn‟t adequately distinguish between different types, or fields, of feminine 
subjectivity, especially as these relate to other features of a woman‟s identity.179  
Caring habits like lifting, bathing, and feeding, are fundamentally intentional and 
uninhibited habits directed towards the care of other subjects which are held in view, and 
they demand assertiveness that is not necessarily common to certain women‟s 
experiences of their own bodies; they are common, however, to some women‟s self-
perceptions, such as women of color and immigrant women, and other identities 
associated with carework as bodywork, about which I say more below.
180
 In any case, we 
ought not neglect the corporeality of care because it complicates feminist critiques of the 
codification of femininity with weakness, passivity, and vulnerability. Rather, we should 
more carefully reflect on embodied care in order to better understand both feminine and 
caregiving subjectivities, and how they intersect. 
In addition to a moment of uninhibited motility, there is also an openness that 
shapes caregiving habits that can also make one vulnerable in ways that she or he would 
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not otherwise be if they lacked a caring practice. Another way of saying this is that 
caregiving typically involves a certain kind of risk, a risk that we might be asked to give 
more than we are capable of giving or the risk that our offering of care might be 
inadequate or rejected. Indeed, the very fact that care is a kind of offering necessarily 
implies vulnerability to others and the possibility of refusal and the near certainty of non-
reciprocity. Importantly, both the uninhibited intentionality constitutive of caring 
techniques and the openness and vulnerability that accompany such techniques intersect 
particular identities, including feminized, raced, and classed subjectivities. With the 
concepts of caring attunement and technique, we can see the emergence of a kind of 
corporeal style that links different types of caregiving; it is a style that is coextensive, as I 
shall argue below, with other modalities and subjectivities which are fashioned by anti-
democratic political structures, systems, and policies that bind certain kinds of people to 
the “dirty work” of care.  
Materiality of Care 
We might also consider the objects that constitute the materiality of carework in 
order to better understand its bodily nature. I refer here to the fact that caregivers 
encounter and are often associated with a certain kind of materiality that has to do with 
bodily process and functions. In other words, the basic material with which caregivers 
work and come to be associated with consists of bodily processes and bodily substances 
that are deeply intertwined with feelings of disgust, shame, and even pollution. Although 
the materiality of care is closely related to attunement, as we saw in the example of smell, 
and techniques of care, it also differs in that it emphasizes the raw materiality of caring 
relationships, or the “materials” that are specific to the work of care, whereas attunement 
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and techniques highlight the signifying of a caring disposition and skill set that is 
corporeal in nature. 
Perhaps the most obvious feature of the materiality of care stems from the fact 
that carework tends to human bodies that are somehow deficient, by which I mean that 
they lack self-sufficiency (to a greater degree than an otherwise healthy individual). Care 
is generally directed towards “abnormal,” “imperfect,” and potentially “contaminating” 
bodies; the internal disgust that often creeps in at the sight or smell of bodies that are not 
so clearly contained is often compounded by a displeasure in the cared-for‟s yet to be 
developed rationality (as with children), or a loss of cognitive capacities (as with the 
elderly).
181
 In any case, one obvious and fundamental material of carework is other 
bodies, bodies that are often denied the possibility of appearing or being represented in 
public spaces and discourse. 
The materiality of these bodies introduces another set of substances that 
careworkers frequently come into contact with and must handle in various ways. 
Carework involves human wastes: shit, pee, vomit, blood, sputum, fingernails and 
toenails, hair, nasal mucus, etc. Further, certain kinds of patients receiving care in hospice 
situations are considered distinctly „unbounded‟ in that they cannot be easily 
accommodated, symbolically or realistically, in public, as a result of things like 
incontinence, smell, or disfigurement.
182
 As a form of bodywork, then, much of 
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caregiving involves managing dirt and grappling with those things that our society has 
labeled a disgusting and even shameful part of the human condition. Regardless of 
whether one has a cultural or biological account of the origins of bodily disgust, disgust is 
at least partially rooted in some fear of contamination, either through direct ingestion or 
touching, or even through images that may be so horrifying that we think of them as 
somehow polluting to us, the witness. In other words, bodily disgust relates, importantly, 
to other people and their bodily processes and wastes. Twigg puts this most succinctly in 
her study of bodywork in caring for the elderly: “Our capacity for self-pollution is 
limited; and it is other people‟s dirt that is of most concern”183 Caregivers spend a lot of 
time managing and interacting with processes that produce substances and materials that 
many of us are ashamed of in ourselves. 
Often, when caregivers are not directly contacting bodies, they are still interacting 
with materials that are neither flesh nor bodily waste, but are meant to serve or interact 
with bodily functions and needs (cooking utensils, diapers, rags, bottles, bedpans, soap, 
etc.); caregivers come to be strongly associated with these sorts of objects over time. 
Caregivers tend to do a great deal of housework and domestic labor in addition to tending 
to bodies, such as cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, ironing, disinfecting, and 
dispensing medicine. All of these activities reproduce the material conditions of others‟ 
lives and requires interacting with materials, such as diapers for babies and the elderly, 
cleaning supplies, cooking utensils, and other inanimate objects, which do not have a 
great deal of value attached to them in our society. I highlight this to reinforce the fact 
that the materiality of care consists in working with substances and processes that are not 
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generally seen as desirable and are often seen as contaminating to otherwise healthy 
bodies. 
Each of these categories of caring subjectivity—attunement, techniques of care, 
and the materiality of care—is important because each highlights a particular aspect of 
carework as it relates to bodies. When taken together, these categories give us a clearer 
picture of what it means to perform care in a bodily way, while also allowing for a broad 
but rich definition of carework. 
 
III. SERIALIZING CAREGIVERS: BODYWORK AND INEQUALITY 
Feminist theorists have taught us a great deal about how identities and bodily 
habits are at least partially constructed, fashioned, and sustained by the particular worlds 
that different groups inhabit. We need to be clearer about the forces that contribute to the 
fashioning of bodies that are, in one sense, built for care in so far as they are encouraged 
and even disciplined in such a way that leaves them few other alternatives besides 
carework. One way to interpret the claim that bodies are built for care is to consider the 
multiple, intersecting, and intervening factors that conspire to fashion and alter caring and 
non-caring subjectivities over time. 
Some care theorists have been attentive to the fact that care is contained and both 
reflects and contributes to inequality. Most have argued that care is devalued because it is 
“women‟s work,” and some have made loose connections between corporeality and care. 
I argue that carework is undesirable both because it is a form of bodywork and because it 
is work done by people who are regarded as nothing more than mere bodies. This 
includes but is certainly not limited to women.  
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These two claims—(1) carework is marginalized and devalued because it is 
bodywork and (2) carework is marginalized and devalued because, as bodywork, it is 
work that is performed by individuals who are codified as mere bodies and so occupy a 
marginal status in society—stand in a productive, dynamic tension with one another. We 
must take seriously care‟s relationship to bodily processes and needs; yet, carework is 
also devalued because it has historically been performed by individuals on the margins of 
our society, individuals who are themselves associated with bodies and material 
reproductive labor. The work of caregiving is seen as something certain kinds of people 
(for example, people of color, immigrants, poor people, women) do when they cannot do 
anything else. This suggests a more complicated relationship between care, the body, and 
political inequality than has been adequately explored in the literature. Political actors, 
policies, discourses, and structures all work to fashion caring subjectivities and they 
exploit individuals already in a position of economic and political subordination.  
Tronto has argued that carework is contained in so far as it has classed, raced, and 
gendered dimensions and feminist theorists have long focused on unequal distributions of 
domestic labor and social reproduction between women and men.
184
 The work of care has 
long been associated with women and femininity and, until recently, less so with the 
bodies of laborers who are constructed as fit only for carework and domestic labor—in 
particular, in the US, black Americans, the poor, and non-white male and female 
immigrants. The language of containment is useful for beginning to think about how care 
is written onto certain body types and how it plays out in segregated spaces that are very 
often hidden from public view. Iris Marion Young‟s concept of gender as seriality further 
illuminates the containment and structuring of care and can perhaps shed new light on the 
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way that caregivers are unified around caregiving objects and their shared association 
with bodies and bodily work.  
Young describes seriality as “a level of social life and action, the level of habit 
and the unreflective reproduction of ongoing historical structures.”185 Although her 
appropriation of seriality is meant to reorient our thinking about female experience, 
moving us away from thinking about women as a group of people who share similar 
qualities toward thinking about them as a group of people who share similar kinds of 
activities and interact with similar kinds of objects, her framework for the 
conceptualization of the structuring of gendered activity can be applied to our thinking 
about the structuring and fashioning of caregiving activity. It might be helpful to 
conceive of caregivers as a social collective “whose members are unified passively by the 
objects around which their actions are oriented or by the objectified results of the material 
effects of the actions of the others.”186 Individuals are positioned as certain kinds of 
subjects (caregivers, in this case) in this process of fashioning and serialization by those 
activities around the structures and objects that constitute their common project(s). Yet, 
they are also co-constructors of their reality in so far as they “pursue their own individual 
ends with respect to the same objects conditioned by a continuous material environment, 
in response to structures that have been created by the unintended collective results of 
past actions.”187 Serial membership constrains actions but it does not ultimately define a 
person by constituting her purposes and projects. In other words, there are constraints that 
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work to encourage and reinforce certain actions that are oriented around a set of objects 
and “practico-inert” histories, but membership in a series does not ultimately and 
eternally define one‟s identity.188  
As a series, caregiver is the name of a “structural relation to material objects as 
they have been produced and organized by a prior history,” and, as we saw in the 
previous section, bodies of depends constitute part of that material world. Caregivers are 
the individuals who are positioned as naturally and willfully caring, perfectly happy to 
give so much of themselves and ignore their own caring needs and desires; they are 
positioned as such by the activities that surround certain structures and practico-inert 
realities. These structures are multi-faceted and consist of inanimate objects, discourses 
that codify gendered and racialized bodies, historical artifacts, geo-political factors, and 
even language. Here, I will consider only a few. 
The sexual division of labor is perhaps the most obvious system that structures 
subjects‟ relations to the practico-inert objects that constitute the caregiving series.189 In 
her discussion of the series women, Young writes, “the division between caring for 
babies and bodies, and not doing so, is the most common sexual division of labor over 
which many other labor divisions are layered in social specific ways.”190 In addition to 
reinscribing gender roles, this sexual division of labor also solidifies caregiving roles and 
works to structure (female) subjects‟ actions and habits around caregiving tasks, projects, 
objects in the home and in the labor market, where women are much more likely than 
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men to enter caregiving occupations.
191
 Even as women have entered the workforce in the 
West in large numbers, women continue to do the majority of caregiving and domestic 
labor in the home.
192
 Although there is more variation with respect to men‟s caregiving in 
the home now than there once was in the United States, it is still the case that their 
caregiving is contingent on their relationship to women caregivers. The presence of wives 
and daughters, who have been oriented towards caregiving knowledges and objects from 
early on, “pull men into caregiving,” while men‟s adult sisters act as substitute caregivers 
in their absence.
193
 This serialization process, whereby caregiving skills are acquired (or 
not) at early ages in informal settings constitutes another mechanism for the structuring 
of subjects‟ future choices and actions. Subjects who have been oriented towards certain 
objects and habits from an early age can still be said to make the “choice” to give care in 
informal or formal settings, paid or unpaid, as an adult, but the external conditions that 
have delimited, constrained, and encouraged their choices, might still yet prevent them 
from making such choices freely.
194
 Further, to the extent that these processes orient our 
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attention away from the oppressive and exploitative conditions that set limits and 
constraints on individuals‟ choices, they threaten democratic practices of freedom, like 
the critical evaluation of the contexts in which subjects make choices.  
 Just as female bodies and the meanings and possibilities ascribed to them 
structure women‟s experiences, so, too, do the bodies of caregivers structure their 
experiences. And there are multiple structures which work to define bodies, such as 
institutionalized heterosexuality, forms of racialization, and, increasingly, anti-immigrant 
sentiment that positions immigrants as threats to American freedom or only fit for jobs 
that Americans don‟t want, domestic labor and carework among them. White women‟s 
wombs have historically signified motherly instinct and love, and they have been 
appropriated for reproduction and nurturance from the time of the ancients until now; 
similarly, brown and black skin has historically signified, and continues to signify in 
many ways, a laboring body, one fit for slave labor in some cases, bus also a body fit for 
the dirty work of care.
195
  
In the United States, black women have performed domestic labor in the homes of 
white families, stretching from the nineteenth century slave era to today.
196
 Racism has 
been an important serializing mechanism of caregivers, and this is reflected in and 
enforced by controlling images of black women as mammies and matriarchs. 
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Historically, when the labor of black women has been appropriated by white households, 
their care-giving labor was reframed as motherly instinct and love (most familiarly, in the 
figure of the mammy), and thus not really work. The same is true of Latina women and 
other immigrant women today who constitute a significant proportion of child and elder 
care workers in the US today; they are seen as best suited to do this work, in part, because 
they get so much pleasure from it.
197
 In a discussion of the way that discourses about race 
constrained black women‟s options with respect to work and choices they might wish to 
make regarding their own families, Micki McEyla writes,  
The system of slavery placed a monetary and labor value on black women‟s 
production of more laboring black bodies…The emotional traits that defined 
maternal affection fell outside the realm of black women‟s relationships to their 
own children in this framework. The black mammy figure became a powerful 
icon of motherly affection and care, but this was not held to be an inherent 
attribute, innate to black women. Rather, promoters of the mammy narrative 
believed these traits to be the product of the supposedly civilizing environs of 
white domestic space.
198
  
 
It may no longer be the case that the mammy narrative, in this particular form at least, has 
as powerful a grip on subjects such that it continues to significantly structure caregiving 
relationships and further entrench racial inequality; though it is surely the case that other 
racist discourses do. However, this example serves to illustrate the powerful materializing 
effects of discourses and images of bodies when it comes to unifying individuals around a 
particular set of objects and type of work. This is one way that racist discourses fashion 
and perpetuate anti-democratic caring relationships. Such structures of care clearly 
conflict with other democratic values like equality and justice, as well as pose clear 
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threats to the democratic freedom to choose one‟s own life plan. They also restrict the 
cultivation of capacities and knowledges relevant to the practice of citizenship. If a 
person is forced to give up so much of their private lives, including obligations to their 
own children and family members, in the service caring for another‟s family, they are not 
likely to be afforded time, energy, and resources that to civic education and engagement. 
 The global capitalist economy and subsequent international migration flows are 
also key structures, containing numerous sub-structures, which contribute to the 
serialization of caregivers. Global care chains (GCC‟s) are multiplying as a result of the 
outsourcing of care labor and internationalization strategies of governments, households, 
religious orders, and kinship networks. Arlie Hochschild coined the term “global care 
chains” to refer to “a series of personal links between people across the global based on 
the paid or unpaid work of caring.”199 Hochschild focuses mainly on “motherly” labor 
and describes a typical GCC as “an older daughter from a poor family who cares for her 
siblings while her mother works as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating nanny 
who, in turn, cares for the child of a family in a rich country.”200 In this account, the chain 
is driven by white women‟s mass entrance into the labor market in the West, which has 
created a demand for inexpensive childcare and elder care.
201
 To be sure, shifts in 
work/family arrangements for white middle-class families contribute to the construction 
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of GCC‟s, but they are not the only factor and probably not the most influential. 
Governments and labor networks also mobilize and coordinate the supply and demand of 
care labor internationally. Additional factors which drive and structure the serialization of 
caregivers in a GCC include national programs that recruit, train, organize, and provide 
financial means for labor export in migrating countries, the production of vacancies in 
carework occupations in developed countries, recruitment efforts, cultural concern with 
maintaining lifestyle and social status, and regulatory frameworks and governance in host 
countries focused on tracking migrant workers into care labor.
202
  
Tronto has suggested that we consider the obligation to grant immigrant care 
workers citizenship on the grounds that they provide a service to the host society that it 
simply cannot do without.
203
 This is an appealing proposal because it seeks 
acknowledgment and reward for a group of people who do low-status work, receive very 
little economic compensation, and make great personal sacrifice in the process. In this 
view, we are called upon as democratic citizens to institute some modicum of equality 
and to empower a group that is made both economically and politically vulnerable as a 
result of their “choice” to participate in a global care chain. And I agree that we need a 
“care movement” to “change the way American‟s think of themselves as public actors,” 
which would entail not only rethinking their reliance on immigrant care workers in an 
increasingly globalized and privatized context, but would also mean rethinking ourselves 
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as caregivers and working to transform our democratic institutions and policies to reflect 
this fact.  
Yet, we should also be cautious to not reproduce and further entrench the very 
structures, networks, and policies that provide incentives to potential migrant workers to 
enter a host country on the conditions that they are willing to perform a certain kind of 
(currently devalued) labor, especially when that choice is so constrained by external 
factors. Such policies continue to align racialized and feminized bodies with the work of 
care and perpetuate narratives and images of non-white immigrants as best suited to do 
the work of care, either because they are “naturally maternal” or because they are not 
capable of making contributions to society that are thought to be more valuable. This is 
related to another worry about recruitment practices in rich countries that target care 
laborers in poorer countries and incentivizing their care labor with the promise of 
citizenship. Such policies might hinder the cultivation of a democratic ethic of care that 
equalizes the burdens of carework across a range of subjectivities and also reimagines 
care as a practice that all citizens should be habituated to, not just those who are 
politically disenfranchised and economically exploited. 
Rethinking caregivers as a series that works to fashion subjectivity by orienting 
individuals‟ attention and actions around a set of “objects” (dependent bodies, bodily 
waste, segregated spaces of dependency and care, household and domestic goods, etc.) 
via structures (sexual division of labor, racist and sexist narratives, the global capitalist 
economy and privatized networks of care, national and transnational immigrant 
careworker policies, etc.) allows us to shift our analysis away from gender, which is just 
one dimension of the series, to the structural constraints and relations that shape 
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caregiving bodies and carework. Further, this framework brings into view the processes 
whereby the caregivers become tightly fastened to bodily work and perhaps reveals 
places where we can begin to reconstruct all capable citizens as practioners of care and 
cultivate more effective and ethical caregiving arrangements. 
In this chapter, I argued that we should connect the study of care to corporeality, 
and proposed that we rethink caregiver as an embodied subjectivity fashioned by 
structures and forces that orient and habituate certain individuals to the work of care. I 
outlined the bodily features of carework, including the caring attunement and techniques 
of caregivers, and the materiality of caregiving labor, all of which are crucial to the 
provision of good care, yet contribute in some way to the representation of carework as 
nonconceptual and “dirty work.” Care is economically and socially devalued because it 
involves body work—that is, work that tends to bodies and work that requires the use of 
bodies—and so continues to be taken up by individuals associated with corporeality. 
Finally, I suggested that Young‟s framework of the seriality of gender might serve as a 
good model for analyzing the structuring of caregiver‟s actions and choices.  
Constructing a democratic ethic of embodied care will require not just an 
equalizing of the “burden” of carework, but also critical reflection on the forces and 
barriers that prevent all citizens from embodying care. Importantly, it also necessitates a 
resolve to re-habituate ourselves, as democratic citizens, via the work of politics, to 
caregiving practices. This is a tall order, no doubt, but we might begin with challenging 
the institutions and policies that codify already marginalized and exploited bodies as 
“naturally caregiving” and preclude others from experiencing themselves as caregivers 
and, indeed, from experiencing a sincere desire to practice care in their daily live 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
EMBODIED CARE RECONSIDERED: 
(RE)CREATING CARING SUBJECTS 
 
 
Before he acquires excellence, then, a person 
must in a way already possess a character akin to 
it, one that is attracted by the fine and repulsed 
by the shameful. But it is hard for someone to 
get the correct guidance towards excellence, 
from childhood on, if he has not been brought up 
under laws that aim at that effect…So their 
upbringing and patterns of behavior must be 
ordered by the laws; for these ways will not be 
painful to them if they have become used to 
them. 
 —Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179b30 
 
No technique, no professional skill can be 
acquired without exercise; nor can the art of 
living, the tekhne tou biou, be learned without an 
askesis that should be understood as a training of 
the self by oneself. 
      —Foucault, “Self-Writing,” from Ethics  
 
Working in philosophy—like work in 
architecture in many respects—is really more 
like working on oneself. 
      —Wittgenstein, Culture and Value  
 
 
This chapter explores how we might take up the political work of cultivating 
practices of embodied care in a way that is consistent with the view that caregiving is 
central to human flourishing and an important practice of citizenship. This marks a final 
shift from a critical perspective on care to a more constructive one. The preceding chapter 
highlights this project‟s concern with critiquing unjust constellations of care and 
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identifying the mechanisms by which certain types of bodies are more likely to be coded 
as caring—naturally caring—than are others. Although I have been quite critical of 
failures to adequately explore the relationship between caregiving, corporeality, and 
inequality, I now want to move beyond these critiques and explore how we might begin 
to put into practice the embodied ethic of care that I have been developing, which, as 
should be clear by now, does include a critical component but does not end there. Here I 
consider some of the political implications of all that I have said thus far and articulate 
the modes by which better caregiving arrangements and practices might be 
democratically secured and an ethic of embodied care more widely adopted. I will also 
discuss in more detail some of the specific policies, structures, and practices that comport 
with the two main modes of political transformation that I propose.  
I begin with a brief discussion of the relationship between care and democratic 
politics and an overview of some arguments for how we might engender more fulfilling, 
equitable and just caregiving arrangements, both for caregivers and receivers of care. 
Following this brief engagement with some of the major contributions in this arena, I 
shall argue that there are two modes by which an ethic of care that is both critical and 
fully embodied can be achieved: First, a structural, or “top-down,” approach that is 
consistent with democratic values and processes is necessary. We must move beyond 
measures that seek only or primarily to give individuals more choices with respect to 
caregiving arrangements, as well as arguments that orbit the question of where the 
citizens‟ responsibility to care for dependents ends and the state‟s begins. Though 
expanding the range of choices and support available for individuals and families who 
receive and give care—that is, all of us—is extremely valuable, it also seems to be the 
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case that simply giving people more choices is insufficient for achieving the kind of 
egalitarianism and justice feminist scholars have long argued for in the realm of 
caregiving.
204
 If we want the work of care to no longer be primarily the work of those 
who are exploited and oppressed, we must begin the difficult work of radically reshaping 
political institutions, laws, and discourse in a way that takes seriously the idea that 
practicing care is central to human flourishing. This should have the much desired effect 
of lessening what is certainly, in many ways anyway, a “burden” of care for women and 
other minorities—for, as I have said, care becomes a burden when it is not widely shared 
by all members of society—and introducing all citizens, not just those who are associated 
with corporeality and bodywork, to the possibility of flourishing in and through practices 
of care. In other words, this restructuring must be undertaken not only for instrumental 
purposes—to end the exploitation of those who currently do carework—but also out of a 
deep commitment to the idea that giving care is central to human flourishing and that 
politics must take as one of its ends the securing of those material and social conditions 
that make that flourishing possible.  
In addition to what I take to be necessary—that is, inevitable and extremely 
valuable—collective work of “normalizing” bodies in a way that is consistent with our 
political values, a somaesthetic, or “bottom-up,” approach will also be indispensable to 
securing better caregiving practices and to cultivating a widespread ethic of care.
205
 Here 
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I suggest taking up something like what Amy Allen, following Foucault, has called the 
“politics of ourselves.”206 Such a project entails practices of “self-writing,” to borrow a 
phrase from Foucault, closely examining how we as subjects become attached in various 
ways to our subjection and the processes by which we are subjectivated, with much of 
our will and desire determined by forces beyond our control. Yet, the politics of ourselves 
as articulated by people like Foucault, Allen, and also Cressida Heyes also charts paths of 
self-transformation despite obvious constraints on autonomy and the fact that autonomy 
is always situated within relationships of dependency and care.
207
 On this view, subjects 
are able to acknowledge and critique current relations of power that structure embodied 
habits and subjectivity, yet also find ways to participate in their own self-fashioning. This 
work of self-transformation, then, requires that we risk interrogating our desires, working 
to change those that frustrate our ability to act freely in the world and to flourish. In our 
efforts to secure care for all citizens, I suggest that we simultaneously, though not 
unproblematically, engage two modes of power first made vivid by Foucault: disciplinary 
power and ethical subjectivation, or care of the self. 
In the first section I discuss several different formulations of what public support 
for an ethic of care requires as a way to introduce the policy recommendations that might 
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be suggested by my own understanding of care‟s relationship to political life.208 After 
reviewing what I think are compelling arguments, I argue that they all ultimately fall 
short on two scores: First, they take caregiving to be a kind of instrumental good rather 
than an activity that is constitutive of human excellence. As such, these arguments do not 
reveal the full force of care‟s potential to enrich our lives. The instrumentalist conception 
is too thin to gain the theoretical or political traction needed to persuade us that, 
whenever possible, we should choose to take up the work of care ourselves for reasons 
that go well beyond the benefits that care brings to the one receiving it. Second, these 
theories do not shed light on the relationship between care and embodied subjectivity, 
and they do not offer insight into how the collective choices we make about how to 
structure our lives and channel desires can produce different and better embodied habits 
of caregiving.  
I propose a two-pronged approach, one that is consistent with the project of 
rehabituating ourselves to different modes of inhabiting our bodies. To be clear, then, my 
main concern here is not how to best arrange our political institutions and structures so 
that people may simply choose to give care, if they so desire, without the risk of being 
unjustly burdened, financially or otherwise. Nor am I simply considering the question of 
the limits of the state‟s duty to provide care for citizens or citizens‟ moral and legal 
responsibility to provide care for dependents, though these are not altogether irrelevant 
questions for what follows. Rather, my primary concern is how we, as democratic 
citizens who have set for ourselves the task of governing ourselves, might resist the 
prevailing modes of subjectivation discussed in the previous chapter that keep some of us 
from adopting caring dispositions and habits, while compelling others of us to do so at 
                                                     
208
 I will only consider some of the most central arguments in the literature here. 
 171 
the expense of our own well being, while also compromising a range of other democratic 
values that we hold dear. In short, my task is to think through how we might undertake 
the kind of collective and individualized transformation that encourages and corresponds 
to the practice of embodied care that I argue is integral to human flourishing. So my 
focus will remain on the relationship between corporeality, care, and politics; and though 
I am indebted to many contributions from a range of scholars to our thinking about care 
and politics, most especially from welfare state scholars, I will not linger too long on 
analyses that have ignored this critical component of care ethics. 
 
I. PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICS OF CARE, A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 Structural support for care can take a range of forms and it can be justified on a 
number of different grounds. A good place to begin is with some of the earliest calls for 
the inclusion of care in political discourse and public policy, those made by “maternalist 
feminists” in the Progressive Era of the United States.209 Stretching as far back to the 
early 1900‟s and the work of Jane Addams at Hull House, some women have historically 
been very active in attempting to bring the care labor that was traditionally relegated to 
the home into the public sphere, most notably through efforts to build the social welfare 
state. Certainly, this early movement has been criticized in retrospect for its racist, ethno-
centric, and elitist undercurrents.
210
 Yet these early activists believed deeply in the 
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political value of care both in terms of the state‟s responsibility to care for “dependents,” 
a class of people which included children, the disabled, the indigent, and even unwed, 
young mothers, and the way that they construed care as an important civic practice, a 
form of valuable work that enriches society.
211
  
 The value of the work of Addams and others who believed that women had a 
unique contribution to make to society ought not be underestimated. Indeed, much was 
accomplished by the work at Hull House and women‟s suffrage depended in large part on 
making the case that society would great benefit from contributions made by “the woman 
citizen.” Yet as Tronto and others have argued, in order for care to be a widely accepted 
political value, for it to receive the attention it deserves, and, indeed, for gender equality 
to be fully realized, care can no longer be considered “women‟s work.” Care is something 
that all citizens need in order to flourish, and it is an activity that both women and men 
alike are able to perform; therefore, all should take an interest in seeing that our political 
institutions and policies take the needs of citizens to both give and receive care seriously.  
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In a sharp and persuasive critique of Rawlsian political liberalism, Eva Kittay 
argues that any acceptable account of political justice must include the distribution of 
care.
212
 I would like to focus briefly on the concept and principle of doulia that Kittay 
introduces into these discussions and on which her formulation for a public ethic of care 
rests. The principle of doulia is this: “Just as we have required care to survive and thrive, 
so we need to provide conditions that allow others—including those who do the work of 
caring—to receive the care they need to survive and thrive.”213 Doulia is an ethic 
captured by the familiar phrase, “What goes around comes around,” suggesting that just 
as caregivers have a responsibility to care for dependents, we, as a society, have a 
responsibility to attend to the well-being of the caregiver.
214
 This is not reciprocity in a 
strict sense, since care very often entails doing something for someone (whether a 
dependent or another caregiver) who is unable to give care, now and maybe never. Kittay 
clarifies how we ought to think about the centrality of reciprocity to care: “Since society 
is an association that persists through generations, an extended notion of „reciprocity (a 
transitive—if you will—responsiveness to our dependence on others) is needed for 
justice between generations.”215 The justification for care in this formulation, then, is that 
we all need care to survive and so care must be considered in the list of primary goods 
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that all citizens need. Society should act as a doulia for caregivers, which, for Kittay, 
means direct payment to “dependency workers,” and this is justified on the grounds that 
we have been cared for and have a collective obligation to support dependency relations 
and to ensure that others are cared for as we have been. This is a kind of moral obligation 
argument.
216
  
 Legal scholar Martha Fineman largely agrees with Kittay‟s analysis of Rawlsian 
political justice and she, too, concludes that there is a care of crisis. For Fineman, the fact 
that we are all, sooner and later, dependent on someone else‟s care for our well being, 
places a moral obligation on the state to secure that care and to provide public support for 
caregivers.
217
 Her analysis of liberalism‟s failure to address care goes even further than 
Kittay and Okin‟s respective critiques of Rawls‟, however. She argues that the structural 
position of the family and the attendant appropriation of domestic labor by both the state 
and the market becomes apparent if the family is a central part of any consideration of 
justice. It isn‟t just that dependency isn‟t listed as a primary good, as Kittay argues, nor is 
it that Rawls fails to consider inequality within the family, as Okin points out.
218
 It‟s also 
the case that a failure to consider the family‟s position in the ordering of institutions 
obscures the fact that the family itself, including the status positions within it, is shaped 
by political institutions and its structure and functioning affect abilities and capabilities in 
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those other arenas.
219
 Fineman‟s analysis of the family as not a “natural” site of 
dependency work or caregiving, but rather a public institution that has been assigned the 
role of caretaking by society is also consistent with my larger claim that caregiving habits 
and practices are always already being, to some extent, fashioned by politics generally 
and by the state specifically. Further, economic, social, and historical events have made it 
the case that “the contemporary family can no longer be relied upon to fulfill historic 
expectation in regard to dependency,” so some of this responsibility, Fineman argues, 
must be allocated to the state.
220
 Her model includes both direct subsidies to caregivers 
and what Maxine Eichner refers to as the “public integration” approach.221 This approach 
includes significant transformations in the workplace; in fact, it focuses primarily on 
work/family policies that will allow individuals and families to meet their caregiver and 
worker responsibilities. 
 Eichner notes the importance of the shift in Fineman from seeing caregivers as 
“charity cases” to seeing them as persons who are owed a debt by society. I agree that 
think this formulation is significant, though not without problems. Although she agrees 
with Fineman‟s fundamental claim that the state has a responsibility to support 
caregiving, Eichner takes a more conservative view of just how comprehensive that 
responsibility actually is. Specifically, Eichner argues that the state‟s responsibility ought 
not be grounded in the notion of “inevitable dependency” as Fineman argues, but rather 
should be based on the “state‟s responsibility to protect the vulnerable and to ensure 
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development of its citizens‟ capacities.”222 For Eichner, the “naturalness” of dependency 
in no way implies a normative demand to support the care that dependency requires and 
“Fineman‟s assertion of the inevitably of dependency fails to answer the question of why 
the state rather than, for example, parents or other family members should support 
dependency.”223 I have already addressed this question in Chapter Two, but it seems to 
me that any answer to this question has much more to do with one‟s view of the ends of 
politics and what it means for a human being to flourish than it does the naturalness of 
dependency or whether particular dependents will one day produce societal benefits. If 
we think that flourishing depends in some way on the extent to which one‟s 
“dependency” needs are met and we think the state has some interest in promoting the 
flourishing of its citizens, then it seems to me that the state must give considerable 
support to the practice of care. On Eichner‟s view, the ends of politics seem to be neither 
excellence nor happiness on this view, but rather the protection of the most vulnerable 
and the development of citizens‟ capacities. There are many things that we think pleasant 
and enriching of our lives but all of those things cannot be supported by the state.
224
 
Eichner ultimately finds some middle ground between those who argue that the state 
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should only step in when the family has failed in its duty to care for dependents and 
those, like Fineman, who argue that the state has a considerable degree of responsibility 
to provide care regardless of how well or poorly the family is doing this work. Eichner 
seeks to keep the boundaries between the state and the family fluid and sees both as 
simultaneously responsible for the well-being of the vulnerable. She explains:  
The division of responsibility that I propose posits what might be called both 
“strong families” and a “strong state.” This division expects that people should 
seek to meet dependency needs of the family members, and therefore requires 
families to take on the difficult task of caring for dependents. Yet it also maintains 
that such caretaking requires supportive institutional structures, and that it is the 
state‟s responsibility to secure such structures. In contrast to the reigning 
autonomy myth, this approach recognizes that the ability of families to nurture 
their members does not simply exist as a matter of fact, or spring up as a matter of 
spontaneous generation; instead, it is an achievement to be pursued jointly by 
both citizens and the state.”225 
 
I certainly agree that individuals, families, and the state are all responsible for the care of 
citizens and that this is an activity to be widely taken up by the public. Eichner concludes 
with an argument that the state should arrange institutions in a way that facilitates 
citizens‟ meeting their caregiving needs while not being impoverished and maintaining 
their worker identities.
226
 The poorest in society should receive the most financial help, 
and there should be adequate parental and family leave policies in place to ensure that 
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workers are not made more vulnerable through job or wage replacement policies that 
disadvantage those with caregiving responsibilities.  
Comparative welfare state scholars Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers, as well as 
critical social theorist Nancy Fraser, have put forth public policy recommendations that 
are compatible with the views of both Fineman and Eichner.
227
 These theorists are 
concerned with individuals who both work and have dependents in their care, rather than 
focusing primarily on how the state can repay full-time carework performed by stay-at-
home moms (or dads). What they seek is a balance between “caregiver” and “earner” 
roles, where both are conceived primarily as responsibilities and obligations, in a 
radically transformed labor market that now consists primarily of dual-earner households.  
Fraser constructs a “Caregiver-Parity” model that accepts Okin‟s earlier 
suggestions regarding comparable pay for domestic labor in the household and also aims 
to restructure institutions in the labor market “so as to welcome human beings who can 
give birth and who often care for relatives and friends, treating them not as exceptions but 
as ideal-typical participants.”228 Drawing a good bit of cross-cultural data, Gornick and 
Meyers offer more concrete suggestions, which include: 1) a comprehensive paid family 
leave program, in which all employed parents and other primary caregivers of children, 
would be granted six months of paid nontransferable leave entitlement following 
childbirth or adoption; 2) a 100 percent wage replacement during leave periods; 3) 
flexibility in paid leave entitlements to take benefits either full-time or in combination 
with part-time employment; 4) the right to take paid time off occasionally to attend to 
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family-related obligations. The focus is on working parents and families here, with the 
primary goal being that of enabling these particular caregivers to adequately divide their 
time between caring and earning responsibilities. Gornick and Meyers are primarily 
concerned with how to widen the range of choices for nuclear families with two working 
parents and children in the household. What they fail to address, however, are the 
numerous other caregiving relationships modern families face today. Further, by 
structuring their discussion around the triad of “father,” “mother,” and “children,” they 
reinscribe a notion of the family that, although perhaps common, excludes a wide range 
of non-traditional families that may have similar but also perhaps quite different 
caregiving needs.
229
 
Finally, Martha Nussbaum has also contributed to the conversation around 
engendering a public ethic of care, focusing primarily on people with disabilities, in 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership.
230
 This is her most 
comprehensive attempt to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to those who were 
previously thought to be more like charity cases than entities (humans and some non-
humans too!) with some claim on justice.
231
 She argues that her capabilities approach 
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suggests three areas where policy should be improved.
232
 First, she argues that full-time 
at-home caregivers should be paid by the state and that society should no longer benefit 
from the labor without giving some sort of compensation.
233
 In these countries, the state 
conceives of care as a kind of national service, one among a few options, including 
military service, which individuals can choose. Second, acknowledging the limitations of 
this approach for significantly altering the gendered dynamics of carework, Nussbaum 
argues that education, the second arena in which transformation is needed, must 
emphasize the importance of carework, though she does not specify how, and should help 
to shift the conceptions of manliness that contribute to men‟s reluctance to do this 
“work.” The workplace must also be altered to reflect the fact of care and to engender 
more concern for caregiving needs. New, more flexible arrangements must be introduced 
into the modern workplace, which are easily brought about by new technologies that 
make it possible for workers to do their tasks at satellite locations and to communicate 
via the internet with fellow workers and employers. There is also potential for the 
workplace to take on the responsibility of changing ethical norms, helping workers to see 
care as an integral part of their lives.
234
 Nussbaum doesn‟t say a lot about how 
corporations and employers might go about doing this or why we should believe that they 
would willingly do so given that it is not in their economic interest to do so. Although she 
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notes that many corporations are “already doing this,” that is already offering things like 
flex-time and the option to set up a home office, she fails to note that often times these 
arrangements do not result in less work and more care, but rather set up situations 
wherein employees are made to feel like they can (and should!) work any time, 
anywhere. Young workers need to begin to think of care as part of their lives, but what 
will spark this transformation? 
Each of these views sheds light on the need to more evenly distribute carework in 
society, as well as ensure that individuals are given opportunities to care without being 
unduly burdened. However, I have two criticisms of these formulations. First, these are 
all instrumentalist arguments for why the state and its citizens should care about care. In 
other words, because they all advance arguments in favor of care within a justice 
framework they cannot move beyond conceptions of care as duty, right, or valuable 
because of the good it bring to those receiving care. These arguments do not shed light on 
the possibility that practicing care is a key component of a fully actualized human life.
235
  
Nussbaum does believe that the capability to give care is integral to a fully flourishing 
life, one that we could say is lived with dignity, but she insists that what politics should 
be concerned to secure and preserve is not the functioning of caregiving, for that would 
press too hard against the rights of citizens to choose their own life plans, but rather the 
capability to care without becoming more economically vulnerably as a result of this 
choice. This, of course, leaves open the possibility that many will continue to not choose 
care, unevenly distributing the work of this particular virtue and thus contributing to the 
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malformed nature of much care as it exists in private, privatized, and public settings. In 
any case, to the theorists we‟ve considered here, care is an activity that, although 
pleasurable at times, as Kittay nicely illustrates, must be worked out in a just manner 
suitable to all parties because it is a form of labor from which all of society benefits. This 
is, at root, a collective action problem; all of society benefits from care labor, but now 
everyone wants to do the work of care, and those that do are often economically exploited 
and socially marginalized. The weakness in reciprocity arguments, like that of Kittay‟s 
and even Fineman‟s to some extent, is easy enough to see. Much of the work of care does 
not, in fact, result in a direct benefit to society, as Eichner reminds us. And how do we 
measure such benefits? Economically? Socially? Morally? We may benefit in all of these 
ways from the care that healthy children receive, but this depends a great deal on the 
quality of care and a great many other factors. But what about care for those who lack the 
capacities to make even the slightest contribution to society and may, in fact, pose a 
threat to or constitute a drain on shared resources?  
In Chapter Two, I made a case for conceptualizing caregiving as central to human 
flourishing. I share the concern most theorists of care that women, people of color, and, 
increasingly, immigrant workers, will continue to be associated with caregiving, and 
made vulnerable by that association, if a range of alternative life plans are not made 
available to them.
236
 I, too, believe strongly that one central component of developing 
structural support for caregiving must be a commitment to gender egalitarianism, at home 
and in the workforce, and men must have their own caregiving capacities nurtured and 
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promoted. Indeed, for care to be a virtue in an Aristotelian framework it must be a choice, 
something one achieves, not something that is thrust on a particular individual or group 
with shared characteristics. So to say that women need not be mothers or professional 
caregivers if they are to either count as “women” or simply be valued as human beings is 
not to commit oneself to the view that they should not care at all. To put the point a bit 
differently: The potential of care to enrich a life, depends in large part on the structural 
and political conditions that support (or fail to support) practices and relationships of care 
across the whole of society. We want to avoid structures and norms that make the 
practice of care a burden for some and the non-practice of it a privilege for others.   
 
 
II. ENGENDERING CRITICAL PRACTICES OF EMBODIED CARE 
 
Although each of these theorists sees care as something we should take seriously 
in the political arena, this is largely justified on the grounds of care‟s relevance to the 
achievement of other ends or because care for others is a kind of debt we owe to 
particular individuals and the larger political community in return for our own past and 
future care. These formulations tend to construct care as a problem in need of solving or, 
at best, a social good in need of better distribution. Care is sometimes performed for the 
purposes of achieving other ends and it is not entirely wrong to say that we should care 
for others because we have been cared for ourselves or because doing so constitutes the 
meeting of some sort of obligation. But these arguments fail to give us a rich enough 
conception of caregiving, one that makes vivid its potential to enrich the life of the one 
caring and to make what would count as a moral life possible. Further, these justice-
oriented formulations are not likely to motivate the deep transformations in the 
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caregiving capacities of individuals and societies that these scholars and I have argued 
are both politically necessary and morally desirable. 
My second criticism, and the one I shall further develop in the rest of this chapter, 
is that these arguments do not adequately address the relationship between corporeality, 
politics, and caregiving. More specifically, they take the government‟s responsibility to 
facilitate care seriously yet ignore the implications of the deeply embodied character of 
caregiving habits and dispositions. They do not go much further than the notion that 
political institutions, structures, and discourse should ensure that all citizens and families 
can provide care without being unjustly burdened, thus ignoring the potential of our 
politics to help shape citizens‟ desire for giving care in the first place and fashioning the 
embodied habits and dispositions that correspond to a range of caregiving relationships. 
In short, then, these approaches do not think the embodied nature of caregiving and how 
challenging it will be to shift those deeply entrenched embodied habits to give care 
unthinkingly and uncritically or to simply avert it. Engendering an ethic of care will 
require refashioning citizens—refashioning ourselves—such that they begin to inhabit 
their very bodies differently, and with the intention of practicing care. The question now 
becomes: How might politics better habituate us to caregiving? Further, how might we 
restructure caregiving arrangements so that we can practice care in a way that is 
consistent with the democratic values of justice and freedom? 
In what follows, I will address these questions and in so doing make two distinct 
contributions to conversations around how we might support care as a democratic 
political community. This particular community is one in which we are constantly 
engaged in the process of shaping and reshaping our political institutions to facilitate our 
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becoming who and what we wish to be. I first explore what it would mean for democratic 
citizens to structure some aspects of their shared life, such as education, work/family 
policy, political discourse, and caregiving communities, based on the view that a life well 
lived is one that entails a variety of caregiving practices. This requires an acceptance of 
the fact that part of what we do in a democratic polity—in any polity, for that matter—is 
govern embodied subjects, disciplining ourselves in the ways that we think best reflect 
and engender our shared values. Conceding that politics will always involve, to some 
extent, the management and normalization of bodies, I consider how we might fashion 
caregiving subjects in more effective, enriching, and democratic ways.  
Although care always plays out in the context of relationships and community 
shifting the focus back to subjectivity and more individualized experiences of learning 
how to care within relationships and communities can have important consequences for 
our relationship to embodied care. To this end, my second contribution is a consideration 
of how we can engage in what Richard Shusterman has termed somaesthetics. Very 
reminiscent of Foucauldian techniques of the self, Shusterman describes this as “a 
discipline dedicated to improving the understanding, use, and experience of the body as a 
locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-fashioning.”237 In her 
book, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies, Cressida Heyes 
has further developed this concept and has responded to feminist worries that 
Foucauldian ethics, or “care of the self,” which emphasizes self-fashioning and work on 
the self oneself in order to cultivate what Foucault called “freedom,” might “encourage a 
privileged, inward-looking attitude that merely taps into existing social trends toward 
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fragmentation and lack of political responsibility or solidarity.”238 Yet as Heyes 
conceptualizes it, somaesthetics has the potential to be taken up as part of a feminist 
project on the condition that such practices are pursued in concert with a coherent critique 
of problematic systemic modes of normalization.
239
 Let us now turn to the question of 
how we might engage these two different modes of power—disciplinary and self-care—
in the service of creating more and better caregiving practices. 
Part One: Constituting Caring Citizens 
 
 With the majority of women in the United States now in the paid labor force and 
given our societal failure to adequately restructure work/family norms and policies, we 
have seen a major increase in the use of privatized care to meet individuals‟ and families‟ 
caregiving needs over the past four decades. Indeed, women from all class and racial 
backgrounds are working outside of the home, people are increasingly living far away 
from their aging parents, and care for children, the elderly, and other dependents must 
now be purchased if people are to meet both financial and caregiving needs. Despite the 
very high cost of quality child or elder care today, a single-earner household is simply not 
as economical as it once was.
240
 In the United States, care has mostly been a social good 
that families and individuals must secure on their own, without the help of the state, but 
only in the relatively recent past has care become such a large (and profitable) industry. It 
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has always been the responsibility of citizens to sort out for themselves caregiving 
arrangements; economic and political transformations have created a situation wherein a 
viable alternative for most is now to hire out this work to “professional careworkers” and 
corporations.
241
  
 Tronto has discussed this issue in the context of the legacy of the feminist 
movement in her essay, “The „Nanny‟ Question in Feminism,” in which she asks: Do 
women who now have the freedom to work outside of the home have a responsibility to 
counteract the ways in which their own professional success has shifted the “burden” of 
care to others who remain marginalized minorities in society?
242
 She concludes that, yes, 
we must be attentive to the shift that has taken place and must not participate in the 
further oppression of women of color and immigrant women who now perform a great 
deal of carework for middle and upper class white families, very often for low wages. 
These consequences of (some) women‟s advancements are unintentional, but the 
responsibility of feminists nonetheless. The new landscape of care is as unjust and 
problematic as the old arrangement and a feminist commitment to justice and 
egalitarianism dictates that we take up this issue. I agree. Specifically, Tronto suggests 
that one of the ways in which the hiring and exploiting of domestic childcare workers 
gets justified is by anxieties produced by “intensive and competitive mothering.”243 
Mothers have bought into the idea that their own self worth depends on their children‟s 
ability to excel in all things—academically, athletically, socially—and they see the 
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placement of nannies with a certain set of skills in their homes as integral to giving their 
child the most enriching childhood possible.
244
 Tronto suggests that rather than bring 
domestic childcare workers into their home where their labor and the actions of the 
“employer” are totally unregulated and the nanny is subject to the worst forms of 
domination and exploitation, parents find alternative child care arrangements, such as day 
care or taking their children to a childcare worker who works from her or his home. Of 
course, this is undesirable from the perspective of the employer-parent, who wishes to 
have the most control possible over the care of her child in her absence. Public supported 
day care must be a political priority for feminists, concludes Tronto, and we must work to 
secure better wages and better working conditions for caregivers. Further, the value of the 
carework that many immigrant women perform be taken into serious consideration in 
decisions regarding whether or not to grant citizenship.
245
 Doing this would mean 
viewing care as a form of civic participation and would signal that it is of great political 
value.  
Of course, we would be hard pressed to come up with a persuasive argument 
against the need for more autonomy and respect, as well as better pay and working 
conditions, for careworkers. These folks are at the very bottom of the labor market yet are 
performing a service that is of a great national value. And though privatized care 
introduces new opportunities for exploitation and abuses of careworkers, the 
commoditization of care itself does not necessarily compromise the quality care in the 
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long run.
246
 Yet focusing solely on the injustices of poor treatment and inadequate 
compensation of professional (and non-professional) caregivers risks bypassing the 
question of what we lose when we outsource care as a rule to begin with and it will not 
bring about the sort of structural transformations required if a widespread ethic of care is 
to be finally realized. I have articulated a conception of caregiving that urges the 
reconsideration of the harm we do to ourselves when we choose life plans that involve 
little caregiving and when we as citizens create or accept the political, social, and even 
economic conditions that greatly hinder the practice of care in our daily lives. Further, if 
we want to adequately respond to the care crisis in this country, much more will be 
required than better wages for caregivers and more flex time for parents. What is needed 
is a deep commitment both to putting in place structural support for care but, even more 
importantly, to transforming ourselves into caregiving subjects. Finally, if care‟s intrinsic 
value can be widely understood and accepted, then it seems much more likely to motivate 
men to care, which is a widely shared goal of care theorists and feminists. 
  One central piece of a structural approach to creating a political culture that 
values care, then, is the institution of policies that not only allow but actually encourage 
citizens to take up caregiving in their daily lives, rather than those that merely making 
care more affordable and expanding options for meeting caregiving obligations, though 
these, too, are extremely important. Part of what I am objecting to, then, is the rhetoric 
and language used by theorists and policy-makers to talk about care, which constructs 
care as work, responsibility, and, often, burdensome. Incentive structures like those 
suggested by Gornick and Meyers seek to address the problem of gender inequality with 
respect to carework by piecing together actual policies that have been demonstrated to 
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help families better balance work and care. Though they certainly advocate state-
supported childcare options, many of their suggestions are directed at freeing citizens up 
from work responsibilities so that they can also assume the role of caregiver to 
dependents. Yet these incentive structures fall short because they do not correspond to 
ethical norms that reflect the centrality of care to human flourishing and happiness.
247
 An 
approach that sees caregiving as an ethical practice that is necessary for the flourishing of 
individuals and societies will entail political measures that habituate citizens to care and 
that channel their desire to care for others. 
 We might begin thinking about what these measures would look like by returning 
to Nussbaum‟s recommendations. Although her policy suggestions are rather brief and a 
bit vague, she helpfully identifies three primary sites for transforming individuals into 
subjects capable of giving care. I‟d like to expand upon the suggestions she makes for 
each site—the public sector, education, and the workplace. 
 What most policy recommendations concerning care lack is an appreciation for 
the role of political institutions and policies in cultivating new forms of awareness and 
bodily habits such that caregiving becomes not only a viable but also a desirable choice 
for citizens. In other words, structural support for care must entail programs and policies 
that seek to give citizens an education in caregiving, specifically, in the cognitive, 
affective, and embodied habits that constitute a caring subjectivity. Care must be seen by 
policy-makers and citizens alike as requiring a certain degree of embodied knowledge, 
which will mean doing more than expanding the range of work/family options available 
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to citizens. It requires a moral and even physical education in caregiving. Let us consider 
some ways that democratic citizens can work to achieve this goal in the public sector.
248
 
First, if we want caregiving to be recognized as a virtue in a similar way that, say, 
courage is commonly viewed, then I think Nussbaum‟s suggestion that we institute 
caregiving as an option for national service, perhaps one among several options that 
citizens can elect to perform.
249
 This is practically useful too, given the fact that 
caregiving needs will only multiply as the Baby Boomer generation begins to age. Of 
course, this would only be effective if carried out in tandem with other measures that 
work to eradicate the gendered nature of caregiving. Nevertheless, this would begin to 
signal that care is not only something that needs to be done for the greater good but is 
something that is also honorable. One possible objection is that young people simply 
won‟t choose to take up caregiving unless they have to. I don‟t have a very good response 
to this, mostly because I don‟t think we can know for certain what anyone would or 
wouldn‟t do if the norms, discourse, and expectations around care were very different 
than they are now.    
The question of whether or not individuals will actually take up the activities most 
characteristic of human excellence is precisely the point at which Aristotelians backs 
seem to be against the wall. What will guarantee that people will actually choose to do 
the things we have argued make a life worth living? One thing to say here is that what 
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sets my own argument apart from other, specifically liberal, arguments in favor of care is 
that I am not interested in simply giving people more choices that would allow people to 
do the work of care in the hopes that they will make the “right” choice without being 
shown the virtues of giving care, without being fashioned, in some sense, into a subject 
capable and desiring of this activity. Though, as argued in Chapter Three, I absolutely 
think that the capacity for critical thought and decision regarding whether and how one 
will participate in a caring relationship is an important component of an ethical and 
excellent practice of care. This is very difficult terrain to navigate, to be sure. How can 
one say that we need to be habituated toward certain actions and desires and yet at the 
same time hold that we must choose those actions for ourselves? Part of what we as 
democratic citizens must do is set out for ourselves the horizons we wish to exceed and 
the limitations we must place on ourselves if we are to live the kind of life we think best. 
In other words, choice is always something we exercise within a set of constraints; and 
this is both necessary and desirable on Aristotelian picture of how one learns to 
appreciate and participate in the virtues, as we saw in Chapter Three. There are entire 
literatures on the importance of cultivating civic virtue and “enlightened preferences,” for 
the success of a political community and, most recently, the value of “choice 
architecture,” where political knowledge and action are concerned.250 The point I wish to 
make here is that I am not claiming that we can expect to see young people or anyone 
else freely choosing to practice care out of a sense of civic duty as things stand now, 
though it should also be said that many people do the work of care right now without 
coercion or monetary reward. But if we were to radically alter how we as a society teach 
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young people about the value and honor in choosing to care for others and if we could 
somehow better communicate care‟s capacity to help us lead more excellent, flourishing 
lives, then we might reasonably expect to see more people choosing to integrate practices 
of care into their daily lives, at least more than they do now. Further, citizens would be 
more likely to do the necessary political work of transforming institutions, policies, and 
systems such that they provide more opportunities and resources for caregiving. 
If caregiving were to become an option for national service, there would likely be 
a considerable amount of training involved, wherein citizens learned both the technical 
skills necessary for caring for elderly folk, children, sick people, and those with severe 
disabilities (bathing, feeding, dressing wounds, etc.). Beyond technical skills, caregivers 
would also receive an education in how to be active listeners, become more attuned to the 
caring needs of others, and critical thinkers who are capable of discerning the relevant 
features of a particular caregiving dilemma and sorting out which are the best possible 
responses and which are likely to bring us up short. This suggestion may seem far-
fetched, given that obligatory national service is not part of our political discourse 
anymore. The Obama administration has emphasized civil service more than previous 
administrations in recent decades, though, and they are exploring ways to subsidize 
careers in civil service. The current care crisis we face in this country suggests that 
caregiving ought to be considered as a possibility for civil service, since there is such an 
overwhelming need for care at this moment in history when elderly people are living 
longer and longer and yet younger people are working more and more. 
 In Chapter Two I discussed the emergence of caregiving communities, such 
L‟Arche. These are places where able-bodied and disabled people come together to live 
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and work, to experience personal growth, fellowship, and community. At present, most of 
these and similar care communities are funded by church organizations or are community 
co-operatives set up by concerned citizens; much more rarely, they are privately funded. 
These care communities emphasize the learning, growth, and self-actualization that takes 
place within the context of caring relationships and reject the idea that care is charity or 
healthy people merely providing a “service” for those who cannot do for themselves. I 
see no reason why such programs ought not be supported at the state and federal levels of 
government. If these communities were to be developed and set up across the nation, they 
could certainly be incorporated into a national service program and, if they were located 
at the heart of urban areas and townships, they would likely go a long way towards 
integrating not just the fact of dependency but also, and just as importantly, caregiving 
into our public life.  
 Caregiving has always been practiced in and by groups of people and 
communities. Individuals and families most often rely on wider networks of people who 
either step into perform care when they are unable to do it themselves or provide support 
to caregivers in a variety of other ways, such as cooking, cleaning, or running errands for 
caregivers. This is a very common practice in developing and developed countries, 
especially for those who have caregiving responsibilities but lack the material resources 
to outsource care for wages.
251
 We frequently rely on support and assistance from others 
as we tend to those in our care. These support networks, or care cooperatives, can take a 
number of different forms. Patricia Hill Collins has written extensively on the virtues of 
the practice of othermothering in Black communities in the United States, wherein 
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working and non-working women rely on a network of other women in the community to 
assist in the rearing of their children. When women need to leave behind their children to 
go to work, tend to other family members in their care, or meet some other responsibility, 
it is very common to leave their child under the care of another woman, or group of 
women, in the neighborhood, people who very often share their values and worldview. 
This has been a very effective and affordable method of meeting caregiving needs, 
despite its informal nature. Similarly, cooperative daycares have become increasingly 
popular with undergraduate and graduate students with children, as well as in art 
communities. These are typically non-profit, small, community/parent run organizations 
wherein parents or primary caregivers are responsible for running the day care. Usually 
parents work a few hours a week at the center in exchange for very low costs, a sense of 
strong community (most often, everyone in the group lives nearby and knows one 
another), and the comfort of knowing that they have a strong investment in and some 
control over their child‟s care. Such cooperatives, which give individuals opportunities to 
practice care on a regular basis but also affords them the opportunity to pursue other 
projects and to work, could serve as a model for elder care and for the severely disabled. 
These cooperatives should be eligible for public funding and support. 
 Another possibility for cultivating more knowledge around caregiving is to 
implement state subsidized classes for individuals and families who are already 
caregivers, will be in the near future, or simply wish to develop their embodied 
caregiving skills. In the UK, for example, new mothers are encouraged take state-
sponsored antenatal and breastfeeding classes, which give them knowledge and 
encouragement helpful for them as they give care to their newborn. Breastfeeding is an 
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especially challenging and even painful practice and, contrary to misperceptions about 
women‟s “natural” ability and instinctual knowledge of breastfeeding, it actually requires 
quite a bit of knowledge, practice, skill, and effort if it is to be done well. Women who 
would like to breastfeed would greatly benefit from instruction and assistance, beyond 
simply having nursing rooms in public spaces.  
We might also take the political steps necessary to institute preparatory classes for 
expecting and new parents. If these were rigorous, open to parents of all class 
backgrounds, and did more than simply give people information but also gave expecting 
and new parents a more physical, “hands on,” experience—for example, practice holding 
a baby, soothing, changing diapers, rocking to sleep, and feeding—parents might have a 
sense of where to begin when they bring their new baby home and where to go with 
questions about how to provide care. As children change, their caregiving needs also 
change; parents could benefit from educational programs and support networks that 
facilitate learning about how to respond to their child‟s caring needs. A good example of 
how this might work is the Saint Paul Early Childhood Family Education Program in 
Saint Paul, Minnesota. This program, which receives funding from the state, operates on 
a suggested fee basis and no family is turned away because of an inability to pay; one‟s 
child need only be enrolled in the Saint Paul school system. The organization offers 
classes, events, information-sharing sessions, and parent-child time together, all intended 
to “strengthen families and enhance the ability of all parents to provide the best possible 
environment for the healthy growth and development of their children.”252 Of course, 
parents are busy and it‟s hard to imagine that the average working parent could find the 
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time to attend childcare courses. Yet, at ECFE childcare is provided (there is usually time 
spent with one‟s child, and then time spent with other parent, caregivers, and “parent 
educators”), which takes away at least one barrier to participation. And if it was possible 
to make participation in these programs a norm and something that parents actually enjoy 
doing, both from a social and educational standpoint, as they seem to at ECFE, then we 
might probably have reason to be a little less skeptical about their success and efficacy. 
An education for adults in caregiving practices, though, should not be limited to 
young parents. This is true for several reasons. First, as Peta Bowden‟s nicely 
demonstrates, caregiving practices will differ and correspond to the particular needs of 
those receiving care.
253
 Bowden gives a very nuanced account of the different techniques 
and practices entailed in mothering, nursing, friendship, and citizenship, all of which vary 
as a result of needs and the nature of the caring relationship, and all of which produce 
different care perspectives. I accept this suggestion that we need to move away from 
static and universal conceptions of what it means to “care,” even as I acknowledge that 
certain techniques and disposition are common to most caregiving relationships. In any 
case, to say that care is integral to human flourishing does not mean that we will all care 
in the same way, or that such an arrangement is even desirable. Indeed, a large and 
diverse nation like the one in which we live has a multitude of caregiving needs that must 
be met; some will care for the elder, some for small children, some for the severely 
disabled, some for the infirm and terminally ill, and even some for their fellow citizens 
who have lost their homes or jobs as a result of natural disaster or the recent economic 
downturn. There should be a range of options available so that citizens can get the 
necessary education and practice for how to best care for those who are relying on them, 
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especially those with family members who have pressing care needs, and these options 
should be free and available to everyone. Adult children with elderly parents often find 
themselves in situations where they lack the skills, patience, and support to properly care 
for their parents; there should be classes available for these caregivers with information 
and practice relevant to the sort of specialized care that elderly folks often need.  
Of course, we live in a world in which families have more responsibilities than 
ever before and people have increasingly less time to spend on anything besides work and 
typical family responsibilities. Such state-sponsored educational classes and care 
programs will not do much if there are not clear incentives or even obligations to 
participate in them. And although I wish to steer clear of debates about the economic 
value of care and whether or not care is properly considered a commodity, there should 
be laws and policies in place—such as direct wage replacement for family leave, 
mandatory leave for new mothers and fathers, direct payment to longer-term stay-at-
home-caregivers, and so forth—to ensure that those who are practicing care are not only 
not made financially vulnerable by doing so but do not have the additional burden of 
choosing a life activity that is not highly regarded by society or valued within the context 
of political institutions or the labor market.
254
  
I absolutely agree that women should no longer be perceived automatically as 
primary caregivers and it is not my intention here to romanticize care or to fault women 
who either have to work or who want to work for not also practicing care (obviously, 
most women do both anyway). Indeed, if women are to achieve true freedom and 
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equality, they must have life plans other than “full time caregiver” available to them and 
those plans must actually be viable. Yet I‟ve also said that embodied care is constitutive 
of a life well lived and a critical part of our process of becoming—our becoming fully 
human. So to be clear: I do not believe that anyone, including women, can entirely 
abandon care and still lead a flourishing life. The choice should never be between 
working full-time or caring full-time, but should rather be a question of how we will craft 
life plans and institute certain policies and institutions that facilitate the pursuit of 
caregiving alongside other activities and projects. However, much more needs to be done 
in the realm of early education to make care an activity that is honorable for both women 
and men to pursue; in other words, young people must come to see quite early on that 
care is neither “feminine” nor “masculine” work, but is an activity that all of those who 
seek a flourishing and happy life should pursue. How might this be achieved?  
Much like computer science and physical education courses, which are commonly 
taught in secondary public schools today, and which are intended to give students 
practical knowledge, care requires a kind of practical knowledge and is a set of cognitive 
and physical skills that young people should learn as part a wider educational program; 
just as with health and technology courses, caregiving courses will help them to better 
navigate the world in which they live and give them the requisite disposition and skills 
they will need to meet the some of the challenges they will most certainly face as they 
come into adulthood. It is quite myopic to see the world primarily through the lenses of 
increased technology and virtual systems; for we also live in a country with a large 
rapidly aging population and entire segments of the population with caregiving needs and 
responsibilities that will have to be met one way or another (and, as it stands now, with 
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tighter and tighter budgets and very little state assistance). It may seem a bit retrograde to 
offer courses on caregiving in public schools, given the associations many women who 
are old enough to remember may have with “home economics” courses. Yet the changing 
landscape of care in this country should be accompanied by a shift in the value we attach 
to it from an early age on. An updated, modern version of classrooms in which young 
people learn about the virtues of care—not unlike learning about the virtues of civic 
engagement—ought to include young men and work to break down the reluctance that 
many boys and men feel about doing the work of care.
255
  
Beginning with an education in caregiving on the grounds that it serves an 
important practical purpose need not entirely conflict with the corresponding view that 
care is something we value as a society because it is constitutive of our excellence, as 
human beings and as a society. We can undertake the project of habituating young people 
to caregiving for more than one reason and we very often begin teaching children to like 
a particular activity because it is useful. Yet, over time, we come to understand more 
deeply what makes a particular activity truly pleasurable. Much like reading Flaubert‟s 
Madame Bovary in the original French or proving Euler‟s theorem, caregiving has 
intrinsic value beyond whatever practical usefulness it might also possess, but this isn‟t 
always easy to see in the beginning. Our exploration of Aristotle‟s understanding of how 
we learn excellence and how we come to love excellent pursuits tells us that we must first 
be told that a particular activity, like the poets, says Aristotle, simply is good and, 
therefore, necessary. Then, once we are open to doing what is good and necessary, we 
can learn to experience that activity in a particular way, and then, once we have 
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developed cognitively and emotionally, we come to see for ourselves that what we have 
been told is, after all, true. Here, once more, is the key passage about the beginning of 
habituation to excellence: 
[W]e need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be adequate students 
of fine and just things, of political questions generally. For we begin from the 
belief that something is true; if this is apparent enough to us, we can begin 
without also knowing why it is true. Someone who is well brought up has the 
beginnings or can easily acquire them (NE 1095b5-10). 
 
On an Aristotelian view, we begin an education in whatever pursuits we value as a 
society because we are told by those entrusted to educate us that it is good and necessary 
to do so. And later we come to appreciate those pursuits more deeply because we have 
received the proper education that allows us to see that, in fact, certain activities demand 
of us a deeper understanding and appreciation.  
Caregiving does not belong solely in the realm of necessity and to leave it there is 
to deny ourselves a deeper practice of care that has the potential to make us more 
excellent human beings. Just like literature or mathematics, both of which have a 
practical and intrinsically beautiful quality to them, caregiving reveals something very 
important to us about the character of our own humanity, our complexity and capacity for 
making fine distinctions and judgments. When we are able to see this, we are able to also 
experience pleasure in care, regardless of the particular outcomes we may wish to see as a 
result of our caregiving efforts. As with Aristotle‟s understanding of how we are first 
habituated to generosity and later come to see why choosing to be generous is 
intrinsically valuable, once we have practical knowledge of how to give care to others, 
we are then able to move on to a deeper understanding of why we might choose this end 
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for ourselves. This is how we move into something like full virtue—in thought, feeling, 
and practice. 
A liberal arts education strikes me as a potentially rich resource for cultivating a 
shared commitment to care, particularly if the liberal arts were better supported by the 
state. This may seem like an odd suggestion, especially since universities and colleges 
are, in general, having a difficult time attracting students interested in the humanities; 
young people today seem increasing drawn to more “practical” disciplines.256 Further as 
the economy is in decline we are seeing more economic justifications for higher 
education.
257
 Nevertheless, such an education encourages reflection on the sort of life one 
should craft for oneself. It aims to make vivid certain admirable forms of life that we 
might pursue, pose questions to us about why one life might be better than another, and 
teach us something about the practices that constitute those forms of life. At a recent 
political theory conference, Stephen Salkever gave a paper in which he claims that in 
addition to a commitment to the love of learning, a liberal arts education requires the 
belief that “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being (Apology), which 
means that we need above all to develop the desire and the capacity to give a logos of our 
lives, to imagine who we are and who we want to be, to think subtly and clearly about the 
kind of life we want to lead, about how to choose the better from among those lives that 
are possible.”258 He identifies the following four ways of life, which form the basis of an 
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enriching liberal arts education: (1) the prohairetic life, (2) the scientific life, (3) the 
democratic citizen‟s life, and (4) the pious life. The centrality of these four forms of life 
to a liberal arts education seems clear enough as argued by Salkever, for these are the 
four he gives because they are the predominant answers (endoxa) given by our diverse 
political community.
259
 But I would suggest that caregiving is a practice that is closely 
bound up with at least three of the four forms of life that Salkever discusses—the 
prohairetic life, the democratic citizen‟s life, and the pious life. The liberal arts and the 
humanities concern themselves not with the instrumentality of knowledge, though, as 
Salkever is quick to point out, it is most certainly concerned with the “practical goal” of 
attempting to answer the question of what a life well lived looks like and how we might 
craft such a life for ourselves. We would not want to see the caring life presented as 
merely a “professional” path, like that of nursing or social work, for such an approach is 
incompatible with what we have said a liberal arts education sets out to achieve in the 
first place. Coming to see that caregiving is constitutive of a number of different 
honorable forms of life or that it might sometimes by itself constitute one such form has 
the potential to alter young people‟s understanding of what it would mean to be a 
caregiver and to live a life of service to others. The kind of “service” that constitutes the 
ethic of care I have been developing is not, of course, promote self-abnegation, which 
would not be compatible with the aims of liberal arts education either, but rather demands 
self-awareness, thoughtful reflection on one‟s actions, and a disposition toward 
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steadiness; this kind of service is one important way that we are able to more fully come 
into our humanity.  
It is, of course, difficult to imagine that something like this could engender real 
changes in human behavior, that the construction of a conception of personhood in 
educational contexts that includes a deep desire and ability to care in order to flourish 
could actually lead people to practice care more frequently. Indeed, as Virginia Held 
points out in her discussion of care and the extension of markets, the effects of thinking 
in purely instrumental, economic terms and being exposed to assumptions about the 
natural “self-interest” of human beings does have a long-term effect on students‟ 
behavior and choices.
260
 Self-understandings are the product of a constellation of 
different factors, no doubt, and lived experience has much to do with it, to be sure. Yet 
it‟s also surely the case that the particular life projects and forms of life we choose have 
very much to do with the messages we receive in primary, secondary, and higher 
education about what we take to be valuable to our flourishing. Perhaps it is no surprise 
that many young college students are drawn to majors like business, economics, 
engineering, and other fields that correlate with higher incomes; we live in a society that 
rewards financial achievement and industry, not philosophical reflection on what it means 
to be fully human and what it would mean to live a good life. Yet these are the sorts of 
questions we must be willing to ask ourselves if we are to come to see the practice of care 
as an important part of what it means to flourish. 
 Despite the sketchy and preliminary nature of these policy recommendations, they 
might seem quite troubling to some, far too comprehensive and rigorous to be deemed 
acceptable, even by those who believe the current care crisis we face demands a response. 
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But taxpayer dollars used to fund caregiving cooperatives? Requiring adult citizens to 
enroll in caregiving classes? Introducing caregiving into primary and secondary 
curricula? Direct payment to at-home caregivers? Forced family leave for new parents? I 
anticipate criticism from two camps. I anticipate criticisms from two main camps. For 
shorthand, I‟ll call the first the “liberal critique” and the second the “postmodern 
critique.” The liberal critic will likely express some variation on the theme of concern 
about the extent to which individual and even family autonomy is threatened by such 
recommendations and citizens‟ choices about their life projects restrained. I have two 
responses to this sort of criticism. I should preface my first response with some 
acknowledgement that it will surely be unsatisfying to those who wish to argue about the 
“limits of the state‟s responsibility” or how to balance support for caregiving with respect 
“privacy” and “individual rights.” The fact that I begin with Aristotle can‟t help but 
reflect my deep skepticism about the effectiveness and value of liberalism when it comes 
to actually producing civically engaged and citizens who are invested in their own 
excellence and that of their polity.  
 To put it another way, and to return to some of the claims advanced in Chapter 
Two, there is a deep affinity between care ethics and Aristotle because both take the aim 
of politics to be, in large part, the production of a certain kind of human being, one with 
certain habits, desires, and traits. Further, both believe that our political arrangements and 
institutions should reflect clear values and norms that reflect and support whatever our 
notion of the good life might be. Of course, the aims of liberalism are much more modest. 
Liberals are likely to want to argue about how we can place a value on an activity that, 
although perhaps very necessary, is clearly a matter of personal choice. But my project is 
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admittedly uninterested in what people presently desire and begins with a different sort of 
question: Is caregiving something we should prefer? And, if it is, how we might come to 
instill in citizens a desire to practice care? So although, like Aristotle, I hold out an 
important place for plurality and choice, I begin with a fairly detailed picture of what is 
good for human beings because that is what is required if we are to entertain questions 
about flourishing and the political conditions that might secure it. In order to say how we 
ought to live together and how we might live better, we need to begin with a conception 
of who we are. I have said that we are, among other things, creatures capable of 
practicing care for one another and, under the best circumstances, desirous of the 
opportunity for this particular activity. So the first answer to the liberal critic is simply 
this: I adopt an Aristotelian view of political inquiry and politics, wherein the goal of 
ethical/political inquiry is to discern the best kind of life and to determine how we might 
organize our political community to achieve this life for all. Contra liberalism, this means 
that the goal of politics is, essentially, to produce individuals of excellent character and 
intellect. 
 My second response to the liberal critic is to suggest that citizens‟ choices are 
always constrained by larger political and social forces; indeed, this is one way to 
understand the very nature of politics. It certainly isn‟t the case that those with caregiving 
responsibilities currently have a wide range of options available to them which would be 
significantly narrowed by my recommendations; quite the opposite actually. Those 
people and families who can afford it, or who happen to have family and community 
support, certainly have the “freedom” to figure out their caregiving arrangements as they 
please, but we would hardly characterize this situation as one in which all citizens have a 
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wide range of acceptable, or even viable, options available to them. Further, democratic 
citizens make choices all of the time—for example, about which social programs to 
publicly fund, whether to support music in the schools, what should be included and 
excluded in educational curricula, and, currently, whether health care should be 
reformed—that have the unintended consequence of restricting, sometimes considerably, 
citizens‟ choices further down the road. We can never secure conditions with an infinite 
range of choices, nor would we even desire such a world; for that would likely look less 
like freedom and more like Hobbes‟ state of nature. Values are always coming into play 
in collective decision-making, even in a liberal society. We value justice in our society. 
Our political culture places a high premium on justice and we seek to produce citizens 
who share this value and who have an observable commitment to it. Why not also care? 
 Another criticism is likely to come from the scholars influenced by postmodernism, 
but, interestingly, its origins are closely related to Arendtian concerns about the threat 
that biological life poses to the political. So let us briefly review the Arendtian 
intervention in order to contextualize the critique I wish to respond to. Arendt‟s fear, 
which motivated much of her political work, was simply this: While we need labor and 
all of the activities associated with corporeality in order to actually achieve freedom (a 
parasitic relationship between the political and the natural is the classical conception of 
the relationship of biological life to politics is what shapes Arendt‟s own view), it‟s 
impermanence and cyclical nature only threaten human life—which is much more 
complex, durable, and permanent than bare life—once it enters the political realm.261 We 
must, therefore, constantly guard against the erosion of the political by the “natural” 
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world. She explains: 
Without taking things out of nature‟s hands and consuming them, and without 
defending himself against the natural processes of growth and decay, the animal 
laborans could not survive. But without being at home in the midst of things 
whose durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a world whose very 
permanence stands in direct contrast to life, this life would never be human.
262
 
 
Interestingly, it is Arendt‟s interpretation of Aristotle‟s understanding of the relationship 
between zoe, mere biological life, and bios, distinctively human (and so political) life, 
that seems to shape what can only be characterized as a deep fear and resentment of all 
bodily activity or care for the body.
263
 The fundamental binaries of zoe/bios and bare 
life/political existence that have been so central to Western political philosophy also 
preoccupied Foucault who, like Arendt, cites Aristotle as the primary authority and 
source for this distinction between animal existence and political life.
264
 And like Arendt, 
Foucault had serious concerns about the role played by biological life in modernity, 
though his analysis of the way in which power works on bodies to bring them out of the 
private realm and into the public for the purposes of controlling and regulating is much 
less rigid than Arendt‟s. For Foucault, it is not individuals‟ or even society‟s 
preoccupation with the bodily that has led to an encroachment of the public/political into 
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the private/bodily and visa versa. Rather this is an historical event that marks the 
beginning of an era in which animal life becomes the subject/object of new insidious 
forms of power exerted over entire populations by governments and corporate entities 
through new discourses and disciplines of the body. In other words, the destructive power 
of violence is no longer useful to those in power; what is useful now is disciplinary power 
over actual bodies and the regulation of the population‟s biological capacities. Malcolm 
Bull gives a succinct description that captures Foucault‟s understanding of disciplinary 
power and governmentality: “The first of these focused on the individual human body, 
increasing its usefulness and economic integration through „the optimization of its 
capabilities‟; the second on the collective body: „births and mortality, the level of health, 
life expectancy and longevity‟ and the environmental variables that controlled them.”265 
To sum up, this is the dark side of biopolitics, a disturbing “bestialization of man 
achieved through the most sophisticated techniques.”266 
 Those who are preoccupied with such concerns might well charge me with 
advocating a most insidious, because deceptively “caring,” form of biopower that serves 
the current power structure by encouraging the self-managing of populations in such a 
way that keeps them mired down in the depths of bare life, busying themselves with care 
for bodies and doing the “dirty work” of states, rather than encouraging the rejection of 
habitual bodywork in favor of the realization of their fullest human potential. On this 
view, then, carework is not mere drudgery that must be carried out in order to sustain 
“real” political life (this is the Arendtian view), but is rather a form of exploitation used 
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to intervene into even the most intimate aspects of individuals‟ lives. An “ethic of care” 
which comes in the form of a political entity (the state) caring about the well being of its 
citizenry is just another set of techniques and tactics used to disempower individual 
citizens in the name of caring for the masses. This critic will echo Foucauldian worries 
about care of „populations‟ as the fundamental instrument of power in modernity. Such 
worries are variations on the following theme:  
In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of 
government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; and the means 
the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all, in some sense, 
immanent to the population; it is the population itself on which government will 
act either directly or, through techniques that will make possible, without the full 
awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of 
population into certain regions or activities, and so on…the population is the 
subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the 
government, aware, vis-à-vis the government of what it wants, but ignorant of 
what is being done to it. Interest as the consciousness of each individual who 
makes up the population, and interest considered as the interest of the population 
regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the 
individuals who compose it: this is the new target and the fundamental instrument 
of the government of population.
267
  
 
I cannot address these sorts of concerns in a comprehensive manner here but I can give 
two very brief responses that may alleviate some worries or, at the very least, make 
known where I stand with respect to this rather dark view of the power of government to 
deny individuals self-knowledge and freedom in late-modernity. First, it is surely true 
that governance occurred on a much smaller scale in antiquity and technology had not yet 
made intelligible „the population‟ as we know it today; yet polities have always been in 
the business of habituating the citizenry and normalizing bodies, and this was just as true 
in ancient Greece as it is today. Indeed, for Plato and Aristotle statecraft was very much 
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about how to successfully go about cultivating certain kinds of dispositions, forms of 
thought, perceptual capacities, bodily habits in citizens. So although technology, 
urbanization, and the transition from a feudal existence to a capitalist economy may 
better facilitate the ability of governments to “act on” populations, it is surely the case 
that governments have always done so. It strikes me that, even in large-scale 
representative democracies where the rule of the people by the people exists in a very 
attenuated sense only, a democratic polity, imperfect though our own may be, is surely 
the best guard against the sort of ignorance and subordination about which so many post-
modernists fret. I will say more about this in the conclusion, but for now let me simply 
say that democracy holds within it very valuable resources for the radical re-constitution 
of the very political structures and institutions that fashion citizens‟ character and 
embodied habits.  
 Further, it is unclear whether or not “biopolitics” is always synonymous with the 
technologies of domination that we observe at work through governmentality. (It‟s 
unclear, too, how we can so easily observe these technologies if we are, as Foucault 
suggests, so ignorant of the grasp they have on us from the inside out.) The above 
formulation leads one to believe that biopower is only a force for evil in the world, but 
others, many of whom ground their arguments in Nietzsche, locate great potential in an 
ethos firmly rooted in the human experience of bios.
268
 And John Tambornino, writing on 
what he calls “the corporeal turn” in 21st century political thought suggests that we 
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rethink our relationship to the “regulation” and “domination” of bodies in late-modern 
political life:  
[A]ttention to embodiment might be ongoing (which is not to say all-consuming), 
not promising a final solution but still of value, and its neglect costly. We might 
attend to our embodiment, seeking practices of reflection that give prominence to 
it and ethical sensibilities and social arrangements that better express it. We might 
acknowledge that governing embodied subjects involves discipline and 
normalization yet seek ways in which this can be more thoughtful, careful, 
acceptable.”269 
 
Although I cannot launch a full-scale investigation or critique of recent interpretations of 
Foucauldian biopower here, I can say that I find Tambornino‟s approach to governing 
embodied subjects much more helpful, certainly more politically interesting, than those 
who would deny the possibility of more thoughtfully “regulating bodies” precisely 
because it holds out the possibility of positive political transformation while at the same 
time maintaining a critical perspective on harmful disciplinary bodily practices.  
Part Two: Caring for Oneself, Caring for Others 
 
My suggestions thus far have focused on how a collective of democratic citizens 
can reconstitute the value of care, transforming political institutions and policies to create 
more opportunities for citizens to care without penalty and to do “work” that is valued 
not just because it is necessary but because it is honorable. Changing public policy is only 
one important mode by which political culture is transformed. I would now like to shift 
the focus to a different kind of political work—the work of self-fashioning—that 
individuals can take up as a way to cultivate more and better practices of care in their 
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everyday lives. Staying close to this notion of embodied care that I have developed, we 
will follow Foucault in calling this second mode care of the self (epimeleia heautou).
270
 
In his later work Foucault turned away from an earlier focus on disciplining 
bodies and technologies of power to what he referred to as technologies of the self, self-
writing, and, finally, care of the self. Foucault returns to his philosophical roots toward 
the end of his life by with a deep investigation into the ancient Greek and Roman 
practices of askesis, translated as the practice and training involved in the art of living, 
techne tou biou.
271
 His use of this word, askesis, is in stark contrast to the Christian 
ascetic life, which is marked by self-denial and detachment from material life. Foucault 
speaks of askesis, “not in the sense of a morality of renunciation but as an exercise of the 
self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a 
certain mode of being.”272 In her book, Self-Transformations, Heyes writes that Foucault 
returns to ancient philosophy “to find ways of living that, although inevitably implicated 
in disciplinary practices, cultivate a broader repertoire of human possibilities instead of 
increasing docility.”273 He has in mind a range of activities that constitute care of the self, 
including physical exercises, listening practices, journaling, meditation, and even dietetic 
practices, though it is unclear where his descriptions of ancient self care end and his 
prescriptions for a practice of self care in contemporary life begin, if at all. But I do think 
that Foucault‟s later interviews, in which he certainly seems to advocate self-care in a 
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general sense, point to at least a cautious endorsement. Further, I agree with Heyes that in 
his later books Foucault clearly sets himself the ethical task of showing us how we might 
go about developing an art of living.
274
 In other words, an ethical practice that, in contrast 
to the juridical morality that constitutes Christianity, is nonnormalizing and not the 
product of codified law or morality. I read Volumes II and III of History of Sexuality and 
his later essays and interviews as an urging of the recovery of ancient technologies of the 
self and ethical subjectivation that both reflects and brings about an ethos of freedom.
275
 
The details of this ethic are somewhat fuzzy, not only because Foucault died 
before he could fully develop a picture of the form self care for a modern subject might 
take, but also because, one suspects, Foucault wanted to avoid making the (normalizing) 
move to prescribing in too much detail how individuals should conduct themselves. 
There are, however, a few conditions features of care of the self that we can identify and 
that, I believe, point in the direction of more specific practices that open up the possibility 
of care for others and of living more freely. The first thing to be said is that self-care has 
a kind of grounding quality to it. In other words, it is a practice that proceeds, 
ontologically and ethically, the relationships that one develops with others. I recognize 
the peculiarity of ending with this mode of ethics, since Foucault believed that self-care, 
which he called “ethics” and “which determines how the individual is supposed to 
constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions,” should come first: “Care for 
others should not be put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is ethically prior 
in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior.”276 In order to cultivate the sort 
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of relationships we want to have with others, we must first (and continually) cultivate an 
honest and steady relationship with ourselves, one in which we equip ourselves with 
“knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both 
truths and prescriptions.”277 What could Foucault mean here by “truth”?  Not divine or 
even natural truths, but rather something like the story we will tell ourselves about the 
values we wish to uphold and enact. He goes on: “To take care of the self is to equip 
oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth.”278 
In any political culture, there are four aspects to moral and ethical life.
279
 These 
aspects take the form of questions: 1) What is the aspect or the part of myself or my 
behavior which is concerned with moral conduct? Foucault suggests that though for Kant 
intention was important and for Christians desire is most relevant, but for us it is feelings. 
Whatever it is that determines moral conduct is called “ethical substance.” 2) What is the 
way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations? It could 
be through divine law, a strict gender code, rational rule, and so on. This mode of 
subjectivation (mode d’assujettissement), whatever it is in a particular place and time, is 
the second aspect of ethics. 3)What are the means by which we can change our ourselves 
in order to become ethical subjects? This is called the “self-forming activity” 
(l’ascétisme) by Foucault and it has to do with how we will choose to “moderate our acts, 
or to decipher what we are, or to eradicate our desires,” and how we can use the desires 
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we deem healthy to achieve certain aims.
280
 4) Which is the kind of being to which we 
aspire when we behave in a moral way? This is called the telos (télélogie). For Foucault, 
“in what we call morals, there is the effective behavior of people, there are the codes, and 
there is the kind of relationship to oneself,” which includes these four aspects.   
Foucault, of course, was particularly drawn to the problematic of ethics in the 
Greco-Roman and Hellenistic culture wherein care of one‟s self (epimeleia heautou) was 
the model and responsibility of good citizens. In contrast to what he calls the self-
absorbed “California cult of the self,” Greek care of one‟s self “does not mean simply 
being interested in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment 
or self-fascination…it describes a sort of work, an activity; it implies attention, 
knowledge, and technique,” which, in Greek culture anyway, is put in the service of 
achieving excellence. Foucault‟s answer to the question of why anyone would choose to 
impose this lifestyle upon oneself is illuminating: 
In antiquity, this work on the self with its attendant austerity is not imposed on the 
individual by means of civil law or religious obedience, but is a choice about 
existence made by the individual. People decide for themselves whether or not to 
care for themselves. 
 I don‟t think it is to attain eternal life after death, because they were not 
particularly concerned with that. Rather, they acted so as to give to their life 
certain values (reproduce certain examples, leave behind them an exalted 
reputation, give the maximum possible brilliance to their lives.) It was a question 
of making one‟s life into an object for a sort of knowledge, for a tekhne—for an 
art.
281
 
  
What seems important to note in the above passage, besides the fact that this is a self 
imposed practice and largely dislocated from any “civil law,” at least according to 
Foucault, a point which we will return to shortly, is that care of the self is a critical, self-
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conscious mode of giving to one‟s life certain desired values, not merely for the sake of 
some other end, like eternal life or social status, but rather for the sake of enriching one‟s 
life with the “maximum possible brilliance.” This strikes me as instructive for our 
thinking about engendering an ethic of care because it encourages serious reflection on 
why we choose particular values and how we should go about enacting them. If the sort 
of being we wish to embody when we behave well is one who cares for others in the most 
attentive and fully embodied way, then Foucault‟s model for ethical self-governance, and 
the sort of disposition it cultivates, may prove very useful.  
Recall that embodied care is a prohairetic activity, which cannot be achieved 
without self-knowledge, deliberative and choice-making capacities, and, at least early on, 
the guidance from others who can serve as a model for acting well.
282
 Central to 
Foucault‟s understanding of care of the self, though, is not so much a “knowing” subject, 
but rather a “doing” subject, or at least this is what some have argued. I think it‟s more 
correct to say that, at least in late-Foucault, one comes to “know oneself” through 
processes of self-constitution and fashioning. The expressive and self-governing subject, 
as Nancy Luxon has recently argued, maintains a stance of both curiosity “towards one‟s 
suddenly unfamiliar experience,” and a resolve “to extend this curiosity in to an 
understanding of different potential responses and their entailments.”283 Focusing 
primarily on the centrality of parrhesia (fearless speech) to ethical self-governance and 
care of the self, Luxon further argues that “a disposition to steadiness” is also important 
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for self-care and care of others. As we navigate our social and moral world, we tend to 
throw ourselves immediately back into the past or inject ourselves into the future, when 
what is most helpful is to remain thoughtfully in the present so that we properly assess 
what is actually before us and what is the set of actual plausible responses. She explains:  
As individuals improve their ability to manipulate their curiosity, they learn to 
forestall immediate reactions and instead to maintain a steady attitude towards 
themselves, to attend to changes and reactions, and to sift through a raft of 
information—some sensory, some analytic—before drawing a conclusion. 
Individuals must try to navigate the two extremes of unblinking fixity and 
mindless distraction…Instead of seeking the “truth” about oneself, individuals 
instead develop those dispositional qualities that allow them to maintain a 
steadiness of orientation to their chosen ideals. Techniques in moderation enable 
individuals to control the pace with which they turn over, consider, and digest the 
experience encountered through their daily regime.
284
 
 
On Luxon‟s reading, then, Foucault views the practices that attend care of the self and 
parrhesia as contributing to the cultivation of a particular kind of stance towards the 
world and a set of skills that aids in sorting through relevant features of difficult 
situations and, at the same time, consciously process their own response to such 
situations. The idea is not that a uniform personality or set of actions is appropriate for 
all, but rather that all subjects, as far as is possible, strive to bring their deeds into 
harmony with their words and their aims.
285
 Relationships of care, fraught as they are 
with the unpredictable and with a great deal of conflict, demand of caregivers, again, not 
a “calm and serene” personality, but rather this Foucauldian “disposition to steadiness,” 
this striving for ethical self-governance and accountability. 
 This brings us to the aspects of care of the self that have to do with others. If this 
work on the self is to prove fruitful for embodied care, it must bear some important 
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relationship to our relations with others. Foucault‟s conception of ethics differs greatly 
from the conventional conception of ethics, which has to do with the moral principles that 
regulate a collective group‟s behavior and interactions. For Foucault, however, ethics is 
“the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection,” and Foucault 
believes it is best achieved through the practice of caring for the self.
286
 This is ethical 
because it is the mode by which we achieve freedom and not because it is constitutive of 
shared norms and regulations: 
What makes it [care of the self] ethical for the Greek is not that it is care for 
others. The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships 
with others insofar as this ethos of freedom is also a way of caring for others. This 
is why it is important for a free man who conducts himself as he should to be able 
to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of governing. 
Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the self enables 
one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal 
relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend. And the care of the self also 
implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires 
listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, 
someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, the problem of relationships with 
others is present throughout the development of the care of the self...in the case of 
a free man, I think the postulate of this whole morality was that a person who took 
proper are of himself would, by the same token, be able to conduct himself 
properly in relation to and for others.
287
  
 
For Foucault, the care of the self, in thinking of itself, necessarily thinks of others; more 
precisely, the free person who takes care of herself to the point of knowing exactly how 
she will choose to act in relation to herself, others, and the natural world, in order to 
achieve excellence in all things will find that she also enjoys a proper relationship with 
those who are under her care.
288
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 At times, the practice of self care seems completely self-guided, almost solipsistic 
in character. It is certainly self chosen by free individuals and Foucault says that it does 
not follow from any civil or divine law but rather is the work of the individual. But the 
above passage clearly points to the need to be educated in practices of caring for the self 
by another who is properly caring for her or his own soul. It suggests the need for 
truthfulness, both about the parts of a person that are obscured from that person and about 
the world in general. We need help in ridding ourselves of self delusions and those of the 
grander sort too. This has some resonance with some of what Aristotle says in his 
discussion of how individuals learn to be virtuous and to practice virtue.
289
 He is clear 
that we need someone who can serve as a model for us as we work to come fully into our 
capacities for self-knowledge, deliberation, action, and judgment (NE 1103a1-4). We 
need at least some one else to discipline us, by teaching us how we can discipline 
ourselves. 
 There is a range of useful activities that those who practice care of the self might 
take up. Foucault highlights different techniques depending on whether he is talking 
about the Socratics, the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Pythagoreans, and so forth. A few 
techniques that seem constant throughout are self-writing, which is something not quite 
akin to journaling about one‟s thoughts and experiences or even recording them but is 
more writing oneself into existence—quite literally, a self-constituting exercise, 
meditation, dietetic regimens, practicing consciousness of one‟s actions, listening well to 
others, reflection on one‟s relationships and how to best care for others, and, in general, 
cultivating a kind of mindfulness around one‟s own limitations and potentiality. All of 
these, it seems to me, have the potential to cultivate the sort of disposition and habits we 
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think most appropriate to someone who is practicing embodied care. Yet, as is made quite 
clear by Foucault‟s discussions of Christianity, the relationship to oneself that one is 
likely to develop has much to do with the wider values circulating in society and with 
norms around how one can successfully transform oneself into an ethical being. This fact, 
in many ways, seems to slip from Foucault‟s grasp when he writes about care for the self 
in modernity. So committed is he, it seems to me, to the view that care for the self must 
be practiced independently of societal norms, values, and regulations (which, to his mind, 
are necessarily disciplining and normalizing), that he cannot give an account of the social 
and political conditions that would be required to support something like a politics of 
ourselves in the first place, and the sort of ethical and aesthetic self-fashioning he is after. 
What would a political culture look like that supported and encouraged care for 
the self? We might start by imagining a society far less schizophrenic than the one in 
which we currently live, one which values sustained concentration, thoughtfulness, self-
reflection, steadiness, and even solitude over and above multi-tasking, theatricality, 
stream-of-consciousness self-reporting via various social media, and consumerism. 
Today, individuals in much of the (notably free) Western world are disciplined to become 
little more than consumers of the latest technology, technology which encourages the 
public narrating of the most mundane minutia of one‟s life while at the same time 
creating the very conditions that make genuine reflection on one‟s self and the 
“determination of what one can and cannot do with one‟s freedom” virtually 
impossible.
290
 Caring for oneself requires a political culture that values the exploration of 
one‟s own freedom (and unfreedom) and thoughtful reflection on it, where freedom is not 
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simply understood as the right to do this or that, but rather as a self-forming activity by 
which we constitute and/or reconstitute ourselves into ethical subjects. 
I wish to echo Cressida Heyes and suggest that what we are after in a 
contemporary mode of self care are somoaesthetic practices that strive to better integrate 
the body and mind.
291
 Such practices, if what we first need is to care for ourselves, should 
be self directed and focused, but the idea is that they can “convert power,” to use 
Foucault‟s phrase, and greatly alter our relationship with others, in particular, the others 
for whom we intend to care.
292
 Interestingly, Heyes cites yoga as one possible mechanism 
by which we can “structure and mobilize” defenses against normalization and docility.293 
It seems to me that yoga, silent meditation, and kirtan, which is a form of call and 
response devotional chanting, are all potential resources for cultivating a disposition to 
steadiness, active listening skills, being fully present, and the capacity for making fine 
distinctions and judgments in complex situations. I want to leave open the possibility for 
now that there are many activities and practices that might develop the character and 
qualities aimed at through care of the self. In other words, since I am not advocating one 
distinct “caregiving personality” I think it‟s also important to not limit the practices that 
might help us to be better caregivers to yoga, meditation, and journaling, since its 
reasonable to imagine that, given the range of personality types that do exist among 
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caregivers, such techniques may not work for evryone. With all of that said, though, I do 
think self-writing, exercises in thoughtful concentration, and exposure to a range of 
representations that offer reflections on what it means for a human being to properly care 
for her self, to aspire to self-governance and freedom strike me as especially fertile 
resources for creative self-transformation in the direction of a caring subjectivity. Indeed, 
Aristotle believed that similar experiences would cultivate and strengthen forms of 
awareness that he thought incredibly value for the development of ethical individuals and 
for ethical communities.  I would go further and say that these practices, when 
undertaken in the right way, with the proper guidance, and with the right sort of intention 
and awareness, are absolutely critical for fashioning ourselves into more caring human 
beings.  
 
III. THE MORAL VOCABULARY OF CARE 
 
In Citizenship and the Ethics of Care, Selma Sevenhuijsen suggests that public 
debates around care are actually a series of language games that often have unjust and 
undemocratic outcomes for caregivers and receivers of care.
294
 We adopt language that 
engenders resentment about caregiving, misperceptions about women‟s “natural” 
capacity to care, the false belief that some of us require very little care to live well, and 
animosity towards adults who are dependent upon a great deal of care in order to flourish. 
She argues that we (theorists and citizens) must adopt a politics directed towards the 
revision of our moral vocabulary such that it corresponds to a feminist ethic of care; this, 
she believes, will lead to new moral subjectivities that will in turn lead to better choices. 
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Those choices, argues Sevenhuijsen, will produce more just and equitable caregiving 
arrangements, especially where gender is concerned.  
Though my overall approach to thinking about care is quite different than 
Sevenhuijsen‟s, I have set out to answer her call in this chapter, and to think through the 
political conditions that might support and issue from a different moral vocabulary and 
ethic around care. When our moral vocabulary of care is limited to words like 
“responsibility,” “duty,” “obligation,” “labor,” “exploitation,” and even “right,” then we 
are limiting our own imaginative possibilities to policies and arrangements that are likely 
to fail to produce the kind of sustained and deep commitment to care that every healthy 
society requires. If we can begin to rethink caregiving as an moral achievement to be 
widely valued—a kind of work that is not its own reward but is rather one way we come 
more fully into our humanity—and one that reflects human excellence, then, following 
Aristotle, we can begin to think much more seriously about the political conditions that 
could produce and support communities of caregivers. That is the conversation I hope to 
have opened up here. What I did not set out to do in this chapter was to exhaust all 
possibilities for engendering a widespread ethic of embodied care. It has not been my aim 
to articulate a very detailed path forward, exhausting all relevant possibilities, but instead 
to abide by Aristotle‟s conception of how the science of politics proceeds, by sketching 
an outline of which activities constitute the best sort of life for humans and then inquiring 
into how we might set ourselves down the path of achieving that which is proper to 
human excellence. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
DEMOCRATIC CARE IN A POSTMODERN AGE 
  
“Immigrants cannot be programmed as robots 
can. You never know when they will do 
something spontaneous, ask an awkward 
question, or use the wrong honorific in 
conversation” (The Economist 2005). 
 
 
I. THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE? CARE-O-BOTS IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
 
Long before Roxxxy, the now famous “sex robot,” made her appearance in 
domestic and foreign markets as an alternative to “human companionship,” robotic 
caregivers, mostly in Japan and Germany, have been assisting families with their 
caregiving needs.
295
 With the growing interesting in robotic technology and major shifts 
in work/family life for people in the developed and developing world, as well as large 
aging populations in much of the world, the turn to robots as one possible answer to the 
crisis of care should perhaps not surprise us. Though political theorists have given this 
issue little attention, it has been the focus of some major debates in the artifical 
intelligence community.
296
 Machines such as the “assisted-care bath,” AIBO (the caring 
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companion robot), and the Care-o-bot can now do everything from bathe the elderly, 
keep an eye on small children, take vital signs, and assist the injured or ill in getting 
around.
297
 Many, including some feminist scholars, are touting such technologies as the 
wave of the future, the mechanism by which women can finally free themselves from the 
burden of care without the complications that ensue from hiring human caregivers, while 
others are alarmed by the potential risks to those receiving care from robots that such 
technology poses. Indeed, given the landscape of our modern, cosmopolitan lives, at a 
time when so many of us live very far away from aging parents, are members of dual-
earner households with children in need of care, and have multiple work and family 
responsibilities spread across vast distances, it‟s easy to see how some might believe that 
caregiving robots, which are admittedly quite advanced in their capacities for “learning” 
and responding to particular individuals‟ needs, are indeed the answer to the care crisis 
with which I began this project.  
It isn‟t so clear, though, how we ought to view this recent trend in caregiving, 
especially if we both want to cultivate alternative life projects for women and minorities 
who currently do the work of care but also believe that caregiving is central to our own 
development as human beings. From a Marxian perspective, we might see the use of 
caregiver-robots as a necessary and indispensable step in freeing women from the unjust 
burdens of carework, thus giving them more time and energy to pursue other life-plans 
and opening up the possibility for the creation of more equitable care arrangements in the 
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household.
298
 As we have discussed, one societal response to the desire and need for 
women to work outside of the home has been the hiring of domestic servants to provide 
homecare for children and the elderly. But as Tronto and others have demonstrated, there 
are often serious costs, especially to the caregiver, in these arrangements.
299
 Given the 
fact that dependency and dependency labor, as things stand now, greatly impact our 
status as equal citizens and often limit our full participation in civic life, robots, it might 
seem, are the perfect solution. If we can find a way to outsource the very labor that has 
for so long been associated with women‟s inequality and unfreedom without contributing 
to the inequality of others, then we are on the right path, many believe. Not only does the 
mechanization of care labor have some positive benefits both for the one receiving care 
and for caregiving service providers who employ them (such as, the lengthening of time 
that an elderly person can remain in her home to live independently and less time spent 
on some of the more repetitive and physically challenging aspects of home care)
300
; it is 
also perhaps one way to avoid some of the most troubling “global” aspects of care in 
modern life, like the exploitation of immigrant workers and the production and 
exportation of a caregiving underclass, as discussed in Chapter Three. And, indeed, “the 
value expressed by the mechanization of caretaking tends to be that of caring for citizens‟ 
bodies,” which, though Parks is quite critical of this because she, perhaps rightly, does 
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not see this accompanied by the kind of deep moral care that Tronto has in mind when 
she talks about care for versus caring about, I still take to be a very important aspect of 
caregiving. 
Yet there are good reasons to believe that robots, though perfectly capable of 
skillfully performing a great many caregiving tasks and even of providing some 
companionship to a population that is often very isolated and cut off from the rest of the 
world, are not entirely up to the task of caregiving in a more meaningful way. Indeed, as I 
have argued, caring for the bodies of others requires more than mere technical skill, but 
rather demands the use of perceptual capacities, cognitive judgments, and forms of 
attention that cannot, or at least have not yet, been achieved in robotic science. As Parks 
and Robert and Linda Sparrow have argued, the social and emotional needs of those 
receiving care, needs which are also fundamentally corporeal, cannot be adequately met 
in the caregiving relationship with a robot. Sparrow and Sparrow acknowledge that the 
reduced costs of robotic care as compared with human care risks an ever lessening of 
human contact for the elderly:  
Given the economic pressures…it is likely that success in introducing robots in 
the aged-care sector will be at the expense of the amount of human engagement 
available to frail aged persons. We have highlighted the importance of social 
contact and both verbal and non-verbal communication to the welfare of older 
people. Any reduction of what is often already minimal human contact would, in 
our view, be indefensible.
301
    
 
Agreeing with Sparrow and Sparrow, Parks acknowledges that though there will surely 
be cultural differences that become relevant as we judge which solutions for the care 
crisis are best, we must uphold and protect citizens‟ capacity for affiliation, as defined by 
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Martha Nussbaum in her capabilities approach.
302
 To the extent that mechanized care 
denies citizens the possibility of an “authentic give-and-take between robot and human, 
then it poses a grave political danger and the state thus has a responsibility to provide 
human care workers without exploiting these workers.
303
 Such arguments, though 
certainly compelling, emphasize the costs to the one receiving care and ignore the costs 
of mechanized care to the would-be human caregiver and, by assuming that capability, 
not functioning, is all that we need to secure, do not provide a vivid enough account of all 
that is lost when care is outsourced to robots rather than performed by human beings and, 
specifically, by members of the demos. 
  
II. CARE AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP  
 
 Throughout this project, I have intentionally bracketed the distinction between 
non-professional/intimate caregiving and professional/non-intimate caregiving.
304
 I have 
done so because I have been primarily interested in developing a concept of care that 
might well map onto certain professions, but is also deeply relevant to the daily lives of 
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 Professionalized care may take place within the context of market relations or, as is 
increasingly common, domestic service. The latter is far less regulated and, according to Tronto 
(2002, far more exploitative and “inherently unjust” than the former. I argue, however, that both 
are problematic in so far as they too often provide us with a way of “opting out” of taking up 
practices of care ourselves.  
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all citizens. And it‟s this latter point that I have wished to stress. To put the point another 
way, embodied care is something all citizens ought to practice, regardless of whether or 
not they are paid to do so; care, then, must be an activity that is relatively equally shared 
and practiced by all. Certainly some people will choose caregiving as a profession, and 
this is not only fine but also desirable given the overwhelming caregiving needs of just 
this country. But in this work I have been more interested in addressing the political and 
social structures that might support non-professionalized caregiving practices. I want to 
close with some thoughts on the democratic potential and limitations of embodied care, 
as well as the potential of democratic politics to engender this ethic. 
One solution to the care crisis that is consistent with liberalism is to maintain a 
relatively sharp distinction between caregiving in the home and carework in the labor 
market; in both we understand caregiving relationships and arrangements as the product 
of individuals‟ choices. These are simply two different realms wherein people can choose 
and sort out for themselves whether and how they will take up the activity of care. This 
view privileges the autonomy of individuals and families more than the potential good 
that might come to them if they were to adopt better arrangements. Although we will 
always have to make choices about how to meet our caregiving needs and we will likely 
always need to rely on a certain amount of “privatized” care, we should begin with this 
premise: All citizens of able body and mind should to be habituated to practicing 
caregiving and provided with adequate support and a range of opportunities to give care 
so that they may lead excellent lives. 
When addressing the issue of how to politically support an ethic of care, scholars 
have tended to focus more on the transformation of policies and institutions than on the 
 231 
transformation of citizens‟ cognitive and embodied habits of care. The assumption behind 
these policies is that institutional changes that expand individuals‟ choices will lead to 
citizens making better choices that more evenly distribute the work of care. Once pay 
parity has been achieved in the workplace and we implement adequate family leave 
policies, women will no longer be the “obvious choice” to do the work of care; both men 
and women will do this work equally and all will choose to meet caregiving 
responsibilities if given the chance to do so. What ties together—loosely, to be sure—
many care theorists across a range of disciplines and viewpoints is that they all advance 
arguments in favor of policy measures aimed at the improvement of caregiving 
arrangements in the family; they seek to establish a better balance between work and 
family responsibilities for all citizens. Many of these conversations have tended to 
circulate around the question of care‟s relationship to justice, and if we think care is 
politically valuable it is often thought to be so either because justice demands that we 
take care seriously or because care, not justice, is the primary political value for 
democratic societies.
305
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 Do the demands of justice and the demands of care inherently conflict, as implied in the work 
of Carol Gilligan and more robustly developed by Nel Noddings? Should care, then, be 
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character of care by revealing both the potential of the work of politics to make possible the 
activity of care so that we might flourish and the various ways in which political power 
problematically fashions our embodied habits with respect to caregiving. 
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My way of thinking about the political nature of care is a bit different than others 
who have approached the subject of care‟s political value by either construing care as an 
alternative to justice or integrating the two. Care is political not only because it a good 
that we must determine how to best generate and distribute to the public and because it 
provides a set of useful principles that can help us to better arrange our institutions and 
policies. As made clear in Chapters Two and Three, care‟s relevance to politics also has 
very much to do with the fact that practices of care both help us to come into our deepest 
nature as human beings and they reflect what it means to live an excellent human life. So 
while I think that questions of justice and care are important, I do not think they give us a 
rich enough framework for  
It might be helpful, though, to clarify my own position on some of the more 
familiar questions concerning care‟s relationship to politics and to democratic citizenship, 
specifically. First, I want to endorse the view that care is an ethic and practice that is not 
only perfectly compatible with justice, conceptually and practically but, even more than 
this, care and justice are dependent upon one another if they are to live up to their own 
respective ideals. In other words, justice is not justice at all if it fails to adopt a care 
perspective, that is, if it does not adequately take into account the relevant particulars, 
experiences, narratives, and histories of individuals. Likewise, a caring relationship is no 
longer one if it collapses into forms of domination or exploitation. In general, I find the 
question of whether or not care is best grounded in an Aristotelian particularistic 
metaethic or a Kantian universalistic metaethic unhelpful for furthering our thinking 
about how care might best be integrated into politics. Not only did Aristotle‟s own 
conception of justice, strange though it may be, urge a balance between general principles 
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and particular facts at hand, but recently scholars of Kant have brought our attention back 
to the fact that the cultivation of the emotions and friendships are actually central to 
Kantian duty and morality.
306
 In any case, precisely because care is so central to the 
health of any polity and because it most often entails inequality, hierarchy, and power, 
norms of justice must figure into our thinking about care.
307
  
Second, practices and relationships of care that are in some way shaped by norms 
of justice are central to the practice of democratic citizenship.
308
 Tronto was the first to 
highlight the stark boundaries that separate care from politics, and the theoretical and 
practical problems that have contributed to the hardening of these rigid boundaries. This 
arrangement, according to Tronto, rests on the faulty logic that care is a moral sentiment 
and activity properly located in the private realm where it is not subject to collective 
judgment or to principles of justice. In other words, the boundary between care and 
politics is greatly supported by the boundary between public and private life.
309
 Indeed, 
philosophers as diverse as Augustine, Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Hannah Arendt, John 
Rawls and contemporary feminist theorist Susan Moller Okin have all sought to draw or 
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preserve important boundaries between the public and the private, morality and politics, 
intimacy and public life.
310
 Care theorist Peta Bowden discusses conventional views on 
the relationship between civic life and care: 
In contrast with the kinds of intimacy and particularity that are characteristic of 
maternal, friendly or nursing care, citizen relations conventionally call up norms 
of conduct that emphasize the impersonal, the interchangeable and the impartial. 
The contexts of attachment, responsivity and flexibility…are frequently 
suppressed by requirements for order, decisiveness and consistency. Or in more 
specifically moral terms, citizenship allegedly signals the replacement of care 
with justice, commitment with duty, and the priority of rights over goods. From 
this perspective the connection between citizenship and interpersonal caring 
relations which is the focus of this chapter suggests movement into an alien 
domain, from the established ground of the investigation.
311
 
 
Yet Bowden suggests that these beliefs are based on false perceptions about distinctions 
between civic activity and practices of care. Theorists of care must better demonstrate 
how and why care is, in fact, a civic activity and help to bring about conceptual habits 
that allow us to see relations among citizens, at least sometimes, in terms of practices of 
care. I am not suggesting that we care as much and in the same way for stranger-citizens 
as we do for family and friends, but rather that our relationships with our fellow citizens, 
even those who are strangers or strange to us, are greatly shaped by the extent to which 
we have had the conceptual and embodied habits of care cultivated in us from an early 
age on. Allow me to briefly expand on what I think Bowden means when she talks about 
the caring dimensions of citizenship.  
Feminists have long argued that private and public life are necessarily 
interdependent, even if we think the latter is naturally coextensive with “politics” in a 
way the former is not; though most feminists reject the view that the household is nothing 
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more than a realm of necessity that makes political and social life possible. Even in 
ancient Greece, with its deeply divided public and private realms, the work of the 
household (oikos) and the work of the polis were interrelated. Not only was the public 
realm materially “parasitic” on the reproductive and productive labor that went on in the 
family, but, as many care theorists have pointed out, persons who embody the norms of 
whatever political society they live in must be nurtured and molded through the work of 
care; in other words, even the autonomous, rational, self-sufficient subject of modern 
liberal societies is only so to the extent that she has been cared for in such a way as to 
give form and shape to those qualities. Further, an entire range of civic practices that we 
tend to think of as “impersonal” and “formal,” such as public contracts based on trust, the 
granting of rights and responsibilities, legal jurisprudence, and educational methods, 
actually rely quite a bit on caring values.
312
 Though it is true, as Mary Dietz nicely points 
out in her criticism of maternalist politics, that liberal democratic civic relations are 
distinct from familial relations, in part, because they are (theoretically) characterized by 
equality rather than hierarchy, it is still the case that we need an active moral imagination, 
or as Hamington has recast it, caring imagination, that draws on our own life experiences 
of caring and being cared for by others in order to exercise judgment about the common 
good.
313
  
The capacity for fine discernment necessary for making judgments about better 
and worse family/work policies requires not Habermasian ideal speech situations but 
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rather the capacity for active listening to specific others, the ability to draw on one‟s own 
embodied knowledge regarding the sort of care individuals need to thrive, as well as the 
willingness to set aside one‟s own interests in order to tend to those of others. One‟s 
ability to make such careful judgments is strengthened by knowledge of the dependency 
and caregiving needs of one‟s fellow citizens—knowledge that is greatly enriched by 
practicing care. Indeed, as Julie White has pointed out, many governmental programs that 
are needs based, such as welfare, crisis-relief, and educational programs, must take up 
practices of care to determine citizens‟ needs in a more democratic rather than 
paternalistic way.
314
  
Third, as we saw in the previous chapter, analyzing constellations of care reveals 
radical inequalities and power asymmetries that permeate society. This is important 
political work for democrats who value equality and justice.
315
 By examining who 
currently performs the bodily work of care, who is likely to be the beneficiaries of the 
current system, and who is disadvantaged, forms of economic inequality and bodily 
exploitation are revealed. Once we do this work, we can begin to reconstruct caregiving 
arrangements in a way that benefits all and exploits none.  
I have joined those who have said that care is deeply bound up with justice, that 
democratic citizenship, by its very nature, offers us many valuable opportunities for care, 
and that practices of care help us to become better democratic citizens. This is true 
because, when practiced in the right way, caregiving cultivates in us certain embodied 
forms of awareness, empathic responses, and capacities for the sort of fine discernment 
that is necessary for good judgment about how we will rule others and ourselves in turn. 
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Yet, it is equally true that dependents and caregivers will never stand in an equal and free, 
that is, a fully democratic, relationship to one another and because of this the question of 
how “democratic” actual caregiving relationships can be remains a vexing one. Tronto 
has argued that all caregiving relationships and communities should have a “democratic 
disposition,” by which she means that paternalistic/maternalistic tendencies should be 
avoided and the needs of the receiver of care should be the main determinant of the 
course of action taken by the caregiver(s) and the wider community. Tronto‟s worry is 
that when we allow care to be a totally comprehensive moral view, thus ignoring the 
political conflicts that arise within and around care, we risk exploitation, domination, and 
the containment of carework within certain social groups at the margins of society. I 
share these worries and want to echo Julie White‟s call for democratic processes that help 
wider caring communities, including the state, determine and better meet the needs of 
both receivers and givers of care. 
There are obvious limitations, however, concerning the extent to which we can 
“democratize” caring relationships and communities. Indeed, at a certain point, we must 
face the fact that, in many cases, care requires that we speak and act in the name of those 
who are unable to do so themselves. This need not devolve into authoritarian, abusive, or 
paternalistic patterns, however, but it will surely take a lot of work to ensure that it does 
not. In addition to political structures and policies that aim to care well for dependents 
and caregivers, one important guard against the misuse of power over those for whom we 
care, is the proper care of ourselves, which, as we see in Foucault, is a way of enacting 
our own freedom. Self-governance is a key component of governing and caring for 
others, which is part of the work of democracy. For the Greeks, being free meant not 
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being a slave to someone else, but it also meant not being a slave to one‟s own passions 
and appetites, including the misuse of power. Self-governance was integral to the rule 
(arche) of others and it signified one‟s freedom. Foucault returns to the Greeks to remind 
us that self-care is required for a certain kind of freedom, one that is attached to particular 
sorts of values: 
A person‟s ethos was evident in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the calm with 
which he responded to every event, and so on. For the Greeks, this was the 
concrete form of freedom…A man possessed of a splendid ethos, who could be 
admired and put forward as an example, was someone who practiced freedom in a 
certain way. I don‟t think a shift is needed for freedom to be conceived as 
ethos…but extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of 
freedom to take shape in an ethos that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, 
memorable, and exemplary.
316
 
 
In other words, freedom is deeply related to the way in which we conduct ourselves and 
the relationship we have with others (including those over whom we necessarily exercise 
power by virtue of the fact that they are in our care) depends a great deal on having the 
proper relationship to ourselves. If caregiving is central to human flourishing, as I hope to 
have shown, and if it is indeed an activity that we think “good, beautiful, honorable, 
estimable, memorable, and exemplary,” then we should take care of the self seriously. 
 But care of the self is not our only recourse to creating more caregiving subjects. 
The fundamentally non-equal character of caregiving relationships should not elide the 
democracy‟s unique potential to make those relationships more just and to transform 
ourselves into the sorts of subjects we wish to be. Some democrats will no doubt be 
troubled by my turn to early-Foucault‟s conceptions of normalization and “disciplinary 
power” as a way to talk about the structural support necessary for engendering a culture 
of care. Foucault was not incorrect in his analysis of the power of modern states to 
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discipline and fashion citizens‟ desires and habits, though he might have helped us to see 
more clearly how this might operate in better or worse forms across different types of 
polities. If we think that Tambornino is correct to say that governing embodied subjects 
always involves some form of “normalization” and “discipline” and that what political 
theorists and citizens must do is consider how we might more thoughtfully engage in 
these processes, then it is very possible that democratic rule provides the best political 
arrangements and institutions in which to collectively cultivate self-fashioning and self-
development in the direction of shared ideals.  Democracy is not just a mechanism 
by which we preserve or realize the right and interests of individuals and groups prior to 
political life.
317
 It is also a set of participatory practices involving deliberation, collective 
decision-making, and institution building, and it is in and through these practices that 
subjects are partially constituted.
318
 Though we can never free ourselves from discipline 
and norms, democracy offers us a chance to decide which limits we wish to set upon each 
other and ourselves, and which are the areas of human life that require fewer restrictions.  
Despite Aristotle‟s worries about the dangers of democracy, we know that 
democratic rule can greatly contribute to human development and, more importantly, has 
the potential to give people the ability to thoughtfully and creatively transform 
themselves into more excellent beings. This is the “self-transformative” view of 
democracy and it is most compatible with the ethic of care that I have developed here. 
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This view of democracy is, of course, complicated by the fact that any citizenry will 
inevitably contain multiple—possibly endless—beliefs about what counts as self-
development and what constitutes the good life. Many do not believe care to be central to 
human flourishing and, even if they think care is a valuable human activity, they may not 
believe that politics should be in the business of helping citizens to live excellent lives. 
Self-transformative democracy, or “expansive democratic theory” as it sometimes called, 
also entails the ideas that self-governance is not merely a private matter and that 
democracy is strengthened when we all participate in the deliberative processes whereby 
we collectively judge which actions, all things considered, best reflect our shared values 
and ends. This does not mean, of course, that all of our initial individual preferences hold 
the day in a democracy; indeed, we know they very often do not. But it does mean that 
democracy requires that we produce citizens who maintain an openness to having their 
own beliefs and desires re-calibrated in light of persuasive arguments and new 
information. In other words, democracy demands that we remain open to the revision of 
fundamental political institutions, which necessarily shape present and future citizens‟ 
habits and desires, if such revision can be shown to hold out the possibility of improving 
our shared moral life. It is this openness upon which the success of my project depends. I 
hope to have shown the reader all that we stand to gain by reimagining and reconstituting 
ourselves as beings for whom the practice of care is essential.  
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